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ABSTRACT ﾠ
 ﾠ Medical ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠan ﾠextraordinarily ﾠlarge ﾠand ﾠimportant ﾠcomponent ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
livery ﾠof ﾠhealthcare ﾠservices. ﾠThis ﾠPaper ﾠexamines ﾠthe ﾠmanner ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠintro-ﾭ‐‑
duced ﾠinto ﾠcommerce ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠways ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠlegal ﾠprivileges ﾠand ﾠencumbrances ﾠupon ﾠ
medical ﾠdevices ﾠaffect ﾠtheir ﾠdynamics ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠmarket. ﾠThe ﾠusual ﾠway ﾠof ﾠregulating ﾠintro-ﾭ‐‑
duction ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠproducts ﾠto ﾠpromote ﾠinnovation ﾠis ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠsystem. ﾠWith ﾠ
medical ﾠdevices, ﾠa ﾠcomplex ﾠregulatory ﾠframework ﾠalso ﾠgoverns ﾠtheir ﾠmarket ﾠintroduc-ﾭ‐‑
tion. ﾠ These ﾠ two ﾠ independent ﾠ bodies ﾠ of ﾠ law ﾠ are ﾠ occasionally ﾠ in ﾠ tension, ﾠ producing ﾠ a ﾠ
number ﾠof ﾠdistortions ﾠand ﾠunusual ﾠincentives ﾠfor ﾠmanufacturers ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices. ﾠ
This ﾠPaper ﾠaims ﾠto ﾠunderstand ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠregulatory ﾠcontext ﾠin ﾠdetail ﾠand ﾠto ﾠ
survey ﾠthese ﾠpressure ﾠpoints, ﾠwith ﾠan ﾠemphasis ﾠon ﾠhow ﾠthe ﾠinteraction ﾠbetween ﾠfood ﾠ
and ﾠdrug ﾠlaw ﾠand ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠrelates ﾠto ﾠinnovation ﾠpolicy. ﾠ
 ﾠ ﾠ
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 ﾠ ﾠ 1 ﾠ
I. ﾠINTRODUCTION ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠ medical ﾠ device ﾠ industry ﾠ is ﾠ tremendously ﾠ important ﾠ to ﾠ health ﾠ care ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ
United ﾠStates. ﾠA ﾠsteady ﾠstream ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠor ﾠimproved ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠutilizing ﾠnew ﾠtech-ﾭ‐‑
nological ﾠwizardry, ﾠis ﾠcrucial ﾠto ﾠmaintaining ﾠan ﾠup-ﾭ‐‑to-ﾭ‐‑date ﾠand ﾠstate-ﾭ‐‑of-ﾭ‐‑the-ﾭ‐‑art ﾠhealth ﾠ
care ﾠsystem. ﾠAnd ﾠyet ﾠpatients ﾠneed ﾠand ﾠdeserve ﾠassurances ﾠthat ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠsafe ﾠ
and ﾠeffectiveness. ﾠThe ﾠlegal ﾠstructures ﾠregulating ﾠthe ﾠintroduction ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠ
must ﾠstrike ﾠa ﾠcareful ﾠbalance ﾠbetween ﾠpromoting ﾠnew ﾠand ﾠbetter ﾠdevices, ﾠand ﾠensuring ﾠ
that ﾠdevices ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠare ﾠsafe ﾠand ﾠeffective. ﾠ
 ﾠ Medical ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠgenerally ﾠsubject ﾠto ﾠreview ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates ﾠFood ﾠand ﾠ
Drug ﾠAdministration ﾠ(“FDA”) ﾠbefore ﾠthey ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠmarketed. ﾠBrand ﾠnew ﾠcategories ﾠof ﾠ
devices, ﾠlike ﾠnew ﾠdrugs, ﾠmust ﾠreceive ﾠpremarket ﾠapproval ﾠ(“PMA”) ﾠfrom ﾠFDA ﾠbefore ﾠ
going ﾠto ﾠmarket, ﾠa ﾠdifficult ﾠand ﾠexpensive ﾠprocess ﾠrequiring ﾠclinical ﾠtrials. ﾠHowever, ﾠthe ﾠ
vast ﾠmajority ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠcleared ﾠinstead ﾠthrough ﾠa ﾠpremarket ﾠnotifica-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠprocess ﾠreferred ﾠto ﾠas ﾠ“510(k),” ﾠwhich ﾠmerely ﾠrequires ﾠa ﾠshowing ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
vice ﾠis ﾠ“substantially ﾠequivalent” ﾠin ﾠterms ﾠof ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠto ﾠan ﾠexisting, ﾠle-ﾭ‐‑
gally ﾠmarketed ﾠdevice. ﾠThe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠis ﾠrapid, ﾠinexpensive, ﾠand ﾠpopular ﾠamong ﾠ
device ﾠmanufacturers. ﾠ
 ﾠ Meanwhile, ﾠit ﾠis ﾠvery ﾠimportant ﾠfor ﾠinnovative ﾠnew ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠto ﾠreceive ﾠ
patent ﾠprotection ﾠin ﾠorder ﾠto ﾠenable ﾠrecovery ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠhigh ﾠcosts ﾠof ﾠupfront ﾠresearch ﾠand ﾠ
development. ﾠAs ﾠthe ﾠusual ﾠlegal ﾠmechanism ﾠfor ﾠpromoting ﾠinnovation, ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑ ﾠ 2 ﾠ
quires ﾠthat ﾠnew ﾠinventions ﾠbe ﾠ“novel” ﾠand ﾠ“non-ﾭ‐‑obvious” ﾠto ﾠmerit ﾠthe ﾠmonopoly ﾠrights ﾠ
that ﾠit ﾠconfers. ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ These ﾠtwo ﾠareas ﾠof ﾠlaw ﾠregulating ﾠthe ﾠintroduction ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠoccasional-ﾭ‐‑
ly ﾠmay ﾠcome ﾠinto ﾠtension ﾠand ﾠraise ﾠserious ﾠquestions ﾠabout ﾠthe ﾠprocess ﾠby ﾠwhich ﾠnew ﾠ
medical ﾠdevices ﾠcome ﾠto ﾠmarket. ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠmay ﾠa ﾠmanufacturer ﾠseek ﾠFDA ﾠclearance ﾠ
under ﾠthe ﾠguise ﾠof ﾠ“substantial ﾠequivalence” ﾠto ﾠan ﾠexisting ﾠproduct ﾠand ﾠyet ﾠclaim ﾠnovel-ﾭ‐‑
ty ﾠ in ﾠ a ﾠ patent ﾠ application? ﾠ Does ﾠ a ﾠ manufacturer ﾠ admit ﾠ infringement ﾠ when ﾠ claiming ﾠ
equivalence ﾠto ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠcovered ﾠby ﾠa ﾠpatent? ﾠHow ﾠis ﾠinnovation ﾠaffected ﾠoverall ﾠwhen ﾠ
the ﾠprocess ﾠfor ﾠbringing ﾠrecognizable ﾠdevices ﾠ(or ﾠimprovements ﾠupon ﾠthem) ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠ
is ﾠfast ﾠand ﾠstraightforward, ﾠbut ﾠbringing ﾠan ﾠunfamiliar ﾠdevice ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠis ﾠexpensive ﾠ
and ﾠcomplex? ﾠIs ﾠour ﾠlegal ﾠsystem ﾠin ﾠpractice ﾠstriking ﾠan ﾠoptimal ﾠbalance ﾠbetween ﾠpro-ﾭ‐‑
moting ﾠthe ﾠdevelopment ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠand ﾠyet ﾠensuring ﾠthe ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠof ﾠ
those ﾠthat ﾠreach ﾠthe ﾠmarket? ﾠ
The ﾠanalysis ﾠof ﾠthis ﾠPaper ﾠproceeds ﾠas ﾠfollows. ﾠPart ﾠII ﾠexplains ﾠthe ﾠregulatory ﾠen-ﾭ‐‑
vironment ﾠfor ﾠpremarket ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠreview ﾠin ﾠdetail, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠessential ﾠfor ﾠunder-ﾭ‐‑
standing ﾠhow ﾠit ﾠinteracts ﾠwith ﾠpatent ﾠlaw. ﾠPart ﾠIII ﾠprovides ﾠa ﾠbrief ﾠsurvey ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠmost ﾠ
important ﾠand ﾠrelevant ﾠaspects ﾠof ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠdoctrine ﾠand ﾠpolicy ﾠas ﾠapplied ﾠto ﾠmedical ﾠ
devices. ﾠPart ﾠIV ﾠthen ﾠexamines ﾠseveral ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠareas ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠfind ﾠthem-ﾭ‐‑
selves ﾠcaught ﾠin ﾠpossible ﾠconflict ﾠbetween ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠand ﾠfood ﾠand ﾠdrug ﾠlaw. ﾠThis ﾠPart ﾠ ﾠ 3 ﾠ
also ﾠoffers ﾠsome ﾠconsideration ﾠof ﾠhow ﾠthese ﾠpressure ﾠpoints ﾠmay ﾠadvance ﾠor ﾠretard ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
novation ﾠpolicy ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠimportant, ﾠcomplex, ﾠand ﾠdynamic ﾠfield. ﾠPart ﾠV ﾠconcludes. ﾠ
II. ﾠTHE ﾠFDA’S ﾠMEDICAL ﾠDEVICE ﾠREGULATORY ﾠFRAMEWORK ﾠ
 ﾠ As ﾠwith ﾠdrugs, ﾠFDA ﾠregulates ﾠthe ﾠintroduction, ﾠmanufacture, ﾠand ﾠuse ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠ
devices ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates. ﾠFor ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠdelineating ﾠthe ﾠscope ﾠof ﾠFDA’s ﾠmedical ﾠ
device ﾠoversight, ﾠthe ﾠFederal ﾠFood, ﾠDrug, ﾠand ﾠCosmetic ﾠAct ﾠ(“FDCA”) ﾠsupplies ﾠan ﾠex-ﾭ‐‑
tremely ﾠbroad ﾠdefinition. ﾠA ﾠ“medical ﾠdevice” ﾠis: ﾠ ﾠ
[A]n ﾠinstrument, ﾠapparatus, ﾠimplement, ﾠmachine, ﾠcontrivance, ﾠimplant, ﾠin ﾠvitro ﾠ
reagent, ﾠor ﾠother ﾠsimilar ﾠor ﾠrelated ﾠarticle, ﾠincluding ﾠa ﾠcomponent ﾠpart ﾠor ﾠacces-ﾭ‐‑
sory, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠintended ﾠfor ﾠuse ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠdiagnosis ﾠof ﾠdisease ﾠor ﾠother ﾠconditions, ﾠor ﾠ
in ﾠthe ﾠcure, ﾠmitigation, ﾠtreatment, ﾠor ﾠprevention ﾠof ﾠdisease ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠor ﾠintended ﾠto ﾠaffect ﾠ
the ﾠstructure ﾠor ﾠany ﾠfunction ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠbody ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠand ﾠwhich ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠachieve ﾠany ﾠof ﾠits ﾠ
primary ﾠ intended ﾠ purposes ﾠ through ﾠ chemical ﾠ action ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ and ﾠ which ﾠ is ﾠ not ﾠ de-ﾭ‐‑
pendent ﾠupon ﾠbeing ﾠmetabolized ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠachievement ﾠof ﾠany ﾠof ﾠits ﾠprimary ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
tended ﾠpurposes.1 ﾠ
 ﾠ This ﾠdefinition ﾠis ﾠbroad ﾠenough ﾠto ﾠencompass ﾠsuch ﾠsimple ﾠobjects ﾠas ﾠtongue ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
pressors, ﾠand ﾠapplies ﾠcounter-ﾭ‐‑intuitively ﾠto ﾠsuch ﾠarticles ﾠas ﾠgeneral-ﾭ‐‑purpose ﾠlab ﾠequip-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
1 ﾠFederal ﾠFood, ﾠDrug, ﾠand ﾠCosmetic ﾠAct ﾠ§ ﾠ201(h), ﾠ21 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ321(h) ﾠ(2010) ﾠ(emphasis ﾠadded). ﾠ ﾠ 4 ﾠ
ment, ﾠwhen ﾠused ﾠin ﾠa ﾠmanner ﾠwithin ﾠthe ﾠstatute’s ﾠdefinition.2 ﾠMedical ﾠdevices ﾠrange ﾠ
from ﾠthese ﾠsimple ﾠexamples ﾠto ﾠextremely ﾠadvanced ﾠdevices ﾠlike ﾠartificial ﾠhearts.3 ﾠ ﾠ
A. ﾠThe ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠAmendments ﾠof ﾠ1976 ﾠ
 ﾠ FDA ﾠis ﾠcharged ﾠwith ﾠoversight ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠbut ﾠuntil ﾠ1976, ﾠits ﾠregulatory ﾠ
authority ﾠwas ﾠlimited ﾠto ﾠpostmarket ﾠreview.4 ﾠCongress ﾠwas ﾠforced ﾠto ﾠrespond ﾠfollowing ﾠ
a ﾠseries ﾠof ﾠpublic ﾠdeaths ﾠand ﾠinfertility ﾠincidents ﾠcaused ﾠby ﾠintra-ﾭ‐‑uterine ﾠdevices.5 ﾠThe ﾠ
resulting ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠAmendments ﾠof ﾠ1976 ﾠ(“MDA”)6 ﾠcreated ﾠthe ﾠstructure ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
regulatory ﾠscheme ﾠstill ﾠused ﾠtoday7 ﾠand, ﾠin ﾠrecognition ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠincreasing ﾠregulatory ﾠbur-ﾭ‐‑
dens ﾠplaced ﾠupon ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠcompanies, ﾠwas ﾠmeant ﾠto ﾠstrike ﾠa ﾠcareful ﾠbalance ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
tween ﾠscrutiny ﾠto ﾠavoid ﾠsafety ﾠhazards ﾠand ﾠcontinued ﾠpromotion ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠdevelopment ﾠof ﾠ
new ﾠmedical ﾠdevices.8 ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ It ﾠis ﾠimportant ﾠto ﾠkeep ﾠin ﾠmind ﾠthe ﾠfactual ﾠbackdrop ﾠagainst ﾠwhich ﾠthe ﾠMDA ﾠ
were ﾠpassed. ﾠThe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠlandscape ﾠwas ﾠdifferent ﾠin ﾠ1976 ﾠthan ﾠit ﾠis ﾠtoday. ﾠFor ﾠ
                                                 
2 ﾠIs ﾠThe ﾠProduct ﾠA ﾠMedical ﾠDevice?, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN., ﾠhttp://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ ﾠ
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051512.htm ﾠ(last ﾠupdated ﾠMar. ﾠ1, ﾠ
2010). ﾠNotably, ﾠthe ﾠmost ﾠsignificant ﾠlimitation ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠdefinition ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠmeant ﾠnot ﾠto ﾠlimit ﾠits ﾠ
scope, ﾠbut ﾠto ﾠdistinguish ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠfrom ﾠdrugs. ﾠId. ﾠ
3 ﾠE.g., ﾠProduct ﾠClassification, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN., ﾠhttp://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/ ﾠ
cfdocs/cfPCD/classification.cfm?ID=900 ﾠ(last ﾠupdated ﾠMar. ﾠ5, ﾠ2012). ﾠ
4 ﾠSee ﾠJames ﾠM. ﾠFlaherty, ﾠJr., ﾠDefending ﾠSubstantial ﾠEquivalence: ﾠAn ﾠArgument ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠContinuing ﾠVitality ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
510(k) ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠProcess, ﾠ63 ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠL.J. ﾠ901, ﾠ902 ﾠ(2008) ﾠ(before ﾠ1976, ﾠFDA ﾠdid ﾠnot ﾠhave ﾠ
premarket ﾠpower ﾠto ﾠreview ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠfor ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness). ﾠ
5 ﾠDiana ﾠM. ﾠZuckerman, ﾠPaul ﾠBrown, ﾠ& ﾠSteven ﾠE. ﾠNissen, ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠRecalls ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠFDA ﾠApproval ﾠPro-ﾭ‐‑
cess, ﾠ171 ﾠARCHIVES ﾠINTERNAL ﾠMED. ﾠ1006 ﾠ,1006 ﾠ(2011); ﾠsee ﾠalso ﾠH.R. ﾠREP. ﾠNo. ﾠ94-ﾭ‐‑853 ﾠ(1976). ﾠ
6 ﾠPub. ﾠL. ﾠNo. ﾠ94-ﾭ‐‑295, ﾠ90 ﾠStat. ﾠ539. ﾠ
7 ﾠPMA ﾠApprovals, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN., ﾠhttp://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/ ﾠ
productsandmedicalprocedures/deviceapprovalsandclearances/pmaapprovals/default.htm ﾠ(last ﾠupdated ﾠ
June ﾠ18, ﾠ2009). ﾠ
8 ﾠFlaherty, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ4, ﾠat ﾠ901. ﾠ ﾠ 5 ﾠ
the ﾠmost ﾠpart, ﾠdevice ﾠtechnology ﾠthen ﾠwas ﾠcomparatively ﾠmuch ﾠmore ﾠstraightforward ﾠ
than ﾠcontemporary ﾠmechanical ﾠwizardry, ﾠand ﾠvery ﾠfew ﾠdevices ﾠwere ﾠpermanently ﾠim-ﾭ‐‑
planted ﾠor ﾠintended ﾠto ﾠsustain ﾠlife ﾠas ﾠmany ﾠare ﾠtoday.9 ﾠ
B. ﾠThree ﾠClasses, ﾠThree ﾠTypes ﾠof ﾠOversight ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠMDA ﾠwere ﾠmeant ﾠto ﾠbalance ﾠcompeting ﾠconcerns ﾠof ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠinnovation ﾠ
through ﾠa ﾠsliding ﾠscale ﾠapproach, ﾠrequiring ﾠFDA ﾠto ﾠcategorize ﾠdevices ﾠinto ﾠthree ﾠclasses ﾠ
according ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠdegree ﾠof ﾠcontrol ﾠneeded ﾠto ﾠassure ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness.10 ﾠThe ﾠclass ﾠ
a ﾠdevice ﾠbelongs ﾠto ﾠdepends ﾠnot ﾠon ﾠits ﾠphysical ﾠor ﾠtechnological ﾠcharacteristics, ﾠbut ﾠra-ﾭ‐‑
ther ﾠits ﾠindications ﾠfor ﾠuse ﾠand ﾠintended ﾠuse.11 ﾠDevice ﾠclassifications ﾠare ﾠpublicly ﾠavaila-ﾭ‐‑
ble ﾠin ﾠcomprehensive ﾠform.12 ﾠ
1. ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠDevices ﾠ
 ﾠ Class ﾠI ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠsubject ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠleast ﾠburdensome ﾠregulation ﾠand ﾠneed ﾠonly ﾠ
comply ﾠ with ﾠ general ﾠ controls, ﾠ which ﾠ consist ﾠ of ﾠ prohibitions ﾠ on ﾠ adulterating ﾠ or ﾠ mis-ﾭ‐‑
branding ﾠand ﾠconformance ﾠwith ﾠgood ﾠmanufacturing ﾠpractices.13 ﾠThis ﾠis ﾠessentially ﾠthe ﾠ
same ﾠkind ﾠof ﾠlimited ﾠregulation ﾠthat ﾠwas ﾠalready ﾠutilized ﾠby ﾠFDA ﾠprior ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠMDA.14 ﾠ
                                                 
9 ﾠZuckerman ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ5, ﾠat ﾠ1007. ﾠ
10 ﾠPMA ﾠApprovals, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ7; ﾠPETER ﾠBARTON ﾠHUTT, ﾠRICHARD ﾠA. ﾠMERRILL, ﾠ& ﾠLEWIS ﾠA. ﾠGROSSMAN, ﾠFOOD ﾠ
AND ﾠDRUG ﾠLAW: ﾠCASES ﾠAND ﾠMATERIALS ﾠ980 ﾠ(3d ﾠed. ﾠ2007). ﾠ
11 ﾠDevice ﾠClassification, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN., ﾠhttp://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ ﾠ
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm ﾠ(last ﾠupdated ﾠApr. ﾠ27, ﾠ2009). ﾠ
12 ﾠSee ﾠgenerally ﾠ21 ﾠC.F.R. ﾠ§§ ﾠ862–892 ﾠ(2010). ﾠ
13 ﾠSee ﾠDevice ﾠClassification, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ11. ﾠ ﾠ
14 ﾠHarry ﾠW. ﾠBarron, ﾠIrving ﾠS. ﾠRappaport, ﾠ& ﾠBruce ﾠA. ﾠJohnson, ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠand ﾠPatent ﾠLaws ﾠClash?, ﾠ34 ﾠ
FOOD ﾠDRUG ﾠCOSM. ﾠL.J. ﾠ304, ﾠ309 ﾠ(1979). ﾠ ﾠ 6 ﾠ
Examples ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠdevices ﾠinclude ﾠsuch ﾠlow ﾠrisk ﾠitems ﾠas ﾠgloves, ﾠbandages, ﾠand ﾠdental ﾠ
floss.15 ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠreality ﾠof ﾠtoday’s ﾠworld ﾠis ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠlarge ﾠmajority ﾠ— ﾠ74% ﾠ— ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠdevices ﾠ
are ﾠexempt ﾠfrom ﾠall ﾠforms ﾠof ﾠpremarket ﾠreview ﾠaltogether.16 ﾠIndeed, ﾠsince ﾠthe ﾠFood ﾠand ﾠ
Drug ﾠAdministration ﾠModernization ﾠAct ﾠof ﾠ1997 ﾠ(“FDAMA”), ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠex-ﾭ‐‑
empted ﾠby ﾠdefault, ﾠand ﾠare ﾠonly ﾠsubject ﾠto ﾠpremarket ﾠreview ﾠif ﾠ“intended ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠuse ﾠof ﾠ
substantial ﾠimportance ﾠin ﾠpreventing ﾠimpairment ﾠto ﾠhuman ﾠhealth, ﾠor ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠpresent[] ﾠa ﾠ
potential ﾠunreasonable ﾠrisk ﾠof ﾠillness ﾠor ﾠinjury.”17 ﾠForceps ﾠand ﾠreading ﾠglasses ﾠare ﾠtwo ﾠ
examples ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠare ﾠexempt ﾠfrom ﾠpremarket ﾠreview.18 ﾠ
2. ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠDevices ﾠ
 ﾠ Class ﾠII ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠthose ﾠfor ﾠwhich ﾠgeneral ﾠcontrols ﾠcannot, ﾠby ﾠthemselves, ﾠpro-ﾭ‐‑
vide ﾠadequate ﾠguarantees ﾠof ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness.19 ﾠExamples ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevices ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
clude ﾠelectrocardiographs, ﾠwheelchairs, ﾠcatheters, ﾠhearing ﾠaids, ﾠx-ﾭ‐‑ray ﾠequipment, ﾠand ﾠ
                                                 
15 ﾠDevice ﾠClassification, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ11. ﾠThese ﾠexamples ﾠalso ﾠunderscore ﾠthe ﾠbreadth ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠdefinition ﾠof ﾠ
“medical ﾠdevice.” ﾠ
16 ﾠId. ﾠMoreover, ﾠa ﾠfew ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠeven ﾠexempt ﾠfrom ﾠGMP. ﾠId. ﾠFDA ﾠmaintains ﾠa ﾠlist ﾠof ﾠexemptions ﾠat ﾠ
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpcd/315.cfm. ﾠ
17 ﾠPub. ﾠL. ﾠNo. ﾠ105-ﾭ‐‑115, ﾠ§ ﾠ206, ﾠ111 ﾠStat. ﾠ2296; ﾠsee ﾠJ. ﾠMatthew ﾠBuchanan, ﾠComment, ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠPatent ﾠ
Rights ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠAge ﾠof ﾠFDA ﾠModernization: ﾠThe ﾠPotential ﾠEffect ﾠof ﾠRegulatory ﾠStreamlining ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠRight ﾠto ﾠExclude, ﾠ
30 ﾠU. ﾠTOL. ﾠL. ﾠREV. ﾠ305, ﾠ325 ﾠ(1999) ﾠ(explaining ﾠthe ﾠFDAMA’s ﾠexemption ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠdevices ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠprocess ﾠ
by ﾠwhich ﾠinterested ﾠparties ﾠcan ﾠpetition ﾠFDA ﾠto ﾠexempt ﾠany ﾠdevice); ﾠThe ﾠNew ﾠ510(k) ﾠParadigm: ﾠAlternate ﾠ
Approaches ﾠto ﾠDemonstrating ﾠSubstantial ﾠEquivalence ﾠin ﾠPremarket ﾠNotifications, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN. ﾠ
(March ﾠ20, ﾠ1998), ﾠhttp://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ ﾠ
GuidanceDocuments/ucm080189.pdf. ﾠ
18 ﾠU.S. ﾠGOV’T ﾠACCOUNTABILITY ﾠOFFICE, ﾠGAO-ﾭ‐‑09-ﾭ‐‑190, ﾠMEDICAL ﾠDEVICES: ﾠFDA ﾠSHOULD ﾠTAKE ﾠSTEPS ﾠTO ﾠEN-ﾭ‐‑
SURE ﾠTHAT ﾠHIGH-ﾭ‐‑RISK ﾠDEVICE ﾠTYPES ﾠARE ﾠAPPROVED ﾠTHROUGH ﾠTHE ﾠMOST ﾠSTRINGENT ﾠPREMARKET ﾠREVIEW ﾠ
PROCESS ﾠ9 ﾠ(2009) ﾠ[hereinafter ﾠGAO ﾠ2009]. ﾠ
19 ﾠSee ﾠFederal ﾠFood, ﾠDrug, ﾠand ﾠCosmetic ﾠAct ﾠ§ ﾠ513, ﾠ21 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ360c ﾠ(2010). ﾠ ﾠ 7 ﾠ
bone ﾠscrews.20 ﾠIn ﾠaddition ﾠto ﾠgeneral ﾠcontrols, ﾠspecial ﾠcontrols ﾠapply ﾠto ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevices, ﾠ
which ﾠconsist ﾠof ﾠlabeling ﾠrequirements ﾠand ﾠpostmarket ﾠsurveillance ﾠto ﾠensure ﾠperfor-ﾭ‐‑
mance ﾠstandards ﾠare ﾠmet.21 ﾠ
 ﾠ Most ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠsubject ﾠto ﾠa ﾠform ﾠof ﾠpremarket ﾠreview ﾠknown ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠ
510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠ(so ﾠnamed ﾠafter ﾠits ﾠsection ﾠnumber ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠFDCA), ﾠrequiring ﾠnotification ﾠ
to ﾠFDA ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠ90 ﾠdays ﾠbefore ﾠmarketing.22 ﾠHowever, ﾠFDA ﾠhas ﾠaffirmatively ﾠexempted ﾠ
some ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevices ﾠfrom ﾠall ﾠforms ﾠof ﾠpremarket ﾠreview,23 ﾠalthough ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠex-ﾭ‐‑
empt ﾠby ﾠdefault ﾠas ﾠare ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠdevices. ﾠExamples ﾠof ﾠexempt ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevices ﾠinclude ﾠ
wheeled ﾠstretchers ﾠand ﾠmercury ﾠthermometers.24 ﾠ
3. ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠDevices ﾠ
 ﾠ Class ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠthose ﾠsubject ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠhighest ﾠstandards ﾠof ﾠpremarket ﾠreview. ﾠ
FDA ﾠorganizes ﾠdevices ﾠinto ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠwhen ﾠperformance ﾠstandards ﾠor ﾠgeneral ﾠcontrols ﾠ
cannot ﾠensure ﾠtheir ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness; ﾠbroadly, ﾠthese ﾠare ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠare ﾠ“for ﾠa ﾠ
use ﾠ in ﾠ supporting ﾠ or ﾠ sustaining ﾠ human ﾠ life ﾠ or ﾠ for ﾠ a ﾠ use ﾠ which ﾠ is ﾠ of ﾠ substantial ﾠ im-ﾭ‐‑
portance ﾠin ﾠpreventing ﾠimpairment ﾠof ﾠhuman ﾠhealth” ﾠor ﾠthat ﾠ“present[] ﾠa ﾠpotential ﾠun-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
20 ﾠBarron ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ14, ﾠat ﾠ309; ﾠDevice ﾠClassification, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ11; ﾠGuidance ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠfor ﾠDevices ﾠ
and ﾠRadiological ﾠHealth’s ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠReview ﾠProgram, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN. ﾠ(June ﾠ30, ﾠ1986), ﾠ
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ ﾠ
ucm081383.htm ﾠ(last ﾠupdated ﾠJune ﾠ18, ﾠ2009). ﾠ
21 ﾠDevice ﾠClassification, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ11. ﾠ
22 ﾠSee ﾠFederal ﾠFood, ﾠDrug, ﾠand ﾠCosmetic ﾠAct ﾠ§ ﾠ510, ﾠ21 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ360 ﾠ(2010); ﾠDevice ﾠClassification, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ
11. ﾠThe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠis ﾠdiscussed ﾠin ﾠdetail ﾠin ﾠPart ﾠII.C., ﾠinfra. ﾠ
23 ﾠFDA ﾠpublishes ﾠtheir ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠexemptions ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠFederal ﾠRegister. ﾠFor ﾠan ﾠexample ﾠof ﾠone ﾠsuch ﾠpublica-ﾭ‐‑
tion, ﾠsee ﾠMedical ﾠDevices; ﾠExemptions ﾠFrom ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification; ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠDevices, ﾠ63 ﾠFed. ﾠReg. ﾠ3142-ﾭ‐‑
01 ﾠ(Jan. ﾠ21, ﾠ1998). ﾠ
24 ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ8. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ 8 ﾠ
reasonable ﾠrisk ﾠof ﾠillness ﾠor ﾠinjury.”25 ﾠMembers ﾠof ﾠthis ﾠlast ﾠcategory ﾠinclude ﾠheart ﾠvalves, ﾠ
pacemakers, ﾠand ﾠautomated ﾠexternal ﾠdefibrillators.26 ﾠ
 ﾠ In ﾠgeneral, ﾠpremarket ﾠapproval ﾠ(“PMA”) ﾠis ﾠrequired ﾠfrom ﾠFDA ﾠbefore ﾠa ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠ
device ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠmarketed.27 ﾠA ﾠPMA ﾠis ﾠan ﾠonerous ﾠand ﾠexhaustive ﾠprocedure, ﾠrequiring ﾠ
extensive ﾠinvestigation ﾠand ﾠclinical ﾠtrials ﾠto ﾠdemonstrate ﾠa ﾠdevice’s ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffective-ﾭ‐‑
ness.28 ﾠA ﾠPMA ﾠcan ﾠcost ﾠmillions ﾠand ﾠtake ﾠyears ﾠto ﾠcomplete. ﾠ
To ﾠ avoid ﾠ a ﾠ substantial ﾠ disruption ﾠ in ﾠ the ﾠ medical ﾠ device ﾠ industry, ﾠ the ﾠ MDA ﾠ
“grandfathered” ﾠdevices ﾠlegally ﾠmarketed ﾠprior ﾠto ﾠ1978 ﾠ(“preamendments” ﾠdevices) ﾠso ﾠ
that ﾠthey ﾠcould ﾠremain ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠwithout ﾠa ﾠPMA.29 ﾠHowever, ﾠall ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠ
automatically ﾠpigeonholed ﾠinto ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠ(and ﾠtherefore ﾠrequire ﾠPMA).30 ﾠOnce ﾠagain, ﾠto ﾠ
preserve ﾠparity ﾠbetween ﾠpreamendments ﾠand ﾠpostamendments ﾠdevices, ﾠan ﾠexception ﾠ
was ﾠincluded ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠMDA. ﾠA ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠ— ﾠdespite ﾠits ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠstatus ﾠ— ﾠmay ﾠavoid ﾠthe ﾠ
PMA ﾠprocess ﾠand ﾠgo ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k) ﾠinstead ﾠif ﾠit ﾠis ﾠ“substantially ﾠequivalent” ﾠto ﾠa ﾠpre-ﾭ‐‑
amendments ﾠdevice, ﾠuntil ﾠFDA ﾠbegins ﾠto ﾠrequire ﾠPMA ﾠfor ﾠthat ﾠpreamendments ﾠdevice ﾠ
                                                 
25 ﾠSee ﾠFederal ﾠFood, ﾠDrug, ﾠ& ﾠCosmetic ﾠAct ﾠ§ ﾠ510, ﾠ21 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ360c ﾠ(2010); ﾠDevice ﾠClassification, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ11. ﾠ
26 ﾠId.; ﾠGuidance ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠfor ﾠDevices ﾠand ﾠRadiological ﾠHealth’s ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠReview ﾠProgram, ﾠsupra ﾠ
note ﾠ20. ﾠ
27 ﾠSee ﾠShashank ﾠUpadhye, ﾠUnderstanding ﾠPatent ﾠInfringement ﾠUnder ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e): ﾠThe ﾠCollisions ﾠBetween ﾠ
Patent, ﾠMedical ﾠDevice, ﾠand ﾠDrug ﾠLaws, ﾠ17 ﾠSANTA ﾠCLARA ﾠCOMPUTER ﾠ& ﾠHIGH ﾠTECH. ﾠL.J. ﾠ1, ﾠ16–17 ﾠ(2000). ﾠ
28 ﾠSee ﾠHUTT ﾠET ﾠAL., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ10, ﾠat ﾠ1010–11; ﾠFlaherty, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ4, ﾠat ﾠ912–13. ﾠ ﾠ
29 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠat ﾠ906–07; ﾠsee ﾠalso ﾠHUTT ﾠET ﾠAL., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ10, ﾠat ﾠ987. ﾠHowever, ﾠFDA ﾠretained ﾠthe ﾠauthority ﾠto ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
quire ﾠpreamendments ﾠcategories ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠto ﾠundergo ﾠPMA ﾠbefore ﾠmarketing. ﾠSee ﾠUpadhye, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ
27, ﾠat ﾠ17. ﾠ
30 ﾠPMA ﾠApprovals, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ7. ﾠ ﾠ 9 ﾠ
type.31 ﾠRoughly ﾠ60% ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠreach ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠthrough ﾠthis ﾠmechanism ﾠto-ﾭ‐‑
day, ﾠa ﾠnumber ﾠwell ﾠbeyond ﾠthe ﾠcontemplation ﾠthe ﾠ1976 ﾠCongress ﾠthat ﾠcreated ﾠthis ﾠop-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠas ﾠa ﾠtemporary ﾠphase ﾠout ﾠfor ﾠpreamendments ﾠdevice ﾠtypes.32 ﾠ
C. ﾠThe ﾠ510(k) ﾠScheme ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠ510(k) ﾠprogram, ﾠwhich ﾠrepresents ﾠan ﾠexpeditious ﾠpath ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠas ﾠcom-ﾭ‐‑
pared ﾠto ﾠPMA, ﾠis ﾠused ﾠto ﾠclear ﾠthe ﾠvast ﾠmajority ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠfor ﾠmarketing.33 ﾠThe ﾠprogram ﾠ
has ﾠthe ﾠtwin ﾠ— ﾠand ﾠnot ﾠalways ﾠcompatible ﾠ— ﾠgoals ﾠof ﾠensuring ﾠthe ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffective-ﾭ‐‑
ness ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠand ﾠpromoting ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠinnovation ﾠby ﾠminimizing ﾠthe ﾠbur-ﾭ‐‑
dens ﾠto ﾠmarketing ﾠthem.34 ﾠ510(k) ﾠrepresents ﾠthe ﾠcareful ﾠbalance ﾠthat ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠreg-ﾭ‐‑
ulation ﾠstrives ﾠto ﾠachieve. ﾠOn ﾠthe ﾠone ﾠhand, ﾠliberally ﾠallowing ﾠthe ﾠmarketing ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
vices ﾠpromotes ﾠtheir ﾠinnovation, ﾠattracts ﾠinventors ﾠand ﾠinvestors ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠfield, ﾠand ﾠlowers ﾠ
                                                 
31Device ﾠClassification, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ11; ﾠsee ﾠHUTT ﾠET ﾠAL., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ10, ﾠat ﾠ987–88. ﾠThe ﾠMDA ﾠanticipated ﾠthat ﾠall ﾠ
Class ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠwould ﾠproceed ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠPMA ﾠprocess ﾠonce ﾠFDA ﾠbegan ﾠrequiring ﾠit. ﾠRita ﾠF. ﾠRedberg, ﾠ
Medical ﾠDevices ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠFDA ﾠApproval ﾠProcess, ﾠ170 ﾠARCHIVES ﾠINTERNAL ﾠMED. ﾠ1831, ﾠ1832 ﾠ(2010); ﾠsee ﾠalso ﾠIN-ﾭ‐‑
STITUTE ﾠOF ﾠMEDICINE, ﾠMEDICAL ﾠDEVICES ﾠAND ﾠTHE ﾠPUBLIC’S ﾠHEALTH: ﾠTHE ﾠFDA ﾠ510(K) ﾠCLEARANCE ﾠPROCESS ﾠ
AT ﾠ35 ﾠYEARS ﾠ168 ﾠ(2011) ﾠ(reporting ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠOffice ﾠof ﾠTechnology ﾠAssessment ﾠcontemplated ﾠthat ﾠsubstantial ﾠ
equivalence ﾠwould ﾠdissipate ﾠover ﾠtime ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠdifferences ﾠbetween ﾠpreamendments ﾠand ﾠpostamendments ﾠ
devices ﾠgrew). ﾠBecause ﾠthis ﾠdid ﾠnot ﾠcome ﾠto ﾠpass, ﾠthe ﾠSafe ﾠMedical ﾠDevices ﾠAct ﾠof ﾠ1990 ﾠobligated ﾠFDA ﾠto ﾠ
“phase ﾠout” ﾠpreamendments ﾠdevices ﾠby ﾠeither ﾠrequiring ﾠPMA ﾠor ﾠreclassifying ﾠeach ﾠone. ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠ
note ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ3, ﾠ16. ﾠFDA ﾠhas ﾠnot ﾠcomplied ﾠwith ﾠthis ﾠdirective, ﾠso ﾠmost ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠto ﾠthis ﾠday ﾠare ﾠcleared ﾠ
for ﾠmarketing ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess. ﾠId. ﾠ
32 ﾠRedberg, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ1832; ﾠHUTT ﾠET ﾠAL., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ10, ﾠat ﾠ988. ﾠ
33 ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ8–9 ﾠ(reporting ﾠthat ﾠ98% ﾠof ﾠpremarket ﾠreview ﾠis ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k)). ﾠ
34 ﾠJefrrey ﾠShuren, ﾠA ﾠLetter ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠDirector, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN. ﾠ(Jan. ﾠ21, ﾠ2011), ﾠ
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/
CDRHReports/UCM239451.pdf. ﾠThe ﾠoriginal ﾠpurpose ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠwas ﾠto ﾠpermit ﾠmanufacturers ﾠto ﾠeasily ﾠ
make ﾠsmall ﾠimprovements ﾠto ﾠdevices ﾠalready ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠbefore ﾠ1978, ﾠwithout ﾠcompromising ﾠpublic ﾠ
safety, ﾠand ﾠin ﾠparity ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠburden ﾠfaced ﾠby ﾠpreamendments ﾠmanufacturers. ﾠSee ﾠZuckerman ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠ
note ﾠ5, ﾠat ﾠ1007; ﾠRedberg, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ1832. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ 10 ﾠ
the ﾠultimate ﾠcost ﾠto ﾠpatients. ﾠMeanwhile, ﾠFDA ﾠmust ﾠprovide ﾠreasonable ﾠassurances ﾠto ﾠ
the ﾠpublic ﾠthat ﾠthese ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠsafe ﾠand ﾠeffective ﾠfor ﾠtheir ﾠindicated ﾠuses. ﾠ
1. ﾠOverview ﾠ
 ﾠ If ﾠthe ﾠpremarket ﾠnotification ﾠpathway ﾠis ﾠavailable, ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturer ﾠmust ﾠ
submit ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠ90 ﾠdays ﾠbefore ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠmarketed ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠtime.35 ﾠA ﾠ
510(k) ﾠmust ﾠalso ﾠbe ﾠsubmitted ﾠbefore ﾠa ﾠcurrently ﾠmarketed ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠsignificantly ﾠ
modified ﾠin ﾠways ﾠthat ﾠcould ﾠimpact ﾠits ﾠsafety ﾠor ﾠeffectiveness ﾠor ﾠthat ﾠalter ﾠits ﾠintended ﾠ
use.36 ﾠ
 ﾠ Whereas ﾠa ﾠPMA ﾠdemands ﾠextensive ﾠand ﾠmeticulous ﾠdocumentation ﾠto ﾠdemon-ﾭ‐‑
strate ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness,37 ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠsubmission ﾠtypically ﾠincludes ﾠsimply: ﾠ(1) ﾠthe ﾠ
device’s ﾠname, ﾠclass, ﾠproposed ﾠlabels, ﾠand ﾠintended ﾠuse; ﾠ(2) ﾠa ﾠstatement ﾠof ﾠsubstantial ﾠ
equivalence ﾠ to ﾠ a ﾠ predicate ﾠ device, ﾠ with ﾠ data; ﾠ (3) ﾠ data ﾠ demonstrating ﾠ the ﾠ effects ﾠ of ﾠ
changes ﾠor ﾠmodifications ﾠthat ﾠcould ﾠaffect ﾠsafety ﾠor ﾠeffectiveness, ﾠif ﾠany; ﾠand ﾠ(4) ﾠa ﾠsum-ﾭ‐‑
mary ﾠ that ﾠ enables ﾠ FDA ﾠ to ﾠ understand ﾠ substantial ﾠ equivalence, ﾠ which ﾠ identifies ﾠ the ﾠ
predicate ﾠdevice ﾠand ﾠcompares ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠdevice’s ﾠintended ﾠuse ﾠand ﾠtechnological ﾠcharac-ﾭ‐‑
teristics.38 ﾠ
                                                 
35 ﾠWhen ﾠa ﾠpremarket ﾠnotification ﾠsubmission ﾠis ﾠrequired, ﾠ21 ﾠC.F.R. ﾠ§ ﾠ807.81 ﾠ(2010). ﾠ
36 ﾠId. ﾠ
37 ﾠSee ﾠLAWRENCE ﾠM. ﾠSUNG, ﾠMEDICAL ﾠDEVICE ﾠPATENTS ﾠ173–74 ﾠ(2008 ﾠed.). ﾠ
38 ﾠInformation ﾠrequired ﾠin ﾠa ﾠpremarket ﾠnotification ﾠsubmission, ﾠ21 ﾠC.F.R. ﾠ§ ﾠ807.87 ﾠ(2010); ﾠContent ﾠand ﾠ
format ﾠof ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠsummary, ﾠ21 ﾠC.F.R. ﾠ§ ﾠ807.92 ﾠ(2010). ﾠ ﾠ 11 ﾠ
 ﾠ Essentially, ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠmust ﾠprovide ﾠenough ﾠinformation ﾠfor ﾠFDA ﾠto ﾠmake ﾠa ﾠsub-ﾭ‐‑
stantial ﾠequivalence ﾠdetermination. ﾠAlthough ﾠclinical ﾠtrials ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠnecessary, ﾠFDA ﾠusu-ﾭ‐‑
ally ﾠneeds ﾠsome ﾠdata ﾠto ﾠmake ﾠthis ﾠevaluation, ﾠwhich ﾠusually ﾠconsists ﾠof ﾠstatistics ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠ
intended ﾠuse, ﾠphysical ﾠcomposition, ﾠand ﾠmethod ﾠof ﾠoperation.39 ﾠPerformance ﾠdata ﾠare ﾠ
only ﾠrequired ﾠwhere ﾠthere ﾠis ﾠan ﾠimportant ﾠdifference ﾠbetween ﾠthe ﾠtwo ﾠdevices, ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠa ﾠ
change ﾠin ﾠintended ﾠuse ﾠor ﾠtechnology, ﾠor ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠdescriptions ﾠalone ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠconvince ﾠFDA ﾠ
of ﾠcorrespondence ﾠin ﾠperformance.40 ﾠ
 ﾠ Because ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠa ﾠnotification ﾠprocess, ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠan ﾠapproval ﾠmechanism, ﾠthe ﾠ
burden ﾠis ﾠon ﾠFDA ﾠto ﾠmake ﾠan ﾠevaluation ﾠof ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠ(and ﾠto ﾠdetermine ﾠ
whether ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠroute ﾠis ﾠeven ﾠavailable). ﾠAfter ﾠ90 ﾠdays, ﾠthe ﾠapplicant ﾠmay ﾠproceed ﾠto ﾠ
market ﾠif ﾠFDA ﾠhas ﾠremained ﾠsilent.41 ﾠFDA ﾠclearance ﾠof ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠsignifies ﾠmerely ﾠthat: ﾠ
clearance, ﾠand ﾠnot ﾠapproval.42 ﾠFDA’s ﾠacquiescence ﾠto ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠonly ﾠan ﾠindication ﾠthat ﾠ
it ﾠconsiders ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠsubstantially ﾠequivalent ﾠto ﾠa ﾠpredicate, ﾠand ﾠtherefore ﾠ
                                                 
39 ﾠGuidance ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠfor ﾠDevices ﾠand ﾠRadiological ﾠHealth’s ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠReview ﾠProgram, ﾠsupra ﾠ
note ﾠ20. ﾠ
40 ﾠId. ﾠIn ﾠaddition, ﾠFDA ﾠrecently ﾠannounced ﾠthat ﾠit ﾠwill ﾠissue ﾠguidance ﾠto ﾠclarify ﾠsome ﾠuncertainty ﾠabout ﾠ
when ﾠmanufacturers ﾠmust ﾠsubmit ﾠperformance ﾠdata. ﾠNews ﾠRelease, ﾠU.S. ﾠFood ﾠ& ﾠDrug ﾠAdmin., ﾠFDA ﾠto ﾠ
improve ﾠmost ﾠcommon ﾠreview ﾠpath ﾠfor ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠ(Jan. ﾠ19, ﾠ2011), ﾠavailable ﾠat ﾠ
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm240418.htm ﾠ
41 ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠ(510k), ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN., ﾠhttp://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ ﾠ
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/ ﾠ
PremarketNotification510k/default.htm ﾠ(last ﾠupdated ﾠSept. ﾠ3, ﾠ2010). ﾠ
42 ﾠId. ﾠ ﾠ 12 ﾠ
marketable, ﾠbut ﾠ“does ﾠnot ﾠin ﾠany ﾠway ﾠdenote ﾠofficial ﾠapproval ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠdevice” ﾠthe ﾠway ﾠa ﾠ
PMA ﾠdoes.43 ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠ 510(k) ﾠ route ﾠ is ﾠ significantly ﾠ easier, ﾠ cheaper, ﾠ and ﾠ speedier ﾠ than ﾠ PMA. ﾠ For ﾠ
most ﾠ510(k) ﾠapplications, ﾠit ﾠis ﾠonly ﾠan ﾠexercise ﾠin ﾠcomparison ﾠto ﾠexisting ﾠdevices ﾠ— ﾠra-ﾭ‐‑
ther ﾠthan ﾠestablishment ﾠof ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠanew ﾠ— ﾠso ﾠclinical ﾠdata ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
quired.44 ﾠWhereas ﾠFDA ﾠreaches ﾠ60% ﾠof ﾠPMA ﾠdecisions ﾠwithin ﾠ180 ﾠdays, ﾠit ﾠreaches ﾠ90% ﾠ
of ﾠ510(k) ﾠdecisions ﾠwithin ﾠ90 ﾠdays.45 ﾠWhereas ﾠthe ﾠaverage ﾠPMA ﾠreview ﾠtime ﾠis ﾠnearly ﾠ
nine ﾠmonths ﾠ(plus ﾠfour ﾠto ﾠfive ﾠyears ﾠneeded ﾠto ﾠconduct ﾠclinical ﾠtrials), ﾠthe ﾠaverage ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
review ﾠ time ﾠ from ﾠ beginning ﾠ to ﾠ end ﾠ is ﾠ three ﾠ months.46 ﾠWhereas ﾠ a ﾠ PMA ﾠ fee ﾠ averages ﾠ
about ﾠ$200,000 ﾠand ﾠcosts ﾠFDA ﾠ$870,000 ﾠ(plus ﾠthe ﾠstaggering ﾠ$15–20 ﾠmillion ﾠprivate ﾠcost ﾠ
of ﾠclinical ﾠtrials), ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠfee ﾠaverages ﾠabout ﾠ$3,700 ﾠand ﾠcosts ﾠFDA ﾠ$18,200.47 ﾠ ﾠ
As ﾠa ﾠresult, ﾠit ﾠis ﾠdifficult ﾠto ﾠoverstate ﾠthe ﾠimportance ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠas ﾠa ﾠtool ﾠfor ﾠbring-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠnovel ﾠdevices ﾠto ﾠmarket. ﾠMore ﾠthan ﾠ8,000 ﾠnew ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠintroduced ﾠan-ﾭ‐‑
nually ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates.48 ﾠOf ﾠthese, ﾠa ﾠmajority ﾠ(67%) ﾠare ﾠexempt ﾠfrom ﾠpremarket ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
43 ﾠId. ﾠIt ﾠis ﾠmisbranding ﾠto ﾠrepresent ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠFDA ﾠapproved ﾠwhen ﾠit ﾠhas ﾠmerely ﾠbeen ﾠcleared ﾠ
through ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess. ﾠId.; ﾠsee ﾠalso ﾠPhotoMedex, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠIrwin, ﾠ601 ﾠF.3d ﾠ919, ﾠ925 ﾠn.3 ﾠ(9th ﾠCir. ﾠ2010) ﾠ
(evaluating ﾠa ﾠcontention ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠwas ﾠmisbranded, ﾠhaving ﾠbeen ﾠreferred ﾠto ﾠas ﾠ“approved”). ﾠ
44 ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ14–15. ﾠ
45 ﾠId. ﾠat ﾠ15. ﾠ98% ﾠof ﾠall ﾠ510(k) ﾠdecisions ﾠare ﾠreached ﾠwithin ﾠ150 ﾠdays. ﾠId. ﾠ
46 ﾠJordan ﾠParadise, ﾠAlison ﾠW. ﾠTisdale, ﾠRalph ﾠF. ﾠHall, ﾠ& ﾠEfrosini ﾠKokkoli, ﾠEvaluating ﾠOversight ﾠof ﾠHuman ﾠ
Drugs ﾠand ﾠMedical ﾠDevices: ﾠA ﾠCase ﾠStudy ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠFDA ﾠAnd ﾠImplications ﾠfor ﾠNanobiotechnology, ﾠ37 ﾠJ.L. ﾠMED. ﾠ& ﾠ
ETHICS ﾠ598, ﾠ602 ﾠ(2009). ﾠ
47 ﾠId.; ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ15. ﾠ
48 ﾠRedberg, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ1831. ﾠ ﾠ 13 ﾠ
view ﾠaltogether.49 ﾠThe ﾠremainder ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠroughly ﾠ3,000 ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠundergo ﾠFDA ﾠreview ﾠ
before ﾠmarketing, ﾠ98% ﾠof ﾠwhich ﾠdo ﾠso ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠpathway.50 ﾠThe ﾠremaining ﾠ50–
70 ﾠdevices ﾠeach ﾠyear ﾠrequire ﾠPMA, ﾠrepresenting ﾠless ﾠthan ﾠ1% ﾠof ﾠall ﾠnew ﾠdevices.51 ﾠEven ﾠ
among ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices, ﾠgreater ﾠthan ﾠthree-ﾭ‐‑fourths ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠundergo ﾠPMA.52 ﾠIn ﾠsum, ﾠthe ﾠ
510(k) ﾠprocess, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠbackward-ﾭ‐‑looking ﾠto ﾠexisting ﾠdevices, ﾠdominates ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠ
entry ﾠof ﾠU.S. ﾠmedical ﾠdevices. ﾠ
Because ﾠof ﾠits ﾠrelative ﾠsimplicity ﾠand ﾠease, ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠcharacterized ﾠas ﾠ“manufac-ﾭ‐‑
turer ﾠfriendly.”53 ﾠIt ﾠcomes ﾠas ﾠno ﾠsurprise, ﾠthen, ﾠthat ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠcompanies ﾠcare ﾠa ﾠ
great ﾠdeal ﾠabout ﾠwhether ﾠtheir ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠqualify ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠconduit. ﾠFrom ﾠtheir ﾠ
perspective, ﾠusing ﾠ510(k) ﾠcan ﾠamount ﾠto ﾠmonths ﾠor ﾠyears ﾠshaved ﾠoff ﾠtheir ﾠpremarket ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
view ﾠtime54 ﾠand ﾠpresents ﾠthe ﾠmuch ﾠeasier ﾠtask ﾠof ﾠfinding ﾠdata ﾠdemonstrating ﾠequiva-ﾭ‐‑
lence ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠthe ﾠherculean ﾠundertaking ﾠof ﾠconducting ﾠclinical ﾠtrials.55 ﾠAs ﾠa ﾠresult, ﾠ
device ﾠ makers ﾠ have ﾠ become ﾠ extremely ﾠ aggressive ﾠ in ﾠ pursuing ﾠ the ﾠ 510(k) ﾠ pathway.56 ﾠ
One ﾠwell-ﾭ‐‑publicized ﾠexample ﾠof ﾠa ﾠcompany ﾠgoing ﾠto ﾠextremes ﾠto ﾠavoid ﾠPMA ﾠinvolved ﾠa ﾠ
company ﾠcalled ﾠReGen ﾠthat ﾠmanufactured ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠcalled ﾠMenaflex, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠa ﾠpad ﾠ
                                                 
49 ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ8–9. ﾠ
50 ﾠHUTT ﾠET ﾠAL., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ10, ﾠat ﾠ992; ﾠShuren, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ34. ﾠ90% ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠor ﾠII ﾠ510(k) ﾠsubmissions ﾠand ﾠ67% ﾠ
of ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠ510(k) ﾠsubmissions ﾠare ﾠultimately ﾠcleared. ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ6. ﾠ
51 ﾠId. ﾠat ﾠ8–9; ﾠEric ﾠP. ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠJames ﾠD. ﾠClements, ﾠA ﾠTrap ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠWary: ﾠHow ﾠCompliance ﾠwith ﾠFDA ﾠMedical ﾠDe-ﾭ‐‑
vice ﾠRegulations ﾠCan ﾠJeopardize ﾠPatent ﾠRights, ﾠ46 ﾠIDEA ﾠ371, ﾠ374 ﾠ(2006). ﾠ
52 ﾠZuckerman ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ5, ﾠat ﾠ1011. ﾠ
53 ﾠFlaherty, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ4, ﾠat ﾠ913. ﾠ
54 ﾠSee ﾠBarron ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ14, ﾠat ﾠ308. ﾠ
55 ﾠSee ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ374. ﾠ
56 ﾠAsha ﾠS. ﾠGeire, ﾠComment, ﾠPrice ﾠWars ﾠand ﾠPatent ﾠLaw: ﾠReducing ﾠthe ﾠCost ﾠof ﾠHealth ﾠCare ﾠThrough ﾠMedical ﾠDe-ﾭ‐‑
vice ﾠPrice ﾠTransparency, ﾠ12 ﾠTUL. ﾠJ. ﾠTECH. ﾠ& ﾠINTELL. ﾠPROP. ﾠ239, ﾠ249–50 ﾠ(2009). ﾠ ﾠ 14 ﾠ
used ﾠin ﾠrepairing ﾠa ﾠtorn ﾠmeniscus ﾠthat ﾠacts ﾠas ﾠa ﾠshock ﾠabsorber ﾠbetween ﾠknee ﾠbones ﾠ
with ﾠthe ﾠhope ﾠof ﾠmitigating ﾠthe ﾠrate ﾠof ﾠrecurrent ﾠtears.57 ﾠAfter ﾠReGen’s ﾠclinical ﾠtrials ﾠcon-ﾭ‐‑
fronted ﾠrecord-ﾭ‐‑keeping ﾠissues, ﾠit ﾠdecided ﾠto ﾠattempt ﾠto ﾠuse ﾠ510(k) ﾠas ﾠan ﾠalternative ﾠto ﾠ
restarting.58 ﾠReGen ﾠclaimed ﾠa ﾠshoulder ﾠimplant ﾠand ﾠa ﾠhernia ﾠtreatment ﾠas ﾠpredicates, ﾠ
which ﾠFDA ﾠtwice ﾠrebuked.59 ﾠAfter ﾠenlisting ﾠmembers ﾠof ﾠCongress ﾠto ﾠpersonally ﾠwrite ﾠto ﾠ
FDA’s ﾠcommissioner, ﾠbringing ﾠin ﾠscientists ﾠfrom ﾠoutside ﾠFDA ﾠlabs, ﾠand ﾠbecoming ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
volved ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠselection ﾠprocess ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠconvention ﾠof ﾠa ﾠspecial ﾠpanel ﾠof ﾠoutside ﾠphysi-ﾭ‐‑
cians, ﾠFDA ﾠcleared ﾠReGen’s ﾠthird ﾠ510(k) ﾠapplication.60 ﾠ
2. ﾠ510(k) ﾠSubject ﾠMatter ﾠand ﾠPermissible ﾠPredicate ﾠDevices ﾠ
A ﾠ“predicate ﾠdevice” ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠolder ﾠdevice ﾠto ﾠwhich ﾠa ﾠnewer ﾠdevice ﾠclaims ﾠsubstan-ﾭ‐‑
tial ﾠequivalence ﾠin ﾠa ﾠ510(k). ﾠThree ﾠbroad ﾠcategories ﾠof ﾠdevice ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠlegally ﾠused ﾠas ﾠ
predicates ﾠin ﾠa ﾠ510(k), ﾠand ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠmay ﾠclaim ﾠmultiple ﾠpredicate ﾠdevices ﾠso ﾠthat ﾠall ﾠfea-ﾭ‐‑
tures ﾠof ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠare ﾠcovered.61 ﾠ ﾠ
First, ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠ— ﾠeven ﾠone ﾠin ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠ— ﾠcan ﾠclaim ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠ
to ﾠ a ﾠ preamendments ﾠ Class ﾠ III ﾠ device.62 ﾠThis ﾠ how ﾠ most ﾠ Class ﾠ III ﾠ devices ﾠ are ﾠ cleared ﾠ
                                                 
57 ﾠAlicia ﾠMundy, ﾠPolitical ﾠLobbying ﾠDrove ﾠFDA ﾠProcess, ﾠWALL ﾠST. ﾠJ., ﾠMar. ﾠ6, ﾠ2009, ﾠat ﾠA1. ﾠThe ﾠmarket ﾠfor ﾠthis ﾠ
device ﾠwas ﾠpotentially ﾠvery ﾠlarge; ﾠone ﾠmillion ﾠmeniscus ﾠrepairs ﾠare ﾠperformed ﾠannually ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠ
States. ﾠId. ﾠ
58 ﾠId. ﾠ
59 ﾠId. ﾠFDA’s ﾠreasoning ﾠwas ﾠthat ﾠweight-ﾭ‐‑bearing ﾠforces ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠknee ﾠare ﾠvery ﾠdifferent ﾠthan ﾠthose ﾠobserved ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠshoulder ﾠor ﾠabdomen, ﾠso ﾠthe ﾠprevious ﾠdevices ﾠoffered ﾠno ﾠguarantee ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠsafety ﾠor ﾠeffectiveness ﾠof ﾠ
Menaflex. ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
60 ﾠId. ﾠ
61 ﾠSUNG, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ37, ﾠat ﾠ167. ﾠ
62 ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠ(510k), ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ41. ﾠ ﾠ 15 ﾠ
through ﾠ510(k) ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠPMA, ﾠas ﾠdescribed ﾠabove. ﾠManufacturers ﾠmay ﾠavail ﾠthem-ﾭ‐‑
selves ﾠthis ﾠopportunity ﾠfor ﾠtheir ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠuntil ﾠFDA ﾠbegins ﾠto ﾠrequire ﾠPMA ﾠfor ﾠ
(or ﾠreclassifies) ﾠthe ﾠpredicate.63 ﾠIn ﾠaddition, ﾠpostamendment ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠin ﾠgeneral ﾠ
cannot ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠas ﾠpredicates ﾠif ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠPMA.64 ﾠ
Second, ﾠdevices ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠby ﾠreason ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠas ﾠpredicates.65 ﾠ
This ﾠallows ﾠa ﾠlineage ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠdevices ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠcreated, ﾠultimately ﾠtracing ﾠback ﾠto ﾠa ﾠpre-ﾭ‐‑
amendments ﾠdevice.66 ﾠThe ﾠability ﾠto ﾠdaisy-ﾭ‐‑chain ﾠ510(k)s ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠway, ﾠlong ﾠallowed ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
formally ﾠby ﾠFDA, ﾠwas ﾠendorsed ﾠby ﾠCongress ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠSafe ﾠMedical ﾠDevices ﾠAct ﾠof ﾠ1990 ﾠ
(“SMDA”).67 ﾠ ﾠ
Finally, ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠreclassified ﾠfrom ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠto ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠor ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠ
may ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠas ﾠpredicates; ﾠmoreover, ﾠany ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠor ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠdevice ﾠcan ﾠgo ﾠthrough ﾠ
510(k).68 ﾠNew ﾠdevices ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠreclassified ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠtime ﾠof ﾠpremarket ﾠreview ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠ
“de ﾠnovo” ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess, ﾠcreated ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠFDAMA ﾠin ﾠ1997, ﾠwhich ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠto ﾠreclassi-ﾭ‐‑
fy ﾠa ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevice ﾠwhen ﾠno ﾠother ﾠsatisfactory ﾠpredicate ﾠis ﾠavailable.69 ﾠThe ﾠde ﾠnovo ﾠpro-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
63 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
64 ﾠSee ﾠStanley ﾠS. ﾠWang ﾠ& ﾠJohn ﾠJ. ﾠSmith, ﾠPotential ﾠLegal ﾠBarriers ﾠto ﾠIncreasing ﾠCMS/FDA ﾠCollaboration: ﾠThe ﾠLaw ﾠ
of ﾠTrade ﾠSecrets ﾠand ﾠRelated ﾠConsiderations, ﾠ58 ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠL.J. ﾠ613, ﾠ615 ﾠ(2003). ﾠ
65 ﾠSee ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠ(510k), ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ41. ﾠ
66 ﾠSee ﾠINSTITUTE ﾠOF ﾠMEDICINE, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ87–88. ﾠ
67 ﾠPub. ﾠL. ﾠNo. ﾠ101-ﾭ‐‑629, ﾠ104 ﾠStat. ﾠ4511; ﾠsee ﾠHUTT ﾠET ﾠAL., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ10, ﾠat ﾠ998–99. ﾠ
68 ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠ(510k), ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ41. ﾠ
69 ﾠPub. ﾠL. ﾠNo. ﾠ105-ﾭ‐‑115, ﾠ§ ﾠ207, ﾠ111 ﾠStat. ﾠ2296; ﾠMichael ﾠA. ﾠSwit, ﾠThe ﾠ“de ﾠNovo” ﾠ510(k) ﾠProcess ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠReclassifi-ﾭ‐‑
cation ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠDevices, ﾠRAPS ﾠFOCUS, ﾠMarch ﾠ2006, ﾠat ﾠ32, ﾠ32, ﾠavailable ﾠat ﾠhttp://www.medicaldevices.org/ ﾠ
sites/default/files/Swit-ﾭ‐‑-ﾭ‐‑RAPSFocusArticle-ﾭ‐‑-ﾭ‐‑deNovo510k-ﾭ‐‑-ﾭ‐‑March2006.pdf; ﾠJames ﾠG. ﾠDickinson, ﾠ510(k) ﾠCau-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠEngulfs ﾠFDA—Predicate ﾠChoices ﾠQuestioned, ﾠMED. ﾠDEVICE ﾠ& ﾠDIAGNOSTIC ﾠINDUSTRY ﾠ(June ﾠ3, ﾠ2010), ﾠ
http://www.mddionline.com/article/510k-ﾭ‐‑caution-ﾭ‐‑engulfs-ﾭ‐‑fda—predicate-ﾭ‐‑choices-ﾭ‐‑questioned. ﾠ ﾠ 16 ﾠ
cess ﾠ was ﾠ meant ﾠ to ﾠ mitigate ﾠ the ﾠ 1976 ﾠ MDA’s ﾠ problem ﾠ that ﾠ truly ﾠ innovative ﾠ devices ﾠ
would ﾠbe ﾠoutside ﾠthe ﾠscope ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠand ﾠtherefore, ﾠironically, ﾠbe ﾠpenalized ﾠby ﾠtheir ﾠ
own ﾠnovelty ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠform ﾠof ﾠa ﾠPMA ﾠobligation.70 ﾠThis ﾠwas ﾠin ﾠspite ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠfact ﾠthat ﾠmany ﾠ
new ﾠdevices ﾠmore ﾠclosely ﾠmatched ﾠthe ﾠrisk ﾠprofile ﾠof ﾠa ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠor ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevice, ﾠeven ﾠas ﾠ
their ﾠ originality ﾠ prevented ﾠ a ﾠ claim ﾠ of ﾠ substantial ﾠ equivalence ﾠ to ﾠ those ﾠ devices. ﾠ The ﾠ
FDAMA ﾠwas ﾠintended ﾠto ﾠtie ﾠthe ﾠrigor ﾠof ﾠpremarket ﾠreview ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠrisk ﾠof ﾠa ﾠparticular ﾠ
kind ﾠof ﾠdevice, ﾠand ﾠso ﾠthe ﾠde ﾠnovo ﾠprocess ﾠwas ﾠcreated ﾠfor ﾠlower ﾠrisk ﾠ— ﾠbut ﾠnew ﾠ— ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
vices.71 ﾠTo ﾠutilize ﾠthis ﾠprocedure, ﾠa ﾠmanufacturer ﾠsubmits ﾠa ﾠ510(k), ﾠwhich ﾠwill ﾠbe ﾠreject-ﾭ‐‑
ed ﾠfor ﾠlack ﾠof ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠwith ﾠa ﾠproper ﾠpredicate ﾠdevice.72 ﾠAt ﾠthat ﾠpoint, ﾠthe ﾠ
manufacturer ﾠcan ﾠfile ﾠa ﾠde ﾠnovo ﾠpetition ﾠwith ﾠFDA, ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠit ﾠmay ﾠsuggest ﾠa ﾠClass ﾠand ﾠ
explain ﾠthe ﾠdegree ﾠof ﾠcontrol ﾠnecessary ﾠto ﾠensure ﾠthe ﾠdevice’s ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness.73 ﾠ
The ﾠmanufacturer ﾠmust ﾠshow ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠdevice ﾠwould ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠsubstantially ﾠequivalent ﾠ
to ﾠa ﾠClass ﾠI ﾠor ﾠII ﾠdevice, ﾠif ﾠone ﾠexisted.74 ﾠAfter ﾠFDA ﾠpublishes ﾠits ﾠclassification ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ
Federal ﾠRegister, ﾠthe ﾠdevice ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠas ﾠa ﾠpredicate.75 ﾠ
A ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠalso ﾠrequired ﾠwhen ﾠa ﾠmanufacturer ﾠmakes ﾠchanges ﾠto ﾠan ﾠexisting, ﾠle-ﾭ‐‑
gally ﾠ marketed ﾠ device. ﾠ FDA ﾠ employs ﾠ a ﾠ special ﾠ process ﾠ for ﾠ this ﾠ incremental ﾠ 510(k), ﾠ
                                                 
70 ﾠSee ﾠSwit, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ69, ﾠat ﾠ32. ﾠThis ﾠis ﾠbecause ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠautomatically ﾠplaced ﾠinto ﾠClass ﾠIII, ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠ
initially. ﾠId. ﾠ
71 ﾠSee ﾠid.; ﾠSUNG, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ37, ﾠat ﾠ171. ﾠ
72 ﾠSwit, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ69, ﾠat ﾠ33. ﾠ
73 ﾠId. ﾠ
74 ﾠSUNG, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ37, ﾠat ﾠ171. ﾠ
75 ﾠSee ﾠSwit, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ69, ﾠat ﾠ33. ﾠ ﾠ 17 ﾠ
known ﾠappropriately ﾠas ﾠa ﾠ“Special ﾠ510(k).”76 ﾠThis ﾠtype ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠmost ﾠclosely ﾠanalo-ﾭ‐‑
gous ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠsecond ﾠscenario ﾠoutlined ﾠabove, ﾠbecause ﾠit ﾠreferences ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠused ﾠto ﾠ
clear ﾠthe ﾠexisting ﾠdevice. ﾠIt ﾠis ﾠan ﾠappealing ﾠprocedure ﾠbecause ﾠit ﾠis ﾠprocessed ﾠwithin ﾠ30 ﾠ
days.77 ﾠSpecial ﾠ510(k)s ﾠare ﾠappropriate ﾠfor ﾠchanges ﾠthat ﾠretain ﾠa ﾠdevice’s ﾠintended ﾠuse ﾠ
and ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠamount ﾠto ﾠan ﾠalteration ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠdevice’s ﾠ“fundamental ﾠscientific ﾠtechnolo-ﾭ‐‑
gy.”78 ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠa ﾠmanufacturer ﾠmay ﾠproperly ﾠsubmit ﾠa ﾠSpecial ﾠ510(k) ﾠwhen ﾠchang-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠa ﾠdevice’s ﾠenergy ﾠtype, ﾠenvironmental ﾠspecifications, ﾠergonomics, ﾠdimensions, ﾠsoft-ﾭ‐‑
ware, ﾠor ﾠpackaging.79 ﾠOn ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠhand, ﾠa ﾠmore ﾠcentral ﾠalteration ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠa ﾠchange ﾠ
from ﾠa ﾠmetal ﾠblade ﾠto ﾠa ﾠlaser ﾠin ﾠa ﾠsurgical ﾠdevice ﾠwould ﾠnot ﾠbe ﾠappropriate.80 ﾠChanges ﾠin ﾠ
materials ﾠcan ﾠsometimes ﾠbe ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠa ﾠSpecial ﾠ510(k), ﾠif ﾠthose ﾠmaterials ﾠare ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
consequential ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠsafety ﾠor ﾠeffectiveness ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠdevice.81 ﾠUltimately, ﾠthis ﾠmechanism ﾠ
facilitates ﾠsmall ﾠbut ﾠpotentially ﾠuseful ﾠtechnological ﾠtweaks ﾠby ﾠpermitting ﾠrapid ﾠtimes ﾠto ﾠ
market ﾠfor ﾠthem. ﾠ
3. ﾠSubstantial ﾠEquivalence ﾠ
 ﾠ To ﾠtruly ﾠunderstand ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess, ﾠone ﾠmust ﾠappreciate ﾠthe ﾠlegal ﾠstandards ﾠ
FDA ﾠuses ﾠto ﾠevaluate ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence. ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠgrounded ﾠin ﾠsubstantial ﾠequiva-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
76 ﾠThe ﾠNew ﾠ510(k) ﾠParadigm: ﾠAlternate ﾠApproaches ﾠto ﾠDemonstrating ﾠSubstantial ﾠEquivalence ﾠin ﾠPremarket ﾠNotifi-ﾭ‐‑
cations, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17. ﾠ
77 ﾠId. ﾠ
78 ﾠId. ﾠ ﾠ
79 ﾠId. ﾠ
80 ﾠId. ﾠ
81 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠa ﾠchange ﾠin ﾠa ﾠmaterial ﾠthat ﾠcontacts ﾠbody ﾠtissue ﾠto ﾠone ﾠthat ﾠhas ﾠnot ﾠyet ﾠbeen ﾠused ﾠin ﾠ
any ﾠpredicate ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠusually ﾠnot ﾠappropriately ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠa ﾠSpecial ﾠ510(k). ﾠId. ﾠ ﾠ 18 ﾠ
lence, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠbasis ﾠfor ﾠits ﾠassurances ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness. ﾠ
For ﾠthis, ﾠdevices ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠmust ﾠhave ﾠsome ﾠguarantee ﾠthat ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠat ﾠ
least ﾠas ﾠsafe ﾠand ﾠeffective ﾠas ﾠa ﾠpredicate ﾠdevice, ﾠbecause ﾠFDA ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠfreshly ﾠreview ﾠ
these ﾠdevices ﾠfor ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠthrough ﾠPMA.82 ﾠIndeed, ﾠFDA ﾠis ﾠonly ﾠempow-ﾭ‐‑
ered ﾠto ﾠissue ﾠan ﾠorder ﾠof ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠonce ﾠit ﾠconcludes ﾠas ﾠsuch.83 ﾠ
Although ﾠthe ﾠterm ﾠ“substantial ﾠequivalence” ﾠappeared ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠMDA, ﾠit ﾠwas ﾠonly ﾠ
ever ﾠdefined ﾠsubstantively ﾠby ﾠFDA ﾠregulation, ﾠwhich ﾠtook ﾠa ﾠflexible, ﾠsliding-ﾭ‐‑scale ﾠap-ﾭ‐‑
proach.84 ﾠSubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠunder ﾠthis ﾠparadigm ﾠvaried ﾠgreatly, ﾠfrom ﾠmere ﾠequiv-ﾭ‐‑
alence ﾠin ﾠlabeling ﾠand ﾠdescriptive ﾠinformation ﾠfor ﾠlow-ﾭ‐‑risk ﾠdevices, ﾠto ﾠperformance ﾠdata ﾠ
requirements ﾠfor ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐‑risk ﾠdevices.85 ﾠFrightened ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠjudicial ﾠdecision ﾠmight ﾠdisrupt ﾠ
its ﾠregulatory ﾠedifice, ﾠFDA ﾠpersuaded ﾠCongress ﾠto ﾠcodify ﾠits ﾠunderstanding, ﾠwhich ﾠit ﾠ
did ﾠin ﾠ1990 ﾠby ﾠamending ﾠthe ﾠFDCA ﾠto ﾠinclude ﾠ§ ﾠ513(i).86 ﾠ ﾠ
This ﾠnow-ﾭ‐‑statutory ﾠdefinition ﾠoutlines ﾠthe ﾠfollowing ﾠschematic ﾠfor ﾠdetermining ﾠ
substantial ﾠequivalence: ﾠFirst, ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠautomatically ﾠconsidered ﾠsubstantially ﾠequiva-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
82 ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠ(510k), ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ41. ﾠ
83 ﾠSee ﾠThe ﾠNew ﾠ510(k) ﾠParadigm: ﾠAlternate ﾠApproaches ﾠto ﾠDemonstrating ﾠSubstantial ﾠEquivalence ﾠin ﾠPremarket ﾠ
Notifications, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17. ﾠ
84 ﾠSee ﾠINSTITUTE ﾠOF ﾠMEDICINE, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ87–88. ﾠFDA ﾠbased ﾠits ﾠinterpretation ﾠon ﾠlanguage ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠ
MDA’s ﾠlegislative ﾠhistory. ﾠGuidance ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠfor ﾠDevices ﾠand ﾠRadiological ﾠHealth’s ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠ
Review ﾠProgram, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ20; ﾠsee ﾠH.R. ﾠREP. ﾠNo. ﾠ94-ﾭ‐‑853, ﾠat ﾠ36–37 ﾠ(1976) ﾠ(“The ﾠcommittee ﾠbelieves ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠ
term ﾠshould ﾠbe ﾠconstrued ﾠnarrowly ﾠwhere ﾠnecessary ﾠto ﾠassure ﾠthe ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠof ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠbut ﾠ
not ﾠnarrowly ﾠwhere ﾠdifferences ﾠbetween ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠand ﾠa ﾠmarketed ﾠdevice ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠrelate ﾠto ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠ
effectiveness.”). ﾠ
85 ﾠSee ﾠThe ﾠNew ﾠ510(k) ﾠParadigm: ﾠAlternate ﾠApproaches ﾠto ﾠDemonstrating ﾠSubstantial ﾠEquivalence ﾠin ﾠPremarket ﾠ
Notifications, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17. ﾠ
86 ﾠSee ﾠINSTITUTE ﾠOF ﾠMEDICINE, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ88. ﾠ ﾠ 19 ﾠ
lent ﾠto ﾠa ﾠpredicate ﾠdevice ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠtwo ﾠshare ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠintended ﾠuse ﾠand ﾠtechnological ﾠ
characteristics.87 ﾠIf ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠhas ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠintended ﾠuse ﾠbut ﾠdifferent ﾠtechnological ﾠ
characteristics ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠpredicate,88 ﾠit ﾠis ﾠsubstantially ﾠequivalent ﾠif: ﾠ(1) ﾠthe ﾠchange ﾠin ﾠtech-ﾭ‐‑
nology ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠraise ﾠnovel ﾠquestions ﾠof ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠas ﾠcompared ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠ
predicate, ﾠand ﾠ(2) ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠotherwise ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠas ﾠsafe ﾠand ﾠeffective ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠpredi-ﾭ‐‑
cate.89 ﾠConversely, ﾠ two ﾠ devices ﾠ are ﾠ not ﾠ substantially ﾠ equivalent ﾠ if ﾠ the ﾠ new ﾠ features ﾠ
“could ﾠaffect ﾠsafety ﾠor ﾠeffectiveness ﾠin ﾠa ﾠway ﾠthat ﾠis ﾠconsequential ﾠunder ﾠconditions ﾠof ﾠ
intended ﾠuse.”90 ﾠA ﾠdevice ﾠwith ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠintended ﾠuse ﾠpresents ﾠa ﾠmore ﾠdifficult ﾠcase ﾠfor ﾠ
substantial ﾠequivalence. ﾠ ﾠ
Ultimately, ﾠ this ﾠ statutory ﾠ definition ﾠ leaves ﾠ many ﾠ ambiguities ﾠ and ﾠ may ﾠ fail ﾠ to ﾠ
generate ﾠthe ﾠflexible ﾠapproach ﾠthat ﾠaccounts ﾠfor ﾠvarying ﾠrisk ﾠamong ﾠdevice ﾠtypes. ﾠThus, ﾠ
a ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠdetermination ﾠin ﾠpractice ﾠ(and ﾠthe ﾠquantity ﾠof ﾠinformation ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
quired ﾠto ﾠmake ﾠsuch ﾠa ﾠdetermination) ﾠutilizes ﾠa ﾠmultitude ﾠof ﾠfactors ﾠweighed ﾠby ﾠFDA. ﾠ
Some ﾠof ﾠthese ﾠinclude: ﾠintended ﾠuse, ﾠdesign, ﾠenergy ﾠconsumption, ﾠmaterials, ﾠchemical ﾠ
composition, ﾠmanufacturing ﾠprocess, ﾠlabeling, ﾠbiocompatibility, ﾠthe ﾠdisease ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠtreat-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
87 ﾠFDA ﾠaction ﾠon ﾠa ﾠpremarket ﾠnotification, ﾠ21 ﾠC.F.R. ﾠ§ ﾠ807.100 ﾠ(2010); ﾠGuidance ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠfor ﾠDevices ﾠand ﾠ
Radiological ﾠHealth’s ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠReview ﾠProgram, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ20. ﾠ
88 ﾠExamples ﾠof ﾠ“different ﾠtechnological ﾠcharacteristics” ﾠinclude ﾠchanges ﾠin ﾠmaterials, ﾠdesign, ﾠenergy ﾠ
source, ﾠor ﾠother ﾠfeatures. ﾠ21 ﾠC.F.R. ﾠ§ ﾠ801.100 ﾠ(2010). ﾠ
89 ﾠId. ﾠ
90 ﾠGuidance ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠCenter ﾠfor ﾠDevices ﾠand ﾠRadiological ﾠHealth’s ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠReview ﾠProgram, ﾠsupra ﾠ
note ﾠ20. ﾠ ﾠ 20 ﾠ
ed ﾠor ﾠdiagnosed, ﾠwhether ﾠthe ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠfor ﾠprofessional ﾠor ﾠlay ﾠuse, ﾠthe ﾠbody ﾠpart ﾠor ﾠtype ﾠ
of ﾠtissue ﾠinvolved, ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠfrequency ﾠof ﾠuse.91 ﾠ
To ﾠ put ﾠ this ﾠ rubric ﾠ in ﾠ perspective ﾠ and ﾠ provide ﾠ some ﾠ real-ﾭ‐‑world ﾠ context, ﾠ from ﾠ
2005-ﾭ‐‑2007, ﾠall ﾠdevices ﾠdetermined ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠsubstantially ﾠequivalent ﾠhad ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠintended ﾠ
uses ﾠas ﾠtheir ﾠpredicates, ﾠand ﾠ86% ﾠhad ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠtechnological ﾠcharacteristics.92 ﾠOn ﾠthe ﾠ
other ﾠhand, ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠ50% ﾠof ﾠthose ﾠdevices ﾠdetermined ﾠnot ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠsubstantially ﾠequiva-ﾭ‐‑
lent ﾠhad ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠintended ﾠuse ﾠor ﾠdifferent ﾠtechnological ﾠcharacteristics ﾠfrom ﾠtheir ﾠpredi-ﾭ‐‑
cates.93 ﾠOverall, ﾠthe ﾠvast ﾠmajority ﾠof ﾠsubmissions ﾠare ﾠcleared ﾠeasily: ﾠonly ﾠ1% ﾠof ﾠall ﾠsub-ﾭ‐‑
missions ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠperiod ﾠhad ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠintended ﾠuse, ﾠand ﾠonly ﾠ15% ﾠhad ﾠnew ﾠtechnological ﾠ
characteristics.94 ﾠThese ﾠdata ﾠsuggest ﾠthat ﾠmost ﾠdevices ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k) ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠ
venture ﾠbeyond ﾠtheir ﾠpredicates ﾠtechnologically. ﾠ
In ﾠorder ﾠto ﾠfulfill ﾠthe ﾠrequirement ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k) ﾠbe ﾠ
substantially ﾠequivalent ﾠto ﾠa ﾠlegally ﾠmarketed ﾠdevice, ﾠFDA ﾠrequires ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠdevice ﾠused ﾠ
as ﾠa ﾠpredicate ﾠremain ﾠlegally ﾠmarketed; ﾠin ﾠother ﾠwords, ﾠFDA ﾠmust ﾠnot ﾠhave ﾠremoved ﾠ
the ﾠpredicate ﾠdevice ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠmarket.95 ﾠMore ﾠthan ﾠthis, ﾠFDA ﾠhas ﾠbegun ﾠto ﾠinsist ﾠon ﾠbet-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
91 ﾠId.; ﾠPremarket ﾠNotification ﾠ(510k), ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ41. ﾠ
92 ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ7. ﾠ
93 ﾠId. ﾠ
94 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
95 ﾠSee ﾠ21 ﾠC.F.R. ﾠ§ ﾠ807.100 ﾠ(2010). ﾠNonetheless, ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠthat ﾠis ﾠoff ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠbecause ﾠof ﾠa ﾠvoluntary ﾠrecall ﾠ
or ﾠfor ﾠobsolescence ﾠor ﾠunprofitability ﾠreasons ﾠmay ﾠstill ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠas ﾠa ﾠpredicate. ﾠAlarmingly, ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠ29% ﾠof ﾠ
devices ﾠapplying ﾠfor ﾠ510(k) ﾠcited ﾠpredicates ﾠno ﾠlonger ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠmarket. ﾠSee ﾠIndustry ﾠreacts ﾠto ﾠproposed ﾠ
changes ﾠto ﾠ510(K) ﾠprogram, ﾠMASSDEVICE ﾠ(Aug. ﾠ4, ﾠ2010), ﾠhttp://www.massdevice.com/news/update-ﾭ‐‑
industry-ﾭ‐‑reacts-ﾭ‐‑proposed-ﾭ‐‑changes-ﾭ‐‑510k-ﾭ‐‑program. ﾠ ﾠ 21 ﾠ
ter ﾠperforming ﾠpredicate ﾠdevices ﾠthan ﾠhas ﾠbeen ﾠseen ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠpast. ﾠA ﾠmanufacturer’s ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
centive ﾠis ﾠto ﾠproceed ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠpredicate ﾠdevice ﾠthat ﾠwill ﾠbest ﾠfacilitate ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠ
(even ﾠa ﾠpoorly ﾠperforming ﾠone), ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠa ﾠwell ﾠperforming ﾠpredicate ﾠthat ﾠpresents ﾠ
the ﾠbest ﾠreflection ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠdevice’s ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠprofile.96 ﾠIn ﾠrecognition ﾠof ﾠ
this ﾠproblem, ﾠFDA ﾠannounced ﾠthat ﾠit ﾠmay ﾠbegin ﾠrejecting ﾠpoorly ﾠperforming ﾠpredicates ﾠ
when ﾠbetter ﾠones ﾠare ﾠavailable.97 ﾠ
The ﾠ use ﾠ of ﾠ good ﾠ quality, ﾠ well ﾠ performing ﾠ predicate ﾠ devices ﾠ is ﾠ extremely ﾠ im-ﾭ‐‑
portant, ﾠ in ﾠ part ﾠ because ﾠ of ﾠ a ﾠ well-ﾭ‐‑recognized ﾠ phenomenon ﾠ known ﾠ as ﾠ “equivalence ﾠ
creep” ﾠor ﾠ“piggybacking.”98 ﾠThis ﾠpractice, ﾠwhich ﾠhas ﾠseen ﾠdaylight ﾠsince ﾠthe ﾠpassage ﾠof ﾠ
the ﾠSMDA ﾠin ﾠ1990 ﾠformally ﾠpermitted ﾠFDA’s ﾠlongstanding ﾠinformal ﾠpolicies, ﾠconsists ﾠof ﾠ
claiming ﾠ substantial ﾠ equivalence ﾠ to ﾠ another ﾠ postamendment ﾠ device ﾠ that ﾠ itself ﾠ was ﾠ
cleared ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess.99 ﾠBy ﾠthis ﾠmechanism, ﾠthe ﾠincremental ﾠdifferences ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
tween ﾠsuccessive ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠsubstantially ﾠimpact ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠ(and ﾠ
therefore ﾠallow ﾠfor ﾠ510(k) ﾠclearance) ﾠcan ﾠcumulate ﾠto ﾠa ﾠlarge ﾠdisparity ﾠbetween ﾠearlier ﾠ
and ﾠlater ﾠdevices. ﾠA ﾠlineage ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠnearly ﾠimpossible ﾠfor ﾠFDA ﾠto ﾠrecreate,100 ﾠ
undermining ﾠ510(k)’s ﾠassurances ﾠof ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness.101 ﾠ ﾠ
                                                 
96 ﾠSee ﾠDickinson, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ69. ﾠ
97 ﾠId. ﾠ
98 ﾠHUTT ﾠET ﾠAL., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ10, ﾠat ﾠ998–99. ﾠ
99 ﾠId.; ﾠsee ﾠalso ﾠINSTITUTE ﾠOF ﾠMEDICINE, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ88, ﾠ230. ﾠ
100 ﾠId. ﾠat ﾠ81 ﾠ
101 ﾠIndeed, ﾠthis ﾠprocess ﾠhas ﾠbeen ﾠcriticized ﾠeven ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠpopular ﾠpress, ﾠwhich ﾠreferred ﾠto ﾠit ﾠas ﾠa ﾠ“daisy-ﾭ‐‑chain ﾠ
system ﾠof ﾠregulation, ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠsimply ﾠpiggy-ﾭ‐‑back ﾠon ﾠearlier ﾠones, ﾠwithout ﾠany ﾠ[independent] ﾠ ﾠ 22 ﾠ
D. ﾠDoes ﾠ510(k) ﾠAdequately ﾠStrike ﾠa ﾠBalance ﾠBetween ﾠProtection ﾠand ﾠPromotion? ﾠ
1. ﾠDevice ﾠRecalls ﾠand ﾠPublic ﾠDiscontent ﾠ
 ﾠ A ﾠseries ﾠof ﾠhigh ﾠprofile ﾠrecalls ﾠhas ﾠproduced ﾠa ﾠchallenge ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprogram ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠpress ﾠand ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠcourt ﾠof ﾠpublic ﾠopinion. ﾠBetween ﾠ2005 ﾠand ﾠ2009, ﾠ3,510 ﾠmedical ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
vices ﾠ were ﾠ voluntarily ﾠ recalled,102 ﾠincluding ﾠ newsworthy ﾠ recalls ﾠ such ﾠ as ﾠ Johnson ﾠ & ﾠ
Johnson’s ﾠASR ﾠhip ﾠimplants ﾠand ﾠsurgical ﾠmeshes ﾠmade ﾠby ﾠBoston ﾠScientific.103 ﾠOverall, ﾠ
71% ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠrecalls ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠperiod ﾠwere ﾠfor ﾠdevices ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k), ﾠand ﾠmany ﾠof ﾠ
these ﾠwere ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠor ﾠotherwise ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐‑risk.104 ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠone ﾠcase ﾠinvolved ﾠan ﾠ
inferior ﾠvena ﾠcava ﾠfilter, ﾠwhich ﾠwas ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevices ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠSpecial ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
process ﾠthat ﾠfractured ﾠin ﾠ25% ﾠof ﾠpatients.105 ﾠIn ﾠspite ﾠof ﾠlater ﾠrecalls ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠthese, ﾠhasty ﾠ
510(k) ﾠclearances ﾠremain ﾠextremely ﾠprofitable ﾠfor ﾠdevice ﾠcompanies.106 ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ Because ﾠof ﾠhow ﾠthin ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠreview ﾠprocess ﾠcan ﾠbe, ﾠrecalls ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠcleared ﾠ
through ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠhave ﾠled ﾠto ﾠoutcry ﾠfrom ﾠa ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠprominent ﾠinstitutions. ﾠ
Public ﾠCitizen’s ﾠPeter ﾠLurie ﾠopined ﾠthat ﾠ“the ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠis ﾠa ﾠloophole ﾠthat’s ﾠswal-ﾭ‐‑
                                                                                                                                                           
examination ﾠof ﾠtheir ﾠsafety.” ﾠBarry ﾠMeier, ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠApproval ﾠProcess ﾠIs ﾠCalled ﾠFlawed, ﾠN.Y. ﾠTimes, ﾠJuly ﾠ
30, ﾠ2011, ﾠat ﾠB1. ﾠ
102 ﾠU.S. ﾠGOV’T ﾠACCOUNTABILITY ﾠOFFICE, ﾠGAO-ﾭ‐‑11-ﾭ‐‑556T, ﾠMEDICAL ﾠDEVICES: ﾠFDA’S ﾠPREMARKET ﾠREVIEW ﾠAND ﾠ
POSTMARKET ﾠSAFETY ﾠEFFORTS ﾠ11 ﾠ(2011) ﾠ[hereinafter ﾠGAO ﾠ2011]. ﾠ
103 ﾠDebra ﾠSherman, ﾠConsumer ﾠReports ﾠtaps ﾠire ﾠover ﾠbad ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠREUTERS, ﾠMar. ﾠ12, ﾠ2012, ﾠavailable ﾠat ﾠ
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/12/us-ﾭ‐‑devices-ﾭ‐‑idUSBRE82B1CX20120312 ﾠ(reporting ﾠJ&J’s ﾠrecall ﾠin ﾠ
response ﾠto ﾠhigh ﾠfailure ﾠrates ﾠwhere ﾠpatients ﾠexperienced ﾠpain, ﾠjoint ﾠdislocation, ﾠand ﾠdamage ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠheart, ﾠ
thyroid, ﾠand ﾠcentral ﾠnervous ﾠsystem ﾠdue ﾠto ﾠcobalt ﾠand ﾠchromium ﾠpoisoning); ﾠsee ﾠalso ﾠBarry ﾠMeier, ﾠHip ﾠ
Device ﾠPhaseout ﾠFollowed ﾠF.D.A. ﾠData ﾠRequest, ﾠN.Y. ﾠTIMES, ﾠMar. ﾠ23, ﾠ2012, ﾠat ﾠB1. ﾠ
104 ﾠZuckerman ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ5, ﾠat ﾠ1006–07. ﾠ
105 ﾠRedberg, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ1832. ﾠ
106 ﾠSee ﾠGeire, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ56, ﾠat ﾠ250. ﾠ ﾠ 23 ﾠ
lowed ﾠthe ﾠlaw.”107 ﾠThe ﾠpresident ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠNational ﾠResearch ﾠCenter ﾠfor ﾠWomen ﾠand ﾠFami-ﾭ‐‑
lies ﾠstated ﾠthat ﾠwhat ﾠis ﾠ“most ﾠworrisome ﾠabout ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠis ﾠwhether ﾠproducts ﾠ
that ﾠare ﾠmade ﾠout ﾠof ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠmaterial ﾠor ﾠusing ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠtechnology ﾠcan ﾠrealistically ﾠbe ﾠcon-ﾭ‐‑
sidered ﾠsafe ﾠwithout ﾠclinical ﾠtrials ﾠor ﾠa ﾠthorough ﾠreview.”108 ﾠConsumer’s ﾠUnion ﾠ(the ﾠad-ﾭ‐‑
vocacy ﾠarm ﾠof ﾠConsumer ﾠReports) ﾠhas ﾠbegun ﾠto ﾠcampaign ﾠfor ﾠchange ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
vice ﾠapproval ﾠprocess.109 ﾠ
 ﾠ Courts ﾠand ﾠcommentators ﾠhave ﾠalso ﾠcriticized ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠas ﾠlacking ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ
strength ﾠneeded ﾠto ﾠassure ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness.110 ﾠEven ﾠthe ﾠSupreme ﾠCourt ﾠhas ﾠhad ﾠ
occasion ﾠto ﾠcomment ﾠon ﾠit, ﾠobserving ﾠthat ﾠ510(k) ﾠclearances ﾠ“provide ﾠlittle ﾠprotection ﾠto ﾠ
the ﾠpublic” ﾠbecause ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠ“focused ﾠon ﾠequivalence, ﾠnot ﾠsafety.”111 ﾠ
 ﾠ Worst ﾠof ﾠall, ﾠpatients, ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠusers ﾠand ﾠbeneficiaries ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠtypical-ﾭ‐‑
ly ﾠknow ﾠnothing ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠregulatory ﾠprocess ﾠby ﾠwhich ﾠthey ﾠreach ﾠmarket. ﾠMost ﾠsimply ﾠas-ﾭ‐‑
sume ﾠthat ﾠFDA ﾠplays ﾠa ﾠheavy ﾠhand ﾠin ﾠregulating ﾠthem ﾠfor ﾠsafety, ﾠand ﾠare ﾠ“livid” ﾠwhen ﾠ
they ﾠ learn ﾠ how ﾠ most ﾠ devices ﾠ are ﾠ actually ﾠ cleared.112 ﾠUnfortunately, ﾠ these ﾠ discoveries ﾠ
                                                 
107 ﾠFlaherty, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ4, ﾠat ﾠ922. ﾠ
108 ﾠId. ﾠ
109 ﾠSherman, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ103. ﾠUnsurprisingly, ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠtrade ﾠgroup ﾠAvaMed ﾠhas ﾠpushed ﾠback, ﾠ
warning ﾠthat ﾠgreater ﾠregulation ﾠwould ﾠstifle ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠmedical ﾠdevices. ﾠId. ﾠ
110 ﾠE.g., ﾠFlaherty, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ4, ﾠat ﾠ903. ﾠ
111 ﾠMedtronic, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠLohr, ﾠ518 ﾠU.S. ﾠ470, ﾠ493 ﾠ(1996) ﾠ(emphasis ﾠin ﾠoriginal) ﾠ(internal ﾠquotations ﾠomitted). ﾠ
The ﾠSupreme ﾠCourt ﾠnonetheless ﾠrecognizes ﾠthe ﾠdifficult ﾠbalance ﾠthat ﾠ510(k) ﾠattempts ﾠto ﾠstrike ﾠin ﾠmedical ﾠ
device ﾠregulation. ﾠSee ﾠBuckman ﾠCo. ﾠv. ﾠPlaintiffs’ ﾠLegal ﾠComm., ﾠ531 ﾠU.S. ﾠ341 ﾠ(2001) ﾠ(“While ﾠthe ﾠ§ ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
process ﾠlack’s ﾠthe ﾠPMA ﾠreview’s ﾠrigor ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ[its] ﾠflexibility ﾠis ﾠa ﾠcritical ﾠcomponent ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠframework ﾠunder ﾠ
which ﾠthe ﾠFDA ﾠpursues ﾠits ﾠdifficult ﾠ(and ﾠoften ﾠcompeting) ﾠobjectives.”). ﾠ ﾠ
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usually ﾠarise ﾠin ﾠcircumstances ﾠwhere ﾠpatients ﾠare ﾠtoo ﾠconcerned ﾠwith ﾠmajor ﾠmedical ﾠ
problems ﾠto ﾠbecome ﾠinvolved ﾠin ﾠFDA-ﾭ‐‑related ﾠactivism.113 ﾠ
2. ﾠThe ﾠGAO ﾠReport ﾠand ﾠFDA’s ﾠProposed ﾠNew ﾠRules ﾠfor ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
 ﾠ Congress, ﾠobserving ﾠsome ﾠof ﾠthese ﾠissues, ﾠrequired ﾠthe ﾠGovernment ﾠAccountabil-ﾭ‐‑
ity ﾠOffice ﾠ(“GAO”) ﾠto ﾠstudy ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠas ﾠpart ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠFDA ﾠAmendments ﾠAct ﾠof ﾠ
2007.114 ﾠGAO ﾠreleased ﾠits ﾠfindings ﾠin ﾠ2009. ﾠIt ﾠdetermined ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠ
designed ﾠto ﾠensure ﾠsafety ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠinstance, ﾠbut ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠlarge ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐‑risk ﾠClass ﾠ
III ﾠdevices ﾠenter ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k) ﾠnonetheless.115 ﾠGAO’s ﾠview ﾠis ﾠthat ﾠprogram, ﾠ
overall, ﾠhas ﾠbecome ﾠtoo ﾠlax. ﾠGAO ﾠrecommended ﾠthat ﾠFDA ﾠtake ﾠaction ﾠto ﾠcomply ﾠwith ﾠ
the ﾠSMDA’s ﾠdirective ﾠto ﾠrequire ﾠPMA ﾠfor ﾠall ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠ(or ﾠreclassify ﾠthem).116 ﾠ
FDA ﾠagreed ﾠwith ﾠthis ﾠrecommendation, ﾠbut ﾠtwo ﾠyears ﾠlater, ﾠGAO ﾠreported ﾠthat ﾠnumer-ﾭ‐‑
ous ﾠClass ﾠIII ﾠdevices ﾠ— ﾠincluding ﾠsome, ﾠlike ﾠimplantable ﾠhip ﾠjoints, ﾠthat ﾠhave ﾠseen ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
calls ﾠ— ﾠremain ﾠmarketable ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k).117 ﾠ
 ﾠ In ﾠresponse ﾠto ﾠthis ﾠstudy, ﾠFDA ﾠdecided ﾠto ﾠreview ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠinternally ﾠ
and ﾠcommissioned ﾠthe ﾠInstitute ﾠof ﾠMedicine ﾠ(“IOM”) ﾠto ﾠdo ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠin ﾠparallel.118 ﾠIn ﾠits ﾠ
report, ﾠrevealed ﾠin ﾠearly ﾠ2011, ﾠFDA ﾠannounced ﾠthat ﾠit ﾠwould ﾠimplement ﾠ25 ﾠnew ﾠmecha-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
113 ﾠId. ﾠ
114 ﾠPub. ﾠL. ﾠNo. ﾠ110-ﾭ‐‑85, ﾠ121 ﾠStat. ﾠ823. ﾠ
115 ﾠGAO ﾠ2009, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ18, ﾠat ﾠ27–28. ﾠ
116 ﾠId. ﾠ
117 ﾠGAO ﾠ2011, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ102, ﾠat ﾠ6–8. ﾠ
118 ﾠFDA ﾠoffers ﾠplans ﾠto ﾠimprove ﾠ510(k) ﾠdevice ﾠclearance ﾠprocess, ﾠpunts ﾠhard ﾠdecisions ﾠto ﾠIOM, ﾠTHEHEART.ORG ﾠ(Jan. ﾠ
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nisms ﾠto ﾠimprove ﾠ510(k), ﾠbolstering ﾠthe ﾠprogram’s ﾠsafety ﾠwhile ﾠfacilitating ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠ
medical ﾠdevices.119 ﾠAmong ﾠthese, ﾠFDA ﾠpromised ﾠto ﾠstreamline ﾠthe ﾠde ﾠnovo ﾠreview ﾠpro-ﾭ‐‑
cess ﾠand ﾠbegin ﾠcommunicating ﾠwith ﾠindustry ﾠmore ﾠregularly.120 ﾠIt ﾠstated ﾠit ﾠwould ﾠissue ﾠ
refreshed ﾠand ﾠclearer ﾠguidance ﾠon ﾠnumerous ﾠissues, ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠwhat ﾠchanges ﾠto ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠ
require ﾠ a ﾠ new ﾠ 510(k) ﾠ and ﾠ when ﾠ clinical ﾠ data ﾠ are ﾠ needed.121 ﾠTo ﾠ improve ﾠ safety, ﾠ FDA ﾠ
pledged ﾠto ﾠestablish ﾠa ﾠ“Science ﾠCenter ﾠCouncil” ﾠof ﾠsenior ﾠFDA ﾠexperts ﾠto ﾠground ﾠthe ﾠ
510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠ(and ﾠeven ﾠinterpretation ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠstatutory ﾠand ﾠregulatory ﾠlegal ﾠstandards) ﾠ
in ﾠscience.122 ﾠThe ﾠagency ﾠsimilarly ﾠstated ﾠit ﾠwould ﾠbegin ﾠto ﾠavail ﾠitself ﾠof ﾠa ﾠnetwork ﾠof ﾠ
external ﾠexperts ﾠfor ﾠsimilar ﾠpurposes.123 ﾠ
Although ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠindustry ﾠwas ﾠapprehensive ﾠabout ﾠthe ﾠpossibility ﾠof ﾠ
more ﾠburdensome ﾠpremarket ﾠregulation ﾠfor ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠFDA’s ﾠproposals ﾠwere ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
ceived ﾠ as ﾠ relatively ﾠ harmless.124 ﾠThe ﾠ agency ﾠ largely ﾠ agreed ﾠ with ﾠ industry ﾠ complaints ﾠ
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120 ﾠPlan ﾠof ﾠAction ﾠfor ﾠImplementation ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠand ﾠScience ﾠRecommendations, ﾠU.S. ﾠFOOD ﾠ& ﾠDRUG ﾠADMIN. ﾠ(Jan. ﾠ
21, ﾠ2011), ﾠhttp://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports/ ﾠ
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http://www.massdevice.com/news/update-ﾭ‐‑industry-ﾭ‐‑reacts-ﾭ‐‑proposed-ﾭ‐‑changes-ﾭ‐‑510k-ﾭ‐‑program. ﾠSome ﾠsaid ﾠ
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that ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠhad ﾠbecome ﾠ“unpredictable, ﾠinconsistent, ﾠand ﾠopaque” ﾠas ﾠdevice ﾠ
complexity ﾠincreased.125 ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ On ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠhand, ﾠFDA ﾠdid ﾠnot ﾠadopt ﾠsome ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠmore ﾠdisruptive ﾠpossibilities ﾠ
it ﾠhad ﾠconsidered. ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠsome ﾠscientists ﾠhad ﾠsuggested ﾠbifurcating ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠinto ﾠ
Class ﾠIIa ﾠand ﾠClass ﾠIIb, ﾠthe ﾠlatter ﾠrequiring ﾠclinical ﾠdata ﾠbefore ﾠclearance ﾠto ﾠmarket.126 ﾠ
Industry ﾠargued ﾠin ﾠreply ﾠthat ﾠspecial ﾠcontrols ﾠand ﾠpostmarket ﾠsurveillance ﾠwere ﾠsuffi-ﾭ‐‑
cient ﾠto ﾠensure ﾠthe ﾠsafety ﾠof ﾠClass ﾠII ﾠdevices, ﾠand ﾠin ﾠany ﾠevent, ﾠFDA ﾠlacked ﾠthe ﾠauthority ﾠ
to ﾠsplit ﾠthe ﾠstatutory ﾠclass.127 ﾠFDA ﾠdeclined ﾠto ﾠadopt ﾠthe ﾠbifurcation ﾠproposal, ﾠa ﾠdecision ﾠ
that ﾠthe ﾠindustry ﾠpredictably ﾠlauded. ﾠConsumer ﾠgroups ﾠlike ﾠPublic ﾠCitizen ﾠresponded ﾠ
that ﾠnot ﾠadopting ﾠthe ﾠClass ﾠIIb ﾠcategory ﾠrepresented ﾠa ﾠfailure ﾠto ﾠremedy ﾠwhat ﾠit ﾠsees ﾠas ﾠ
510(k)’s ﾠinability ﾠto ﾠprotect ﾠthe ﾠpublic.128 ﾠ
3. ﾠThe ﾠIOM ﾠReport ﾠ
 ﾠ In ﾠcontrast, ﾠthe ﾠconcurrent ﾠIOM ﾠreport, ﾠreleased ﾠin ﾠJuly ﾠ2011, ﾠcaused ﾠan ﾠuproar ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠindustry. ﾠIOM, ﾠa ﾠnonpartisan ﾠexpert ﾠarm ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠNational ﾠAcademy ﾠof ﾠSciences, ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
came ﾠinvolved ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠrequest ﾠof ﾠFDA ﾠin ﾠ2009, ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠwake ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠMenaflex ﾠincident ﾠand ﾠ
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(2011). ﾠ
127 ﾠSee ﾠFDA ﾠoffers ﾠplans ﾠto ﾠimprove ﾠ510(k) ﾠdevice ﾠclearance ﾠprocess, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ118. ﾠ
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the ﾠGAO ﾠreport.129 ﾠFDA ﾠinstructed ﾠIOM ﾠto ﾠevaluate ﾠwhether ﾠ510(k) ﾠ“optimally ﾠprotect[s] ﾠ
patient[s] ﾠand ﾠpromote[s] ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠsupport ﾠof ﾠpublic ﾠhealth.”130 ﾠ
 ﾠ IOM, ﾠunwaveringly, ﾠconcluded ﾠthat ﾠ510(k) ﾠshould ﾠbe ﾠabandoned ﾠaltogether ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
cause ﾠit ﾠis ﾠ“flawed” ﾠand ﾠcannot ﾠbe ﾠimproved ﾠto ﾠadequately ﾠexamine ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffec-ﾭ‐‑
tiveness.131 ﾠIndeed, ﾠin ﾠIOM’s ﾠview, ﾠ510(k) ﾠwas ﾠnever ﾠmeant ﾠto ﾠplay ﾠthe ﾠrole ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpre-ﾭ‐‑
market ﾠgatekeeper ﾠfor ﾠsafety, ﾠso ﾠit ﾠis ﾠstructurally ﾠincapable ﾠof ﾠbeing ﾠfixed ﾠto ﾠdo ﾠso. ﾠIOM ﾠ
recommended ﾠin ﾠparticular ﾠthe ﾠconstruction ﾠof ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠregulatory ﾠframework ﾠfor ﾠClass ﾠII, ﾠ
“moderate ﾠrisk” ﾠdevices.132 ﾠ
 ﾠ Remarkably, ﾠindustry ﾠbegan ﾠcriticizing ﾠIOM’s ﾠreport ﾠas ﾠbiased ﾠand ﾠerroneous ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
fore ﾠit ﾠwas ﾠeven ﾠreleased.133 ﾠAn ﾠattack ﾠon ﾠa ﾠreport, ﾠsight ﾠunseen, ﾠwas ﾠunprecedented ﾠfor ﾠ
IOM, ﾠ which ﾠ considers ﾠ itself ﾠ to ﾠ be ﾠ a ﾠ scientific ﾠ rather ﾠ than ﾠ partisan ﾠ organization. ﾠ Alt-ﾭ‐‑
hough ﾠ industry ﾠ fully ﾠ rejected ﾠ its ﾠ report, ﾠ patient ﾠ groups ﾠ embraced ﾠ it.134 ﾠMeanwhile, ﾠ
FDA ﾠ— ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠunder ﾠno ﾠobligation ﾠto ﾠadopt ﾠanything ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠadvisory ﾠreport ﾠ— ﾠwas ﾠ
left ﾠin ﾠdisbelief ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠbreadth ﾠand ﾠcertitude ﾠof ﾠIOM’s ﾠconclusions.135 ﾠ
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E. ﾠInnovation ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠindustry ﾠ
 ﾠ In ﾠspite ﾠof ﾠall ﾠthe ﾠrhetoric ﾠand ﾠregulatory ﾠcomplexity, ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠindustry ﾠ
remains ﾠa ﾠpioneering, ﾠdynamic, ﾠand ﾠhugely ﾠlucrative ﾠfield. ﾠMedical ﾠdevices ﾠrepresent ﾠa ﾠ
$188.8 ﾠbillion ﾠindustry ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates ﾠ(generating ﾠthe ﾠmajority ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠ
revenues ﾠworldwide).136 ﾠWithin ﾠthe ﾠhealthcare ﾠsector, ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠrepresent ﾠa ﾠsig-ﾭ‐‑
nificant ﾠmarket ﾠshare, ﾠand ﾠgrowing ﾠrapidly: ﾠfrom ﾠ35% ﾠin ﾠ2004 ﾠto ﾠ45% ﾠin ﾠ2007.137 ﾠThe ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
dustry ﾠhas ﾠan ﾠoverall ﾠgrowth ﾠrate ﾠof ﾠ23%, ﾠand, ﾠat ﾠa ﾠprofit ﾠrate ﾠof ﾠ18%, ﾠcarries ﾠone ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
highest ﾠmargins ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠprivate ﾠsector.138 ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ Both ﾠrevenues ﾠand ﾠinnovations ﾠare ﾠextremely ﾠunbalanced ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠindustry. ﾠIn ﾠthe ﾠ
United ﾠStates, ﾠthe ﾠlargest ﾠ2% ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠcompanies ﾠproduce ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠhalf ﾠof ﾠall ﾠ
industry ﾠsales.139 ﾠInterestingly, ﾠhowever, ﾠ“virtually ﾠall ﾠrevolutionary ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
velopment ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠU.S.” ﾠis ﾠdriven ﾠby ﾠventure ﾠcapitalists ﾠ(“VCs”), ﾠchanneling ﾠfunds ﾠinto ﾠ
small ﾠstartup ﾠfirms.140 ﾠThis ﾠis ﾠparticularly ﾠrelevant ﾠto ﾠour ﾠdiscussion ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠintroduction ﾠof ﾠ
new ﾠmedical ﾠdevices. ﾠVCs ﾠinvest ﾠbetween ﾠ$2–4 ﾠbillion ﾠeach ﾠyear ﾠin ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠalt-ﾭ‐‑
hough ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠextremely ﾠsensitive ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠregulatory ﾠenvironment ﾠbecause ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠex-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
136 ﾠSee ﾠINSTITUTE ﾠOF ﾠMEDICINE, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ169; ﾠGeire, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ56, ﾠat ﾠ247. ﾠ
137 ﾠId. ﾠ
138 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
139 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
140 ﾠJack ﾠW. ﾠLasersohn, ﾠNat’l ﾠVenture ﾠCapital ﾠAss’n, ﾠInteragency ﾠCollaboration ﾠin ﾠsupport ﾠof ﾠMedical ﾠDe-ﾭ‐‑
vice ﾠInnovation, ﾠSlides ﾠfrom ﾠPresentation ﾠat ﾠFDA ﾠPublic ﾠWorkshop: ﾠIdentifying ﾠUnmet ﾠPublic ﾠHealth ﾠ
Needs ﾠand ﾠFacilitating ﾠInnovation ﾠin ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠDevelopment ﾠ(June ﾠ24, ﾠ2010), ﾠavailable ﾠat ﾠ
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM221031.pdf ﾠ
(emphasis ﾠadded). ﾠ ﾠ 29 ﾠ
pense ﾠof ﾠbringing ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠto ﾠmarket.141 ﾠThey ﾠalso ﾠdemand ﾠsignificant ﾠreturns ﾠfor ﾠ
their ﾠlarge ﾠupfront ﾠinvestment.142 ﾠStill, ﾠthe ﾠamount ﾠof ﾠventure ﾠcapital, ﾠwhich ﾠworks ﾠas ﾠ
rough ﾠproxy ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠlevel ﾠof ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠfield ﾠat ﾠany ﾠgiven ﾠtime, ﾠis ﾠlarge.143 ﾠ
 ﾠ One ﾠarea ﾠof ﾠinnovation ﾠthat ﾠhas ﾠrecently ﾠemerged ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠuse ﾠof ﾠpowerful, ﾠhyper-ﾭ‐‑
connected ﾠmobile ﾠphones ﾠand ﾠtablets ﾠto ﾠimprove ﾠhealthcare.144 ﾠBecause ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠFDCA’s ﾠ
sweeping ﾠdefinition ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevice, ﾠa ﾠsmartphone ﾠapplication ﾠfalls ﾠwithin ﾠthe ﾠscope ﾠ
of ﾠFDA’s ﾠauthority ﾠwhen ﾠused ﾠas ﾠa ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠwithin ﾠthe ﾠmeaning ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠFDCA.145 ﾠ
The ﾠexplosion ﾠof ﾠmobile ﾠapplications ﾠ(“apps”) ﾠcalls ﾠfor ﾠan ﾠevaluation ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠregulatory ﾠ
environment ﾠthat ﾠserves ﾠto ﾠcontrol ﾠtheir ﾠmarket ﾠentry, ﾠand ﾠsome ﾠreflection ﾠon ﾠhow ﾠwell ﾠ
food ﾠand ﾠdrug ﾠlaw ﾠresponds ﾠto ﾠnew ﾠtechnology.146 ﾠWhile ﾠoverregulation ﾠcould ﾠsuppress ﾠ
innovation ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠpromising ﾠarea, ﾠcertain ﾠapps ﾠwill ﾠneed ﾠsome ﾠoversight ﾠto ﾠensure ﾠtheir ﾠ
safety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness. ﾠ
 ﾠ As ﾠan ﾠexample, ﾠthe ﾠfirst ﾠsmartphone ﾠapp ﾠcleared ﾠfor ﾠmarketing ﾠ(on ﾠApple’s ﾠiPh-ﾭ‐‑
one ﾠplatform) ﾠis ﾠMobile ﾠMIM, ﾠan ﾠapp ﾠthat ﾠallows ﾠphysicians ﾠto ﾠreview ﾠvarious ﾠkinds ﾠof ﾠ
                                                 
141 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
142 ﾠD. ﾠClay ﾠAckerly ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠFueling ﾠInnovation ﾠIn ﾠMedical ﾠDevices ﾠ(And ﾠBeyond): ﾠVenture ﾠCapital ﾠIn ﾠHealth ﾠCare, ﾠ
28 ﾠHEALTH ﾠAFF. ﾠw68, ﾠw69 ﾠ(2008). ﾠ
143 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠat ﾠw74. ﾠ
144 ﾠ81% ﾠof ﾠphysicians ﾠare ﾠexpected ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠusing ﾠa ﾠsmartphone ﾠin ﾠ2012. ﾠJessica ﾠWapner ﾠiRegulate: ﾠShould ﾠMed-ﾭ‐‑
ical ﾠApps ﾠFace ﾠGovernment ﾠOversight?, ﾠSCI. ﾠAM. ﾠ(Apr. ﾠ12, ﾠ2010), ﾠhttp://www.scientificamerican.com/ ﾠ
article.cfm?id=medical-ﾭ‐‑apps-ﾭ‐‑regulation. ﾠ
145 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
146 ﾠThere ﾠare ﾠover ﾠ1,500 ﾠmedical ﾠapps ﾠavailable, ﾠmany ﾠof ﾠwhich ﾠare ﾠsimply ﾠpocket-ﾭ‐‑sized ﾠreference ﾠvol-ﾭ‐‑
umes, ﾠbut ﾠsome ﾠof ﾠwhich ﾠmonitor ﾠand ﾠcontrol ﾠimportant ﾠhealthcare ﾠfunctionality. ﾠSee ﾠKatherine ﾠHarmon, ﾠ
Your ﾠMRI ﾠis ﾠcalling: ﾠFDA ﾠapproves ﾠfirst ﾠmedical ﾠiPhone ﾠapp, ﾠSCI. ﾠAM. ﾠBLOGS ﾠ(Feb. ﾠ7, ﾠ2011), ﾠ
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2011/02/07/your-ﾭ‐‑mri-ﾭ‐‑is-ﾭ‐‑calling-ﾭ‐‑fda-ﾭ‐‑approves-ﾭ‐‑first-ﾭ‐‑
medical-ﾭ‐‑iphone-ﾭ‐‑app. ﾠ ﾠ 30 ﾠ
imaging ﾠ— ﾠincluding ﾠCT, ﾠPET, ﾠMRI, ﾠand ﾠmore ﾠ— ﾠimmediately ﾠon ﾠa ﾠmobile ﾠdevice, ﾠan-ﾭ‐‑
ywhere ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠworld, ﾠwithout ﾠhaving ﾠto ﾠwait ﾠfor ﾠfilm ﾠto ﾠdevelop.147 ﾠThough ﾠthis ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠ
exactly ﾠa ﾠbreakthrough ﾠtechnology, ﾠit ﾠdoes ﾠsubstantially ﾠimprove ﾠthe ﾠprocess ﾠof ﾠreview-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠimages ﾠfrom ﾠimportant ﾠscans ﾠby ﾠapplying ﾠtechnology ﾠin ﾠa ﾠnovel ﾠfashion. ﾠ
 ﾠ FDA ﾠhas ﾠnow ﾠcleared ﾠseveral ﾠother ﾠsmartphone-ﾭ‐‑related ﾠ“devices.” ﾠOne ﾠincludes ﾠ
an ﾠultrasound ﾠprobe ﾠthat ﾠplugs ﾠinto ﾠa ﾠsmartphone ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠa ﾠspecialized ﾠcomputer, ﾠ
and ﾠallows ﾠfor ﾠits ﾠreadings ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠdistributed ﾠover ﾠthe ﾠinternet ﾠworldwide.148 ﾠThis ﾠsolu-ﾭ‐‑
tion, ﾠcreated ﾠby ﾠMobisante, ﾠwas ﾠcleared ﾠin ﾠ2011 ﾠand ﾠallows ﾠfor ﾠpatients ﾠin ﾠmore ﾠremote ﾠ
areas ﾠto ﾠhave ﾠaccess ﾠto ﾠgreater ﾠmedical ﾠexpertise ﾠthrough ﾠthe ﾠinternet.149 ﾠ
 ﾠ Another ﾠapp, ﾠcalled ﾠPracticeRx, ﾠpromises ﾠto ﾠimprove ﾠpatient ﾠsafety ﾠby ﾠreporting ﾠ
medical ﾠerrors ﾠto ﾠa ﾠcentral ﾠdatabase, ﾠwhich ﾠcan ﾠobserve ﾠtrends ﾠand ﾠalert ﾠmedical ﾠprofes-ﾭ‐‑
sionals ﾠto ﾠavert ﾠfuture ﾠharm.150 ﾠYet ﾠanother ﾠapp ﾠautomatically ﾠalerts ﾠdoctors ﾠto ﾠemergen-ﾭ‐‑
cy ﾠroom ﾠvisits ﾠby ﾠtheir ﾠpatients, ﾠwhich ﾠallows ﾠan ﾠunnecessary ﾠvisit ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠprevented ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
fore ﾠthe ﾠexpense ﾠis ﾠincurred.151 ﾠFinally, ﾠAgaMatrix ﾠnow ﾠproduces ﾠa ﾠblood ﾠglucose ﾠmeter ﾠ
called ﾠiBGStar, ﾠwhich ﾠallows ﾠa ﾠdiabetic ﾠpatient ﾠto ﾠmonitor ﾠand ﾠanalyze ﾠglucose ﾠinfor-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
147 ﾠAnne ﾠEisenberg, ﾠThose ﾠScan ﾠResults ﾠAre ﾠJust ﾠan ﾠApp ﾠAway, ﾠN.Y. ﾠTIMES, ﾠOct. ﾠ15, ﾠ2011, ﾠat ﾠBU5. ﾠIt ﾠis ﾠworth ﾠ
noting ﾠthat ﾠMobile ﾠMIM ﾠtook ﾠover ﾠtwo ﾠyears ﾠto ﾠclear. ﾠId. ﾠ
148 ﾠScott ﾠJung, ﾠMobisante’s ﾠMobiUS ﾠSmartphone ﾠUltrasound ﾠReceives ﾠFDA ﾠ510(k) ﾠClearance, ﾠMEDGADGETS ﾠ(Feb. ﾠ
7, ﾠ2011), ﾠhttp://medgadget.com/2011/02/mobisantes_mobius_smartphone_ultrasound_receives_fda_ ﾠ
510k_clearance.html. ﾠ
149 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
150 ﾠWapner, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ144. ﾠ
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mation ﾠ in ﾠ real-ﾭ‐‑time ﾠ and ﾠ send ﾠ data ﾠ to ﾠ a ﾠ physician ﾠ via ﾠ email.152 ﾠFDA ﾠ cleared ﾠ iBGStar ﾠ
through ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess.153 ﾠ
 ﾠ It ﾠis ﾠobvious ﾠthat ﾠFDA ﾠmust ﾠregulate ﾠmedical ﾠapps ﾠto ﾠsome ﾠextent, ﾠespecially ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
cause ﾠ some ﾠ adverse ﾠ events ﾠ have ﾠ already ﾠ been ﾠ reported.154 ﾠBut ﾠ the ﾠ central ﾠ tension ﾠ in ﾠ
medical ﾠdevice ﾠregulation, ﾠbetween ﾠprotection ﾠand ﾠpromotion, ﾠis ﾠequally ﾠapparent ﾠhere ﾠ
because ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠarea ﾠis ﾠas ﾠeasy ﾠto ﾠobserve ﾠas ﾠrefreshing ﾠthe ﾠever-ﾭ‐‑expanding ﾠ
list ﾠof ﾠavailable ﾠmedical ﾠapps. ﾠFDA, ﾠfor ﾠits ﾠpart, ﾠacknowledges ﾠthis ﾠtension. ﾠIt ﾠreports ﾠ
that ﾠit ﾠis ﾠworking ﾠon ﾠguidance ﾠfor ﾠapps, ﾠwhich ﾠwill ﾠprobably ﾠbe ﾠon ﾠa ﾠmild ﾠbut ﾠsliding ﾠ
scale ﾠof ﾠregulation, ﾠand ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k).155 ﾠ
III. ﾠA ﾠPRIMER ﾠON ﾠPATENT ﾠLAW ﾠAND ﾠMEDICAL ﾠDEVICES ﾠ
A. ﾠThe ﾠFoundations ﾠand ﾠPurpose ﾠof ﾠPatent ﾠLaw ﾠ
The ﾠusual ﾠlegal ﾠembodiment ﾠof ﾠinnovation ﾠpolicy ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠU.S. ﾠ— ﾠand ﾠthat ﾠof ﾠmost ﾠ
nations ﾠworldwide ﾠ— ﾠis ﾠpatent ﾠlaw. ﾠThe ﾠU.S. ﾠConstitution ﾠexplicitly ﾠgrants ﾠCongress ﾠthe ﾠ
power ﾠto ﾠcreate ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠsystem ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠexpress ﾠpurpose ﾠof ﾠ“promot[ing] ﾠthe ﾠProgress ﾠ
                                                 
152 ﾠBrian ﾠDolan, ﾠFDA ﾠclears ﾠAgaMatrix’s ﾠiPhone ﾠGlucose ﾠMeter, ﾠMOBIHEALTHNEWS ﾠ(Dec. ﾠ7, ﾠ2011), ﾠ
http://mobihealthnews.com/15137/fda-ﾭ‐‑clears-ﾭ‐‑agamatrixs-ﾭ‐‑iphone-ﾭ‐‑glucose-ﾭ‐‑meter. ﾠ
153 ﾠId. ﾠ
154 ﾠA ﾠclinical ﾠdecision ﾠsupport ﾠapp ﾠfailed ﾠto ﾠdisplay ﾠallergy-ﾭ‐‑related ﾠinformation ﾠin ﾠone ﾠinstance. ﾠWapner, ﾠ
supra ﾠnote ﾠ144. ﾠ
155 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ(noting ﾠthat ﾠapps ﾠthat ﾠmonitor ﾠa ﾠpulse ﾠor ﾠan ﾠelectrocardiogram, ﾠfor ﾠexample, ﾠwill ﾠneed ﾠsome ﾠ
regulation, ﾠbut ﾠdigital ﾠreference ﾠbooks ﾠwill ﾠnot). ﾠAll ﾠof ﾠthese ﾠexamples ﾠare ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠwith ﾠidentical ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
tended ﾠuse ﾠbut ﾠdifferent ﾠtechnological ﾠcharacteristics ﾠas ﾠcompared ﾠto ﾠpredicate ﾠdevices. ﾠAs ﾠsuch, ﾠthey ﾠcan ﾠ
be ﾠcleared ﾠfor ﾠmarketing ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k), ﾠbut ﾠFDA ﾠwill ﾠexamine ﾠhow, ﾠif ﾠat ﾠall, ﾠdifferences ﾠin ﾠtechnology ﾠ
affect ﾠsafety ﾠor ﾠeffectiveness. ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠcase ﾠof ﾠMobile ﾠMIM, ﾠFDA ﾠworked ﾠwith ﾠapp ﾠdevelopers ﾠ
to ﾠensure ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠvarying ﾠscreen ﾠcontrast ﾠof ﾠa ﾠphone, ﾠas ﾠcompared ﾠto ﾠa ﾠtraditional ﾠlight ﾠbox, ﾠdid ﾠnot ﾠcom-ﾭ‐‑
promise ﾠphysicians’ ﾠability ﾠto ﾠread ﾠscans. ﾠHarmon, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ146. ﾠ ﾠ 32 ﾠ
of ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠuseful ﾠArts.”156 ﾠA ﾠpatent ﾠis ﾠan ﾠexclusive ﾠright, ﾠor ﾠa ﾠmonopoly, ﾠon ﾠan ﾠidea, ﾠgranted ﾠ
for ﾠa ﾠlimited ﾠperiod ﾠof ﾠtime.157 ﾠ
Standard ﾠeconomic ﾠtheory ﾠinforms ﾠus ﾠthat ﾠin ﾠordinary ﾠcircumstances, ﾠfree ﾠcom-ﾭ‐‑
petition ﾠis ﾠpreferable ﾠto ﾠmonopolies, ﾠwhich ﾠcause ﾠinflated ﾠprices ﾠand ﾠreduced ﾠoutput ﾠ(or ﾠ
deadweight ﾠloss, ﾠin ﾠeconomic ﾠterms).158 ﾠHowever, ﾠideas ﾠand ﾠother ﾠforms ﾠof ﾠintellectual ﾠ
output, ﾠwhich ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠvery ﾠcostly ﾠto ﾠgenerate ﾠthrough ﾠR&D, ﾠare ﾠwhat ﾠeconomists ﾠrefer ﾠto ﾠ
as ﾠpublic ﾠgoods.159 ﾠThis ﾠmeans ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠnaturally ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑rival ﾠ(one ﾠperson’s ﾠusage ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠ
reduce ﾠanother’s ﾠenjoyment ﾠof ﾠthem) ﾠand ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑excludable ﾠ(without ﾠlegal ﾠor ﾠtechnologi-ﾭ‐‑
cal ﾠprotection, ﾠit ﾠis ﾠdifficult ﾠto ﾠprevent ﾠaccess ﾠto ﾠthem).160 ﾠ
Innovation ﾠis ﾠextremely ﾠimportant ﾠto ﾠeconomic ﾠgrowth, ﾠbut ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠabsence ﾠof ﾠ
some ﾠform ﾠof ﾠlegal ﾠexclusivity ﾠover ﾠintellectual ﾠoutput, ﾠwe ﾠwill ﾠwitness ﾠa ﾠmarket ﾠfail-ﾭ‐‑
ure.161 ﾠBecause ﾠmany ﾠtypes ﾠof ﾠinventions ﾠhave ﾠa ﾠhigh ﾠupfront ﾠcost ﾠbut ﾠtheir ﾠresulting ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
tellectual ﾠproducts ﾠare ﾠpublic ﾠgoods, ﾠpioneers ﾠwill ﾠnot ﾠbe ﾠable ﾠto ﾠrecover ﾠtheir ﾠupfront ﾠ
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157 ﾠSee, ﾠe.g., ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ372. ﾠ
158 ﾠSee ﾠKristen ﾠNugent, ﾠPatenting ﾠMedical ﾠDevices: ﾠThe ﾠEconomic ﾠImplications ﾠof ﾠEthically ﾠMotivated ﾠReform, ﾠ17 ﾠ
ANNALS ﾠHEALTH ﾠL. ﾠ135, ﾠ139 ﾠ(2008). ﾠ
159 ﾠSee ﾠDan ﾠL. ﾠBurk ﾠ& ﾠMark ﾠA. ﾠLemley, ﾠPolicy ﾠLevers ﾠin ﾠPatent ﾠLaw, ﾠ89 ﾠVA. ﾠL. ﾠREV. ﾠ1575, ﾠ1605 ﾠ(2003). ﾠ
160 ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠif ﾠone ﾠperson ﾠconsumes ﾠan ﾠapple, ﾠnobody ﾠelse ﾠcan ﾠeat ﾠit. ﾠTherefore, ﾠan ﾠapple ﾠis ﾠa ﾠrival ﾠ
good. ﾠYet ﾠinformation ﾠis ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑rival: ﾠ“He ﾠwho ﾠreceives ﾠan ﾠidea ﾠfrom ﾠme, ﾠreceives ﾠinstruction ﾠhimself ﾠwith-ﾭ‐‑
out ﾠlessening ﾠmine; ﾠas ﾠhe ﾠwho ﾠlights ﾠhis ﾠtaper ﾠat ﾠmine, ﾠreceives ﾠlight ﾠwithout ﾠdarkening ﾠme.” ﾠLetter ﾠfrom ﾠ
Thomas ﾠJefferson ﾠto ﾠIsaac ﾠMcPherson ﾠ(Aug. ﾠ13, ﾠ1813), ﾠavailable ﾠat ﾠhttp://press-ﾭ‐‑pubs.uchicago.edu/ ﾠ
founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html. ﾠWhile ﾠit ﾠis ﾠeasy ﾠto ﾠprevent ﾠaccess ﾠto ﾠphysical ﾠproperty, ﾠ“ideas ﾠ
should ﾠfreely ﾠspread ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ[naturally] ﾠincapable ﾠof ﾠconfinement ﾠor ﾠexclusive ﾠappropriation.” ﾠId. ﾠInformation ﾠ
is ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑excludable ﾠin ﾠits ﾠnatural ﾠform, ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠabsence ﾠof ﾠlegal ﾠor ﾠtechnological ﾠprotection ﾠmeasures. ﾠ
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investment, ﾠand ﾠfree-ﾭ‐‑riders ﾠwill ﾠtake ﾠadvantage ﾠof ﾠinnovators ﾠwithout ﾠdoing ﾠany ﾠwork ﾠ
of ﾠtheir ﾠown.162 ﾠIn ﾠresponse, ﾠinnovators ﾠwill ﾠeither ﾠreduce ﾠtheir ﾠlevel ﾠof ﾠR&D ﾠto ﾠhighly ﾠ
suboptimal ﾠlevels, ﾠor ﾠrefrain ﾠfrom ﾠdisclosing ﾠtheir ﾠinventions ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠpublic, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠ
problematic ﾠbecause ﾠmost ﾠinnovation ﾠbuilds ﾠon ﾠearlier ﾠknowledge.163 ﾠ ﾠ
By ﾠmeans ﾠof ﾠa ﾠlimited ﾠmonopoly, ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠthus ﾠseeks ﾠto ﾠstimulate ﾠinnovation, ﾠ
generate ﾠdissemination ﾠof ﾠinformation, ﾠencourage ﾠdevelopment ﾠand ﾠcommercialization, ﾠ
and ﾠenable ﾠcumulative ﾠor ﾠfollow-ﾭ‐‑on ﾠinnovation.164 ﾠAn ﾠexclusive ﾠright ﾠto ﾠan ﾠinvention ﾠfor ﾠ
a ﾠlimited ﾠperiod ﾠof ﾠtime ﾠassures ﾠan ﾠinventor ﾠthat ﾠit ﾠcan ﾠrecuperate ﾠits ﾠupfront ﾠinvestment ﾠ
by ﾠcharging ﾠhigh ﾠmonopoly ﾠprices, ﾠfree ﾠof ﾠcompetition. ﾠThe ﾠpatent ﾠsystem ﾠaccomplishes ﾠ
exclusivity ﾠby ﾠgiving ﾠa ﾠpatentee ﾠthe ﾠexclusive ﾠright ﾠto ﾠmake, ﾠuse, ﾠand ﾠsell ﾠthe ﾠpatented ﾠ
invention ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠfinite ﾠterm.165 ﾠExclusivity ﾠis ﾠcommonly ﾠconsidered ﾠa ﾠ“bargain,” ﾠwhere ﾠ
the ﾠpublic ﾠsatisfies ﾠitself ﾠwith ﾠa ﾠmonopoly ﾠin ﾠexchange ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠinventor ﾠrevealing ﾠtech-ﾭ‐‑
nological ﾠsecrets ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠpublic.166 ﾠ
Patents ﾠare ﾠa ﾠ“limited” ﾠmonopoly ﾠbecause ﾠtheir ﾠduration ﾠis ﾠfinite, ﾠfixed ﾠto ﾠ20 ﾠ
years ﾠby ﾠdefault.167 ﾠMoreover, ﾠthe ﾠscope ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent’s ﾠlegal ﾠprotection ﾠis ﾠdefined ﾠby ﾠ— ﾠ
and ﾠlimited ﾠto ﾠ— ﾠits ﾠclaims, ﾠwhich ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠnecessarily ﾠcorrespond ﾠto ﾠone ﾠproduct ﾠor ﾠem-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
162 ﾠId. ﾠ
163 ﾠId. ﾠ
164 ﾠGeire, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ56, ﾠat ﾠ243. ﾠ
165 ﾠNugent, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ158, ﾠat ﾠ153. ﾠ
166 ﾠSee ﾠgenerally ﾠAlan ﾠDevlin, ﾠThe ﾠMisunderstood ﾠFunction ﾠof ﾠDisclosure ﾠin ﾠPatent ﾠLaw, ﾠ23 ﾠHARV. ﾠJ.L. ﾠ& ﾠTECH. ﾠ
401, ﾠ407 ﾠ(2010). ﾠ
167 ﾠSee ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ154 ﾠ(2006). ﾠUnder ﾠcertain ﾠcircumstances, ﾠthe ﾠterm ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠmodified, ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠ
delays ﾠcaused ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠUSPTO ﾠor ﾠFDA. ﾠSee ﾠinfra ﾠPart ﾠIV.A. ﾠ ﾠ 34 ﾠ
bodiment ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠinvention. ﾠThe ﾠclaims ﾠdescribe ﾠthe ﾠpatentee’s ﾠproprietary ﾠrights ﾠ“like ﾠ
metes ﾠand ﾠbounds ﾠof ﾠproperty,” ﾠand ﾠpatent ﾠinfringement ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠbased ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠsimilarity ﾠ
of ﾠtwo ﾠproducts ﾠbut ﾠwhether ﾠthe ﾠclaims ﾠof ﾠa ﾠplaintiff’s ﾠpatent ﾠliterally ﾠcover ﾠthe ﾠtechnol-ﾭ‐‑
ogy ﾠof ﾠa ﾠdefendant’s ﾠproduct.168 ﾠBecause ﾠof ﾠthis, ﾠ“design-ﾭ‐‑around,” ﾠwhich ﾠconsists ﾠof ﾠcre-ﾭ‐‑
ating ﾠ a ﾠ product ﾠ that ﾠ accomplishes ﾠ a ﾠ similar ﾠ technological ﾠ result ﾠ while ﾠ avoiding ﾠ the ﾠ
claims ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent, ﾠis ﾠoften ﾠpossible ﾠand ﾠpermitted ﾠby ﾠpatent ﾠlaw.169 ﾠOn ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠhand, ﾠ
patent ﾠlaw ﾠutilizes ﾠa ﾠ“doctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents” ﾠto ﾠdeal ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠproblem ﾠof ﾠtrivial ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
sign-ﾭ‐‑around ﾠmeant ﾠfor ﾠnothing ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠevasion ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent’s ﾠclaim ﾠlanguage.170 ﾠIn ﾠa ﾠ
common ﾠformulation, ﾠa ﾠproduct ﾠnonetheless ﾠinfringes ﾠon ﾠpatent ﾠclaims ﾠthat ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠliter-ﾭ‐‑
ally ﾠ cover ﾠ it ﾠ if ﾠ it ﾠ accomplishes ﾠ “substantially ﾠ the ﾠ same ﾠ function, ﾠ in ﾠ substantially ﾠ the ﾠ
same ﾠway,” ﾠto ﾠachieve ﾠsubstantially ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠresult.171 ﾠ ﾠ
Inventions ﾠthat ﾠcover ﾠdrugs ﾠor ﾠdevices ﾠhave ﾠextremely ﾠhigh ﾠupfront ﾠcosts ﾠ— ﾠfor ﾠ
example, ﾠ due ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ need ﾠ for ﾠ extensive ﾠ R&D, ﾠ clinical ﾠ trials, ﾠ and ﾠ regulatory ﾠ proce-ﾭ‐‑
dures ﾠ— ﾠbut ﾠare ﾠeasily ﾠduplicated ﾠat ﾠrelatively ﾠlow ﾠcost ﾠonce ﾠdisclosed ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠpublic. ﾠ
Whereas ﾠthere ﾠis ﾠsome ﾠdebate ﾠabout ﾠwhether ﾠpatents ﾠare ﾠneeded ﾠto ﾠencourage ﾠinnova-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠin ﾠsome ﾠfields, ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠmechanism ﾠis ﾠparticularly ﾠwell ﾠsuited ﾠto ﾠdrugs ﾠand ﾠdevic-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
168 ﾠSee ﾠSUNG, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ37, ﾠat ﾠ73 ﾠ(“[E]ach ﾠand ﾠevery ﾠclaim ﾠlimitation ﾠ[must] ﾠbe ﾠpresent ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠaccused ﾠ
product.”); ﾠBarron ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ14, ﾠat ﾠ305. ﾠ
169 ﾠSee ﾠCharles ﾠAllen ﾠBlack, ﾠThe ﾠCure ﾠfor ﾠDeadly ﾠPatent ﾠPractices: ﾠPreventing ﾠTechnology ﾠSuppression ﾠand ﾠPatent ﾠ
Shelving ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠLife ﾠSciences, ﾠ14 ﾠALB. ﾠL.J. ﾠSCI. ﾠ& ﾠTECH. ﾠ397, ﾠ432 ﾠ(2004) ﾠ(citing ﾠWMS ﾠGaming, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠInt’l ﾠ
Game ﾠTech., ﾠ184 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1339, ﾠ1355 ﾠ(Fed. ﾠCir. ﾠ1999)). ﾠ ﾠ
170 ﾠSee ﾠgenerally ﾠWarner-ﾭ‐‑Jenkinson ﾠCo. ﾠv. ﾠHilton ﾠDavis ﾠChem. ﾠCo., ﾠ520 ﾠU.S. ﾠ17 ﾠ(1997). ﾠ
171 ﾠGraver ﾠTank ﾠ& ﾠMfg. ﾠCo. ﾠv. ﾠLinde ﾠAir ﾠProds. ﾠCo., ﾠ399 ﾠU.S. ﾠ605, ﾠ608 ﾠ(1950). ﾠThis ﾠhas ﾠbecome ﾠknown ﾠas ﾠ
the ﾠtriple ﾠidentity ﾠtest. ﾠ ﾠ 35 ﾠ
es.172 ﾠWithout ﾠpatent ﾠprotection ﾠin ﾠthese ﾠfields, ﾠinventors ﾠand ﾠinvestors ﾠmight ﾠflee ﾠto ﾠ
other ﾠindustries.173 ﾠYet, ﾠbecause ﾠlife ﾠis ﾠoften ﾠat ﾠstake, ﾠthe ﾠdeadweight ﾠloss ﾠproduced ﾠby ﾠ
monopoly ﾠprices ﾠis ﾠparticularly ﾠinsidious ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠsector.174 ﾠ
B. ﾠPatentable ﾠSubject ﾠMatter ﾠand ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠPatents ﾠ
 ﾠ Not ﾠall ﾠideas ﾠare ﾠpatentable. ﾠHowever, ﾠthe ﾠPatent ﾠAct ﾠbroadly ﾠextends ﾠthe ﾠscope ﾠ
of ﾠsubject ﾠmatter ﾠprotection ﾠto ﾠ“any ﾠnew ﾠand ﾠuseful ﾠprocess, ﾠmachine, ﾠmanufacture, ﾠor ﾠ
composition ﾠof ﾠmatter, ﾠor ﾠany ﾠnew ﾠand ﾠuseful ﾠimprovement ﾠthereof,”175 ﾠwhich ﾠcourts ﾠ
have ﾠinterpreted ﾠto ﾠmean ﾠ“anything ﾠunder ﾠthe ﾠsun ﾠthat ﾠis ﾠmade ﾠby ﾠman.”176 ﾠ
Medical ﾠdevices, ﾠand ﾠimprovements ﾠupon ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠeasily ﾠsatisfy ﾠthis ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
quirement.177 ﾠIndeed, ﾠpatents ﾠare ﾠof ﾠparamount ﾠimportance ﾠto ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠmanufac-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
172 ﾠSee ﾠBurk ﾠ& ﾠLemley, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ159, ﾠat ﾠ1616. ﾠ
173 ﾠNugent, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ158, ﾠat ﾠ153. ﾠ
174 ﾠId. ﾠat ﾠ139. ﾠ
175 ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ101 ﾠ(2006). ﾠ
176 ﾠDiamond ﾠv. ﾠChakrabarty, ﾠ447 ﾠU.S. ﾠ303, ﾠ309 ﾠ(1980). ﾠThere ﾠare ﾠrelatively ﾠfixed ﾠboundaries ﾠto ﾠthese ﾠcate-ﾭ‐‑
gories, ﾠnamely ﾠthat ﾠ“laws ﾠof ﾠnature, ﾠphysical ﾠphenomena, ﾠand ﾠabstract ﾠideas” ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠpatentable. ﾠE.g., ﾠid. ﾠ
at ﾠ309. ﾠRecently, ﾠthe ﾠSupreme ﾠCourt ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠFederal ﾠCircuit ﾠhave ﾠbegun ﾠto ﾠapply ﾠthese ﾠlimitations ﾠto ﾠan ﾠ
increasing ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠpatent ﾠtypes, ﾠsome ﾠof ﾠwhich ﾠmay ﾠrepresent ﾠperipheral ﾠpatents ﾠobtained ﾠby ﾠmedical ﾠ
device ﾠmanufacturers. ﾠSee ﾠMayo ﾠCollaborative ﾠServs. ﾠv. ﾠPrometheus ﾠLabs., ﾠInc., ﾠ132 ﾠS.Ct. ﾠ1289, ﾠ1296–97 ﾠ
(2012) ﾠ(patent ﾠenabling ﾠdoctors ﾠto ﾠadminister ﾠappropriate ﾠamounts ﾠof ﾠa ﾠdrug ﾠmerely ﾠclaims ﾠa ﾠcorrelation, ﾠ
which ﾠis ﾠa ﾠlaw ﾠof ﾠnature); ﾠBilski ﾠv. ﾠKappos, ﾠ130 ﾠS.Ct. ﾠ3218, ﾠ3229–30 ﾠ(2010) ﾠ(patent ﾠclaiming ﾠhedging ﾠ
against ﾠrisk ﾠin ﾠcommodities ﾠmarket ﾠis ﾠan ﾠabstract ﾠidea). ﾠBut ﾠsee ﾠAss’n ﾠfor ﾠMolecular ﾠPathology ﾠv. ﾠU.S. ﾠPa-ﾭ‐‑
tent ﾠ& ﾠTrademark ﾠOffice, ﾠ653 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1329, ﾠ1354, ﾠ1359, ﾠvacated ﾠAss’n ﾠfor ﾠMolecular ﾠPathology ﾠv. ﾠMyriad ﾠGe-ﾭ‐‑
netics, ﾠNo. ﾠ11-ﾭ‐‑725, ﾠ2012 ﾠWL ﾠ986819 ﾠ(U.S. ﾠMar. ﾠ26, ﾠ2012) ﾠ(patent ﾠclaiming ﾠisolated ﾠhuman ﾠgene ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠ
claim ﾠa ﾠproduct ﾠof ﾠnature ﾠand ﾠpatent ﾠclaiming ﾠcancer ﾠscreening ﾠbased ﾠupon ﾠcell ﾠgrowths ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠclaim ﾠ
an ﾠabstract ﾠidea). ﾠAlthough ﾠthere ﾠis ﾠlittle ﾠdoubt ﾠthat ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠthemselves ﾠqualify ﾠas ﾠ“machines,” ﾠ
certain ﾠother ﾠpatents, ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠa ﾠprocess ﾠperformed ﾠby ﾠa ﾠmedical ﾠdevice, ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠon ﾠshakier ﾠground. ﾠSee ﾠ
Mayo, ﾠ132 ﾠS.Ct. ﾠat ﾠ1296–97 ﾠ(patent ﾠon ﾠdiagnostic ﾠtechnique ﾠinvalid). ﾠThe ﾠsoftware ﾠthat ﾠruns ﾠmedical ﾠdevic-ﾭ‐‑
es, ﾠalso ﾠpatentable ﾠunder ﾠcurrent ﾠlaw, ﾠmay ﾠalso ﾠbe ﾠin ﾠIP ﾠjeopardy ﾠas ﾠsoftware ﾠpatents ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠunder ﾠfire ﾠ
for ﾠsome ﾠtime. ﾠSee, ﾠe.g., ﾠBurk ﾠ& ﾠLemley, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ159, ﾠat ﾠ1687–88; ﾠSteve ﾠLohr, ﾠMicrosoft’s ﾠAOL ﾠPatent ﾠDeal ﾠ
Intensifies ﾠPatent ﾠWars, ﾠN.Y. ﾠTIMES, ﾠApr. ﾠ10, ﾠ2012, ﾠat ﾠB1. ﾠ
177 ﾠSee ﾠNugent, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ158, ﾠat ﾠ138. ﾠ ﾠ ﾠ 36 ﾠ
turers.178 ﾠBecause ﾠthe ﾠregulatory ﾠbarriers ﾠ— ﾠparticularly ﾠ510(k) ﾠ— ﾠare ﾠlower ﾠthan ﾠthose ﾠ
applicable ﾠ to ﾠ drugs, ﾠ patents ﾠ are ﾠ the ﾠ primary ﾠ means ﾠ by ﾠ which ﾠ device ﾠ manufacturers ﾠ
erect ﾠbarriers ﾠto ﾠprevent ﾠmarket ﾠentry ﾠby ﾠcompetitors.179 ﾠThis ﾠenables ﾠthem ﾠto ﾠrealize ﾠ
their ﾠprofits, ﾠfor ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠrequire ﾠgreat ﾠupfront ﾠexpense ﾠto ﾠdevelop.180 ﾠ ﾠ
The ﾠ medical ﾠ device ﾠ industry ﾠ has ﾠ some ﾠ unusual ﾠ features. ﾠ Unsurprisingly, ﾠ the ﾠ
most ﾠprofitable ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠcompanies ﾠalso ﾠhold ﾠthe ﾠgreatest ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠpatents.181 ﾠ
Interestingly, ﾠhowever, ﾠbecause ﾠsmall, ﾠventure-ﾭ‐‑backed ﾠstartup ﾠcompanies ﾠdrive ﾠinnova-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠindustry,182 ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠmuch ﾠmore ﾠlikely ﾠto ﾠown ﾠand ﾠrely ﾠon ﾠpatents.183 ﾠWhereas ﾠ
small ﾠcompanies ﾠobtain ﾠless ﾠthan ﾠone-ﾭ‐‑third ﾠof ﾠall ﾠpatents, ﾠthey ﾠobtain ﾠmore ﾠthan ﾠhalf ﾠof ﾠ
medical ﾠdevice ﾠpatents.184 ﾠ
C. ﾠThe ﾠUtility, ﾠNovelty, ﾠand ﾠNon-ﾭ‐‑Obviousness ﾠRequirements ﾠ
Patentable ﾠsubject ﾠmatter ﾠis ﾠa ﾠrelatively ﾠweak ﾠthreshold ﾠrequirement ﾠfor ﾠan ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
vention’s ﾠ patentability. ﾠ More ﾠ significant ﾠ are ﾠ the ﾠ substantive ﾠ requirements ﾠ of ﾠ utility, ﾠ
novelty, ﾠand ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑obviousness, ﾠwithout ﾠwhich ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠmay ﾠnot ﾠbe ﾠgranted ﾠ(or, ﾠif ﾠerro-ﾭ‐‑
neously ﾠgranted, ﾠis ﾠrendered ﾠinvalid).185 ﾠMost ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠpatents ﾠeasily ﾠsatisfy ﾠthe ﾠ
                                                 
178 ﾠSee ﾠBurk ﾠ& ﾠLemley, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ158, ﾠat ﾠ1592 ﾠ(medical ﾠdevice ﾠpatentees ﾠare ﾠfar ﾠmore ﾠlikely ﾠto ﾠassert ﾠtheir ﾠ
patents ﾠthan ﾠpatentees ﾠin ﾠother ﾠfields). ﾠ
179 ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ371–72. ﾠ
180 ﾠSee ﾠBuchanan, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17, ﾠat ﾠ306. ﾠ
181 ﾠGeire, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ56, ﾠat ﾠ247. ﾠ
182 ﾠINSTITUTE ﾠOF ﾠMEDICINE, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ31, ﾠat ﾠ170. ﾠ
183 ﾠAckerly ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ142, ﾠat ﾠw72; ﾠBurk ﾠ& ﾠLemley, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ159, ﾠat ﾠ1591. ﾠ
184 ﾠJohn ﾠR. ﾠAllison ﾠ& ﾠMark ﾠA. ﾠLemley, ﾠWho’s ﾠPatenting ﾠWhat? ﾠAn ﾠEmpirical ﾠExploration ﾠof ﾠPatent ﾠProsecution, ﾠ
53 ﾠVAND. ﾠL. ﾠREV. ﾠ2099, ﾠ2128 ﾠ(2000). ﾠ
185 ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§§ ﾠ102, ﾠ103, ﾠ112 ﾠ(2006). ﾠ ﾠ 37 ﾠ
utility ﾠrequirement, ﾠwhich ﾠdemands ﾠonly ﾠthat ﾠan ﾠinvention ﾠaccomplish ﾠthe ﾠresult ﾠthat ﾠ
the ﾠclaims ﾠpurport ﾠto ﾠachieve.186 ﾠ ﾠ
To ﾠsatisfy ﾠthe ﾠnovelty ﾠrequirement, ﾠan ﾠinvention ﾠmust ﾠnot ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠ“known ﾠor ﾠ
used ﾠby ﾠothers ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠor ﾠpatented ﾠor ﾠdescribed ﾠin ﾠa ﾠprinted ﾠpublication.”187 ﾠAny ﾠdocument ﾠ
accessible ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠpublic ﾠ(known ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠ“prior ﾠart” ﾠreference), ﾠno ﾠmatter ﾠhow ﾠobscure ﾠor ﾠ
hidden, ﾠwill ﾠrender ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠclaim ﾠinvalid ﾠif ﾠall ﾠelements ﾠof ﾠthat ﾠclaim ﾠare ﾠdisclosed ﾠ
within ﾠthe ﾠ“four ﾠcorners” ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠdocument.188 ﾠIf ﾠthat ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠcase, ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠclaim ﾠis ﾠcon-ﾭ‐‑
sidered ﾠ“anticipated” ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠprior ﾠart.189 ﾠ
In ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates, ﾠan ﾠinventor ﾠhas ﾠa ﾠone-ﾭ‐‑year ﾠgrace ﾠperiod ﾠto ﾠfile ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠpatent. ﾠ
Inventions ﾠthat ﾠare ﾠ“on ﾠsale ﾠor ﾠin ﾠpublic ﾠuse” ﾠduring ﾠthis ﾠyear ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠbar ﾠpatentability.190 ﾠ
Many ﾠother ﾠcountries ﾠhave ﾠan ﾠ“absolute ﾠnovelty” ﾠrule ﾠthat ﾠrenders ﾠan ﾠinvention ﾠun-ﾭ‐‑
patentable ﾠthe ﾠmoment ﾠit ﾠemerges ﾠin ﾠpublic, ﾠbut ﾠpatent ﾠrights ﾠare ﾠpreserved ﾠworldwide ﾠ
upon ﾠfiling ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠapplication ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates ﾠby ﾠtreaty.191 ﾠAs ﾠa ﾠmatter ﾠof ﾠpractice, ﾠ
therefore, ﾠinventors ﾠintending ﾠto ﾠbroadly ﾠmarket ﾠtheir ﾠproducts ﾠprefer ﾠto ﾠfile ﾠpatent ﾠap-ﾭ‐‑
plications ﾠno ﾠlater ﾠthan ﾠthe ﾠday ﾠproducts ﾠembodying ﾠtheir ﾠinventions ﾠgo ﾠto ﾠmarket.192 ﾠ
                                                 
186 ﾠSee ﾠNugent, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ158, ﾠat ﾠ138. ﾠThis ﾠis ﾠone ﾠdifference ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠpharmaceutical ﾠindustry, ﾠwhere ﾠthe ﾠ
utility ﾠrequirement ﾠmay ﾠdo ﾠsome ﾠwork. ﾠSee, ﾠe.g., ﾠIn ﾠre ﾠBrana, ﾠ51 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1560 ﾠ(Fed. ﾠCir. ﾠ1995); ﾠIn ﾠre ﾠKirk, ﾠ376 ﾠ
F.2d ﾠ936 ﾠ(C.C.P.A. ﾠ1967). ﾠ
187 ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ102(a) ﾠ(2006). ﾠ
188 ﾠSee ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ379. ﾠ
189 ﾠId. ﾠ
190 ﾠSee ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ102(b) ﾠ(2006). ﾠ
191 ﾠSee ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ372, ﾠ381. ﾠ
192 ﾠId. ﾠat ﾠ381. ﾠ ﾠ 38 ﾠ
Finally, ﾠthe ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑obviousness ﾠrequirement ﾠholds ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠsubject ﾠmatter ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tent ﾠmust ﾠnot ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠ“obvious ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠtime ﾠthe ﾠinvention ﾠwas ﾠmade ﾠto ﾠa ﾠperson ﾠhav-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠordinary ﾠskill ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠart” ﾠ(“PHOSITA”).193 ﾠWhereas ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠclaim ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠanticipat-ﾭ‐‑
ed ﾠby ﾠonly ﾠone ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠreference, ﾠthe ﾠobviousness ﾠanalysis ﾠasks ﾠwhether ﾠthe ﾠleap ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠ
patent ﾠfrom ﾠa ﾠsingle ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠreference, ﾠor ﾠfrom ﾠa ﾠcombination ﾠof ﾠmultiple ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠref-ﾭ‐‑
erences, ﾠis ﾠtoo ﾠtrivial ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠdeserving ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠin ﾠlight ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠstate ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠart.194 ﾠTogeth-ﾭ‐‑
er, ﾠthe ﾠnovelty ﾠand ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑obviousness ﾠrequirements ﾠprevent ﾠmaterial ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠpublic ﾠdo-ﾭ‐‑
main ﾠfrom ﾠbeing ﾠexcised ﾠinto ﾠpatent ﾠprotection. ﾠ
IV. ﾠTHE ﾠTENSIONS ﾠBETWEEN ﾠMEDICAL ﾠDEVICE ﾠREGULATION ﾠAND ﾠPATENT ﾠLAW ﾠ
 ﾠ Although ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠsystem ﾠis ﾠextremely ﾠimportant ﾠfor ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠmanufac-ﾭ‐‑
turers, ﾠthe ﾠinterface ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠregulatory ﾠenvironment ﾠgoverning ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠand ﾠpatent ﾠ
law ﾠis ﾠ“jagged ﾠand ﾠcomplicated.”195 ﾠWhile ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠrequires ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠtechnology ﾠbe ﾠnew, ﾠ
the ﾠmajority ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠa ﾠmechanism ﾠthat ﾠrequires ﾠsimilari-ﾭ‐‑
ty ﾠto ﾠa ﾠpreexisting ﾠdevice. ﾠThis ﾠtension, ﾠin ﾠlight ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠcentral ﾠbalance ﾠbetween ﾠpromo-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠand ﾠprotection ﾠthat ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠregulation ﾠseeks ﾠto ﾠachieve, ﾠmay ﾠcause ﾠsignifi-ﾭ‐‑
cant ﾠdistortions ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠeconomics ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠmarket ﾠintroduction.196 ﾠThe ﾠsituation ﾠ
is ﾠnot ﾠhelped ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠtotal ﾠabsence ﾠof ﾠcoordination ﾠbetween ﾠthe ﾠtwo ﾠagencies ﾠthat ﾠserve ﾠ
                                                 
193 ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ103 ﾠ(2006). ﾠ
194 ﾠSee ﾠKSR ﾠInt’l ﾠCo. ﾠv. ﾠTeleflex ﾠInc., ﾠ550 ﾠU.S. ﾠ398, ﾠ420 ﾠ(2006). ﾠ
195 ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ372. ﾠ
196 ﾠThe ﾠmain ﾠdistinction ﾠthat, ﾠas ﾠwe ﾠwill ﾠsee, ﾠhelps ﾠresolve ﾠsome ﾠtension ﾠis ﾠthat ﾠ510(k) ﾠaddresses ﾠfunctional ﾠ
equivalency ﾠ(at ﾠleast ﾠas ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠare ﾠconcerned), ﾠbut ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠconcerns ﾠitself ﾠwith ﾠtech-ﾭ‐‑
nological ﾠidentity. ﾠ ﾠ 39 ﾠ
as ﾠgatekeepers ﾠto ﾠmarketability ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices: ﾠFDA, ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠDepartment ﾠof ﾠHealth ﾠ
and ﾠHuman ﾠServices, ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠUnited ﾠStates ﾠPatent ﾠand ﾠTrademark ﾠOffice ﾠ(“USPTO”), ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠDepartment ﾠof ﾠCommerce ﾠ(not ﾠto ﾠmention ﾠfrequent ﾠlack ﾠof ﾠsynchronization ﾠbetween ﾠ
companies’ ﾠpatent ﾠattorneys ﾠand ﾠtheir ﾠcounsel ﾠfor ﾠFDA). ﾠThis ﾠPart ﾠsurveys ﾠmany ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
doctrinal ﾠand ﾠpolitical ﾠpressure ﾠpoints ﾠbetween ﾠthe ﾠtwo ﾠfields ﾠand ﾠhow ﾠsome ﾠ(but ﾠnot ﾠ
all) ﾠhave ﾠbeen ﾠresolved. ﾠ ﾠ
A. ﾠPatent ﾠTerms ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠpossibility ﾠof ﾠconflict ﾠbetween ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠand ﾠfood ﾠand ﾠdrug ﾠlaw ﾠhas ﾠnot ﾠen-ﾭ‐‑
tirely ﾠgone ﾠunnoticed. ﾠWith ﾠthe ﾠpassage ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ1984 ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct, ﾠCongress ﾠ(inter ﾠ
alia) ﾠsought ﾠto ﾠremedy ﾠtwo ﾠdistortions ﾠrelated ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠduration ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠterm ﾠfor ﾠ
drugs ﾠand ﾠdevices.197 ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ First, ﾠpatentees ﾠare ﾠnormally ﾠentitled ﾠto ﾠbegin ﾠexclusively ﾠmarketing ﾠproducts ﾠ
embodying ﾠtheir ﾠinventions ﾠimmediately ﾠupon ﾠthe ﾠUSPTO’s ﾠissuance ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent. ﾠBut ﾠ
because ﾠpremarket ﾠregulatory ﾠbarriers ﾠto ﾠentry ﾠare ﾠoften ﾠso ﾠlengthy ﾠat ﾠFDA, ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠ
term ﾠexperiences ﾠa ﾠde ﾠfacto ﾠshortening ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠinitial ﾠphase ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠterm ﾠmay ﾠ
be ﾠconsumed ﾠby ﾠFDA ﾠprocedures ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠcommercialization.198 ﾠFiling ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠ
later ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠprocess ﾠis ﾠdisfavored ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠnumber ﾠof ﾠreasons, ﾠmost ﾠsignificantly ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠ
                                                 
197 ﾠDrug ﾠPrice ﾠCompetition ﾠand ﾠPatent ﾠTerm ﾠRestoration ﾠAct, ﾠPub. ﾠL. ﾠNo. ﾠ98-ﾭ‐‑417, ﾠ1984 ﾠStat. ﾠ1538 ﾠ(codified ﾠ
as ﾠamended ﾠin ﾠvarious ﾠsections ﾠof ﾠ21 ﾠ& ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C.). ﾠ
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prior ﾠart ﾠthat ﾠmay ﾠanticipate ﾠor ﾠrender ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠobvious, ﾠas ﾠwell ﾠas ﾠinfringement ﾠby ﾠoth-ﾭ‐‑
ers, ﾠis ﾠjudged ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠtime ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠpatent’s ﾠfiling. ﾠ
 ﾠ Second, ﾠ because ﾠ a ﾠ patent ﾠ includes ﾠ the ﾠ exclusive ﾠ rights ﾠ to ﾠ make ﾠ and ﾠ use ﾠ the ﾠ
claimed ﾠinvention, ﾠin ﾠaddition ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠexclusive ﾠright ﾠto ﾠsell ﾠit, ﾠa ﾠcompetitor ﾠmay ﾠnot ﾠ
begin ﾠeven ﾠtesting ﾠa ﾠproduct ﾠthat ﾠis ﾠto ﾠcompete ﾠwith ﾠa ﾠpatented ﾠproduct ﾠupon ﾠthe ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tent’s ﾠexpiration, ﾠuntil ﾠthe ﾠday ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠexpires. ﾠNormally, ﾠthis ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠproblematic ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
cause ﾠthe ﾠpublic ﾠnature ﾠof ﾠpatented ﾠinventions ﾠenables ﾠcompetitors ﾠto ﾠrapidly ﾠenter ﾠthe ﾠ
market ﾠsoon ﾠafter ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠexpires. ﾠIn ﾠthe ﾠcontext ﾠof ﾠdrugs ﾠand ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠhow-ﾭ‐‑
ever, ﾠa ﾠcompetitor ﾠ(such ﾠas ﾠa ﾠgeneric ﾠdrug ﾠmanufacturer) ﾠmay ﾠnot ﾠbegin ﾠpursuing ﾠFDA ﾠ
approval ﾠor ﾠconducting ﾠclinical ﾠtrials, ﾠwhich ﾠusually ﾠrequire ﾠmaking ﾠand ﾠusing ﾠthe ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tented ﾠproduct, ﾠuntil ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠexpires.199 ﾠUnder ﾠsuch ﾠa ﾠsystem, ﾠa ﾠcompetitor ﾠproduct ﾠ
would ﾠnot ﾠreach ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠuntil ﾠlong ﾠafter ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠexpired, ﾠcreating ﾠa ﾠde ﾠfacto ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tent ﾠterm ﾠextension ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠholder.200 ﾠ
1. ﾠ§ ﾠ156’s ﾠPatent ﾠTerm ﾠExtension ﾠ
 ﾠ Section ﾠ201 ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct, ﾠnow ﾠcodified ﾠat ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ156, ﾠis ﾠmeant ﾠ
to ﾠremedy ﾠthe ﾠde ﾠfacto ﾠpatent ﾠterm ﾠreduction ﾠcaused ﾠby ﾠdelays ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠresulting ﾠfrom ﾠ
FDA ﾠreview.201 ﾠThe ﾠobjective ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠextension ﾠis ﾠto ﾠrestore ﾠthe ﾠtime ﾠduring ﾠwhich ﾠa ﾠman-ﾭ‐‑
ufacturer ﾠwas ﾠunable ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠits ﾠproduct ﾠbecause ﾠFDA ﾠreview ﾠwas ﾠunderway. ﾠIn ﾠthe-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
199 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠat ﾠ6–7. ﾠ
200 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
201 ﾠSee ﾠMichelle ﾠA. ﾠSherwood, ﾠMedical ﾠDevices ﾠand ﾠPatent ﾠTerm ﾠExtension ﾠUnder ﾠthe ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct, ﾠ
LANDSLIDE, ﾠJuly/Aug. ﾠ2010, ﾠat ﾠ38, ﾠ39. ﾠ ﾠ 41 ﾠ
ory, ﾠthe ﾠextension ﾠprovided ﾠshould ﾠexactly ﾠoffset ﾠthis ﾠlost ﾠtime, ﾠwhich ﾠwould ﾠunfairly ﾠ
disadvantage ﾠdrug ﾠand ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturers ﾠas ﾠcompared ﾠto ﾠpatentees ﾠin ﾠother ﾠindus-ﾭ‐‑
tries.202 ﾠ ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠextension ﾠis ﾠavailable ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠUSPTO ﾠfor ﾠpatents ﾠthat ﾠclaim ﾠa ﾠproduct ﾠor ﾠa ﾠ
method ﾠof ﾠusing ﾠor ﾠmanufacturing ﾠa ﾠproduct.203 ﾠIts ﾠmagnitude ﾠis ﾠthe ﾠadministrative ﾠtime ﾠ
(from ﾠPMA ﾠapplication ﾠuntil ﾠFDA ﾠapproval) ﾠplus ﾠhalf ﾠthe ﾠexperimental ﾠtime ﾠ(from ﾠthe ﾠ
commencement ﾠof ﾠclinical ﾠtrials ﾠuntil ﾠPMA ﾠapplication).204 ﾠFacially, ﾠthe ﾠAct ﾠapplies ﾠonly ﾠ
to ﾠdrugs, ﾠbut ﾠthe ﾠSupreme ﾠCourt ﾠhas ﾠheld ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct ﾠapplies ﾠequally ﾠ
to ﾠmedical ﾠdevices.205 ﾠNonetheless, ﾠthe ﾠstatute ﾠprovides ﾠan ﾠextension ﾠonly ﾠfor ﾠpatents ﾠon ﾠ
products ﾠthat ﾠare ﾠsubject ﾠto ﾠa ﾠ“regulatory ﾠreview ﾠperiod,” ﾠwhich ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠcontext ﾠmeans ﾠ
PMA ﾠonly.206 ﾠ
 ﾠ This ﾠcreates ﾠa ﾠlack ﾠof ﾠparity ﾠbetween ﾠPMA ﾠand ﾠ510(k), ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠterm ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tent ﾠthat ﾠcovers ﾠa ﾠproduct ﾠthat ﾠenters ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k) ﾠcannot ﾠbe ﾠextended. ﾠNo ﾠ
manufacturer ﾠwould ﾠnonetheless ﾠprefer ﾠPMA, ﾠbut ﾠthe ﾠasymmetry ﾠdoes ﾠsomewhat ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
duce ﾠ the ﾠ appeal ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ 510(k) ﾠ process. ﾠ A ﾠ robust ﾠ patent ﾠ term, ﾠ even ﾠ as ﾠ measured ﾠ in ﾠ
months, ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠimportant ﾠto ﾠmanufacturers ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k), ﾠwhose ﾠ
                                                 
202 ﾠSee ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ156 ﾠ(2006). ﾠ
203 ﾠSherwood, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ201, ﾠat ﾠ39. ﾠ
204 ﾠId. ﾠThere ﾠis ﾠan ﾠoverall ﾠlimit ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠextension ﾠof ﾠfive ﾠyears. ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ156 ﾠ(2006) ﾠ
205 ﾠEli ﾠLilly ﾠ& ﾠCo. ﾠv. ﾠMedtronic, ﾠInc., ﾠ496 ﾠU.S. ﾠ661 ﾠ(1990) ﾠ(holding ﾠthat ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠissues ﾠalso ﾠarise ﾠun-ﾭ‐‑
der ﾠthe ﾠFDCA). ﾠ
206 ﾠBuchanan, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17, ﾠat ﾠ322; ﾠSherwood, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ201, ﾠat ﾠ39. ﾠ ﾠ 42 ﾠ
competitors ﾠface ﾠrelatively ﾠlow ﾠbarriers ﾠto ﾠentry ﾠand ﾠwhose ﾠpatents ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠrelatively ﾠ
weak ﾠsubstantively.207 ﾠ
2. ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1)’s ﾠInfringement ﾠException ﾠ
 ﾠ Section ﾠ202 ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct, ﾠnow ﾠcodified ﾠat ﾠ35 ﾠU.S.C. ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1), ﾠmit-ﾭ‐‑
igates ﾠthe ﾠde ﾠfacto ﾠpatent ﾠterm ﾠextension ﾠcaused ﾠby ﾠFDA ﾠregulatory ﾠdelays ﾠto ﾠcompeti-ﾭ‐‑
tor ﾠentry ﾠupon ﾠa ﾠpatent’s ﾠexpiration.208 ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1) ﾠprovides ﾠa ﾠ“safe ﾠharbor” ﾠto ﾠpatent ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
fringement ﾠfor ﾠconduct ﾠtaken ﾠ“solely ﾠfor ﾠuses ﾠreasonably ﾠrelated ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠdevelopment ﾠ
and ﾠsubmission ﾠof ﾠinformation” ﾠto ﾠFDA ﾠfor ﾠprocuring ﾠregulatory ﾠapproval ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠa ﾠ
device ﾠor ﾠdrug. ﾠThis ﾠexception ﾠpermits ﾠcompanies ﾠto ﾠengage ﾠin ﾠactivity ﾠ— ﾠmaking ﾠand ﾠ
testing ﾠdevices ﾠcovered ﾠby ﾠa ﾠsoon-ﾭ‐‑expiring ﾠpatent ﾠ— ﾠthat ﾠwould ﾠbe ﾠinfringing, ﾠto ﾠpre-ﾭ‐‑
vent ﾠa ﾠde ﾠfacto ﾠextension ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠterm. ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠSupreme ﾠCourt ﾠheld ﾠin ﾠEli ﾠLilly ﾠthat ﾠmaking ﾠand ﾠusing ﾠa ﾠpatented ﾠdevice ﾠin ﾠ
pursuit ﾠof ﾠa ﾠPMA ﾠrequirement ﾠqualified ﾠas ﾠ“reasonably ﾠrelated” ﾠto ﾠobtaining ﾠregulatory ﾠ
approval.209 ﾠHowever, ﾠthe ﾠCourt ﾠleft ﾠunanswered ﾠthe ﾠquestion ﾠwhether ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1) ﾠalso ﾠ
applied ﾠto ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠrequire ﾠPMA, ﾠsuch ﾠas ﾠdevices ﾠexempt ﾠfrom ﾠpremarket ﾠre-ﾭ‐‑
view ﾠor ﾠthose ﾠutilizing ﾠ510(k).210 ﾠFor ﾠa ﾠtime, ﾠthis ﾠissue ﾠwas ﾠunsettled ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠCourt ﾠ
had ﾠelsewhere ﾠacknowledged ﾠthe ﾠimportant ﾠdifferences ﾠbetween ﾠpremarket ﾠapproval ﾠ
                                                 
207 ﾠA ﾠpatent ﾠon ﾠan ﾠimprovement ﾠor ﾠnew ﾠuse ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠproduct ﾠis ﾠconsidered ﾠweaker ﾠthan ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠprod-ﾭ‐‑
uct ﾠitself ﾠas ﾠa ﾠmachine ﾠor ﾠcomposition ﾠof ﾠmatter. ﾠ
208 ﾠUpadhye, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ27, ﾠat ﾠ3. ﾠ ﾠ
209 ﾠ496 ﾠU.S. ﾠ661 ﾠ(1990); ﾠUpadhye, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ27, ﾠat ﾠ25. ﾠ ﾠ
210 ﾠBuchanan, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17, ﾠat ﾠ321. ﾠ ﾠ 43 ﾠ
and ﾠpremarket ﾠnotification.211 ﾠNonetheless, ﾠthe ﾠFederal ﾠCircuit, ﾠapplying ﾠits ﾠnationwide ﾠ
appellate ﾠjurisdiction ﾠover ﾠpatent ﾠcases, ﾠheld ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1) ﾠsafe ﾠharbor ﾠapplies ﾠto ﾠ
all ﾠ regulated ﾠ medical ﾠ devices,212 ﾠand ﾠ more ﾠ recently, ﾠ that ﾠ devices ﾠ not ﾠ subject ﾠ to ﾠ pre-ﾭ‐‑
market ﾠreview ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠcovered.213 ﾠThese ﾠholdings ﾠare ﾠconsistent ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠ
§ ﾠ271(e)(1), ﾠbecause ﾠexempt ﾠdevices ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠface ﾠany ﾠFDA-ﾭ‐‑related ﾠdelay ﾠin ﾠmarketing ﾠ
upon ﾠexpiry ﾠof ﾠa ﾠrelevant ﾠpatent.214 ﾠAs ﾠa ﾠresult, ﾠproductions ﾠand ﾠuses ﾠrelated ﾠto ﾠadvanc-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠa ﾠPMA ﾠor ﾠ510(k) ﾠare ﾠimmunized ﾠby ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1), ﾠbut ﾠmanufacturers ﾠmust ﾠwait ﾠuntil ﾠa ﾠ
patent ﾠcovering ﾠan ﾠexempt ﾠdevice ﾠexpires ﾠbefore ﾠcreating ﾠor ﾠtesting ﾠa ﾠcompeting ﾠprod-ﾭ‐‑
uct. ﾠ
 ﾠ Unlike ﾠ§ ﾠ156, ﾠthe ﾠsafe ﾠharbor ﾠin ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1) ﾠ— ﾠif ﾠproperly ﾠadministered ﾠ— ﾠcreates ﾠ
a ﾠcompletely ﾠeven ﾠplaying ﾠfield ﾠbetween ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠpatents ﾠand ﾠall ﾠother ﾠtypes ﾠof ﾠ
patents. ﾠWhile ﾠit ﾠis ﾠtrue ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠresearch ﾠand ﾠdevelopment ﾠrequired ﾠto ﾠmanufacture ﾠa ﾠ
competing ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠmore ﾠextensive ﾠthan ﾠin ﾠother ﾠfields, ﾠthe ﾠfact ﾠremains ﾠ
that ﾠunder ﾠnormal ﾠcircumstances ﾠin ﾠmost ﾠindustries, ﾠcompanies ﾠmay ﾠnot ﾠbegin ﾠmanu-ﾭ‐‑
facturing ﾠcompeting ﾠproducts ﾠ(in ﾠthe ﾠabsence ﾠof ﾠa ﾠlicense) ﾠuntil ﾠpatents ﾠcovering ﾠthe ﾠ
original, ﾠpatented ﾠproducts ﾠexpire. ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1) ﾠmerely ﾠrelieves ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠcompanies ﾠ
of ﾠa ﾠdistortion ﾠthat ﾠemerges ﾠfrom ﾠthe ﾠintroduction ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠFDA ﾠregulatory ﾠframework. ﾠ ﾠ
                                                 
211 ﾠMedtronic, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠLohr, ﾠ518 ﾠU.S. ﾠ470 ﾠ(1996); ﾠBuchanan, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17, ﾠat ﾠ314. ﾠ
212 ﾠSee ﾠAbtox, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠExitron ﾠCorp., ﾠ122 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1019, ﾠ1028 ﾠ(Fed. ﾠCir. ﾠ1997). ﾠ
213 ﾠSee ﾠProveris ﾠScientific ﾠCorp. ﾠv. ﾠInnovasystems, ﾠInc., ﾠ536 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1256 ﾠ(Fed. ﾠCir. ﾠ2008). ﾠ
214 ﾠCf. ﾠBuchanan, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17, ﾠat ﾠ322 ﾠ(arguing ﾠ— ﾠbefore ﾠProveris ﾠwas ﾠdecided ﾠ— ﾠthat ﾠ§ ﾠ271(e)(1) ﾠprobably ﾠ
would ﾠnot ﾠimmunize ﾠexempt ﾠdevices ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct ﾠapplies ﾠonly ﾠto ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠunder-ﾭ‐‑
go ﾠregulatory ﾠreview). ﾠ ﾠ 44 ﾠ
Manufacturers ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠnudged ﾠinto ﾠavoiding ﾠexisting ﾠpatents ﾠby ﾠdeveloping ﾠen-ﾭ‐‑
tirely ﾠnew ﾠproducts, ﾠwhich ﾠmight ﾠrequire ﾠPMA ﾠbefore ﾠintroduction, ﾠbut ﾠwould ﾠalso ﾠlike-ﾭ‐‑
ly ﾠentitle ﾠtheir ﾠinventors ﾠto ﾠrobust ﾠpatent ﾠprotection ﾠthat ﾠwould ﾠenable ﾠthem ﾠto ﾠrecoup ﾠ
upfront ﾠR&D ﾠcosts. ﾠIn ﾠsuch ﾠcircumstances, ﾠ§ ﾠ156 ﾠwould ﾠcompensate ﾠsuch ﾠan ﾠinventor ﾠ
for ﾠthe ﾠtime ﾠinvolved ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠPMA ﾠprocess ﾠ(although, ﾠas ﾠdiscussed ﾠabove, ﾠnot ﾠa ﾠmanufac-ﾭ‐‑
turer ﾠthat ﾠproceeds ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k), ﾠeven ﾠwhen ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠembodies ﾠpatentable ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
ventions). ﾠFor ﾠthe ﾠmost ﾠpart, ﾠhowever, ﾠthe ﾠHatch-ﾭ‐‑Waxman ﾠAct ﾠrestores ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠ
to ﾠthe ﾠusual ﾠinnovation-ﾭ‐‑promotion ﾠframework ﾠin ﾠU.S. ﾠpatent ﾠlaw, ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠinsofar ﾠas ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tent ﾠterm ﾠis ﾠconcerned. ﾠ
B. ﾠAnticipation ﾠby ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
 ﾠ A ﾠ510(k) ﾠbecomes ﾠa ﾠpublic ﾠdocument, ﾠaccessible ﾠeither ﾠthrough ﾠa ﾠFreedom ﾠof ﾠIn-ﾭ‐‑
formation ﾠAct ﾠrequest ﾠor ﾠby ﾠFDA ﾠpublication.215 ﾠIn ﾠtheory, ﾠtherefore, ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠsubmitted ﾠ
by ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠapplicant ﾠor ﾠby ﾠanother ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturer ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠas ﾠa ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠdoc-ﾭ‐‑
ument ﾠto ﾠdemonstrate ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠclaim’s ﾠlack ﾠof ﾠnovelty, ﾠthereby ﾠrendering ﾠthat ﾠclaim ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
valid.216 ﾠThe ﾠrisk ﾠis ﾠparticularly ﾠsalient ﾠbecause, ﾠby ﾠits ﾠnature, ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠclaims ﾠ“equiva-ﾭ‐‑
lence” ﾠto ﾠan ﾠexisting ﾠdevice. ﾠThis ﾠpromises ﾠto ﾠrender ﾠall ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠpatents ﾠless ﾠval-ﾭ‐‑
                                                 
215 ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ376. ﾠMedical ﾠDevice ﾠReports, ﾠwhich ﾠare ﾠfiled ﾠwhen ﾠa ﾠmanufacturer ﾠ
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216 ﾠSee ﾠMentor ﾠH/S, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠMed. ﾠDevice ﾠAlliance, ﾠInc., ﾠ244 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1365, ﾠ1376 ﾠ(Fed. ﾠCir. ﾠ2001). ﾠRecall ﾠthat ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠ
United ﾠStates, ﾠthere ﾠis ﾠa ﾠone-ﾭ‐‑year ﾠgrace ﾠperiod ﾠfor ﾠinventors ﾠwho ﾠdisclose ﾠtheir ﾠinventions, ﾠbut ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
that ﾠdiscloses ﾠall ﾠthe ﾠelements ﾠof ﾠa ﾠlater ﾠpatent ﾠclaim ﾠcan ﾠseriously ﾠcompromise ﾠforeign ﾠpatent ﾠrights. ﾠMi-ﾭ‐‑
chael ﾠRegize, ﾠHow ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠSubmission ﾠCan ﾠAffect ﾠYour ﾠPatent, ﾠMED. ﾠDEVICE ﾠ& ﾠDIAGNOSTIC ﾠINDUSTRY ﾠ(June ﾠ
1, ﾠ2010), ﾠhttp://www.mddionline.com/article/how-ﾭ‐‑510k-ﾭ‐‑submission-ﾭ‐‑can-ﾭ‐‑affect-ﾭ‐‑your-ﾭ‐‑patent. ﾠ ﾠ 45 ﾠ
uable, ﾠbecause ﾠeach ﾠone ﾠis ﾠat ﾠgreater ﾠrisk ﾠof ﾠinvalidity. ﾠIt ﾠalso ﾠmay ﾠresult ﾠin ﾠa ﾠtrap ﾠof ﾠ
sorts ﾠfor ﾠcompanies ﾠthat ﾠaccidentally ﾠdisclose ﾠtoo ﾠmuch ﾠin ﾠa ﾠ510(k). ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠ underlying ﾠ problem ﾠ with ﾠ such ﾠ theories ﾠ is ﾠ that ﾠ while ﾠ a ﾠ 510(k) ﾠ discloses ﾠ
some ﾠ— ﾠbut ﾠnot ﾠall, ﾠand ﾠnot ﾠnecessarily ﾠall ﾠpatent-ﾭ‐‑important ﾠ— ﾠtechnical ﾠaspects ﾠof ﾠa ﾠ
product, ﾠit ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠnecessarily ﾠdisclose ﾠall ﾠelements ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠclaim. ﾠTherefore, ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
description ﾠoften ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠamount ﾠto ﾠanticipation.217 ﾠIndeed, ﾠaware ﾠof ﾠthis, ﾠsavvy ﾠcom-ﾭ‐‑
panies ﾠmay ﾠchoose ﾠpredicate ﾠdevices ﾠin ﾠtheir ﾠ510(k)s ﾠto ﾠenable ﾠthem ﾠto ﾠclaim ﾠequiva-ﾭ‐‑
lence ﾠin ﾠways ﾠoblique ﾠto ﾠpatent ﾠeligibility ﾠor ﾠexplicitly ﾠdisclaim ﾠpatent ﾠissues ﾠin ﾠtheir ﾠ
510(k).218 ﾠ ﾠ
Fortunately ﾠfor ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturers, ﾠcourts ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠagree ﾠwith ﾠanticipation-ﾭ‐‑
by-ﾭ‐‑510(k) ﾠarguments ﾠwhen ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠlitigated. ﾠFor ﾠexample, ﾠthe ﾠDistrict ﾠof ﾠDelaware ﾠheld ﾠ
that ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠadmissible ﾠto ﾠprove ﾠanticipation ﾠbecause ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠcompares ﾠtwo ﾠ
commercial ﾠembodiments, ﾠbut ﾠthe ﾠcorrect ﾠnovelty ﾠanalysis ﾠis ﾠto ﾠcompare ﾠthe ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠ
with ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠclaims.219 ﾠWith ﾠmore ﾠparticularity, ﾠthe ﾠWestern ﾠDistrict ﾠof ﾠPennsylvania ﾠ
explained ﾠthat ﾠadmissions ﾠin ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠrelate ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠlimitations ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠclaim ﾠ
because ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠa ﾠdemonstration ﾠto ﾠFDA ﾠof ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠa ﾠ
                                                 
217 ﾠRaciti ﾠ& ﾠClements, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ51, ﾠat ﾠ376. ﾠ
218 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠat ﾠ376, ﾠ378. ﾠ
219 ﾠArthrocare ﾠCorp. ﾠv. ﾠSmith ﾠ& ﾠNephew, ﾠInc., ﾠ310 ﾠF. ﾠSupp. ﾠ2d ﾠ638, ﾠ667 ﾠ(D. ﾠDel. ﾠ2004) ﾠ(510(k) ﾠinadmissible ﾠ
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comparison ﾠof ﾠan ﾠolder ﾠdevice ﾠto ﾠnewer ﾠpatent ﾠclaims.220 ﾠAt ﾠthe ﾠend ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠday, ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠ
itself ﾠ(notwithstanding ﾠthe ﾠproduct ﾠit ﾠclaims ﾠequivalence ﾠto) ﾠshould ﾠnot ﾠprove ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠtoo ﾠ
much ﾠof ﾠan ﾠobstacle ﾠto ﾠpatentability ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠfor ﾠcareful ﾠcompanies, ﾠand ﾠso ﾠthe ﾠ
notion ﾠof ﾠanticipation ﾠby ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠprobably ﾠnot ﾠa ﾠmajor ﾠdistortion ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠintroduction ﾠof ﾠ
medical ﾠdevices.221 ﾠ
C. ﾠ510(k) ﾠas ﾠEvidence ﾠof ﾠInfringement ﾠ
 ﾠ It ﾠis ﾠeasy ﾠto ﾠsee ﾠwhy ﾠa ﾠmanufacturer ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpredicate ﾠdevice ﾠcovered ﾠby ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠ
would ﾠbe ﾠagitated ﾠby ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠentering ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠthat ﾠclaims ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠequivalent ﾠto ﾠ
the ﾠ predicate. ﾠ While ﾠ FDA ﾠ maintains ﾠ that ﾠ a ﾠ determination ﾠ of ﾠ substantial ﾠ equivalence ﾠ
should ﾠnot ﾠhave ﾠany ﾠbearing ﾠon ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠsuit,222 ﾠparties ﾠto ﾠpatent ﾠlitigation ﾠargued ﾠfor ﾠ
some ﾠtime ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠshould ﾠbe ﾠadmissible ﾠto ﾠprove ﾠinfringement, ﾠsince ﾠit ﾠis ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠ
probative ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠsimilarity ﾠbetween ﾠtwo ﾠdevices.223 ﾠ
                                                 
220 ﾠSunrise ﾠMedical ﾠHHG, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠAirSep ﾠCorp., ﾠ95 ﾠF. ﾠSupp. ﾠ2d ﾠ348, ﾠ406 ﾠ(W.D. ﾠPa. ﾠ2000) ﾠ(510(k) ﾠinadmissi-ﾭ‐‑
ble ﾠto ﾠprove ﾠanticipation). ﾠ
221 ﾠIt ﾠdoes ﾠnot ﾠappear ﾠthat ﾠanyone ﾠhas ﾠutilized ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠin ﾠmaking ﾠa ﾠcase ﾠfor ﾠobviousness. ﾠA ﾠ510(k) ﾠcould, ﾠ
conceivably, ﾠdemonstrate ﾠ— ﾠby ﾠitself ﾠor ﾠwith ﾠother ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠ— ﾠthe ﾠprocess ﾠof ﾠachieving ﾠthe ﾠtransition ﾠ
from ﾠan ﾠolder ﾠdevice ﾠto ﾠnewer ﾠpatent ﾠclaims, ﾠthus ﾠallowing ﾠa ﾠchallenger ﾠto ﾠargue ﾠobviousness. ﾠWe ﾠwill ﾠ
have ﾠto ﾠwait ﾠand ﾠsee ﾠhow, ﾠif ﾠat ﾠall, ﾠthis ﾠissue ﾠis ﾠresolved. ﾠ
222 ﾠBarron ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ14, ﾠat ﾠ316. ﾠ
223 ﾠSee ﾠFED. ﾠR. ﾠEVID. ﾠ401 ﾠ(relevance); ﾠsee ﾠalso ﾠFED. ﾠR. ﾠEVID. ﾠ801(d)(2) ﾠ(admissions ﾠby ﾠparty-ﾭ‐‑opponent ﾠare ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑
hearsay ﾠand ﾠtherefore ﾠgenerally ﾠadmissible); ﾠFED. ﾠR. ﾠEVID. ﾠ803(8) ﾠ(public ﾠrecords ﾠexception ﾠto ﾠhearsay ﾠ
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 ﾠ Until ﾠ recently, ﾠ the ﾠ law ﾠ was ﾠ indeterminate, ﾠ so ﾠ it ﾠ may ﾠ be ﾠ that ﾠ manufacturers ﾠ
avoided ﾠusing ﾠpatented ﾠdevices ﾠas ﾠpredicates ﾠin ﾠtheir ﾠ510(k)s, ﾠeven ﾠif ﾠthey ﾠbelieved ﾠtheir ﾠ
newer ﾠdevices ﾠwere ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑infringing. ﾠUncertainty ﾠtends ﾠto ﾠdiscourage ﾠinnovation.224 ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠFederal ﾠCircuit ﾠrecently ﾠweighed ﾠin, ﾠstating ﾠdefinitively ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠ
an ﾠadmission ﾠof ﾠinfringement.225 ﾠIt ﾠreasoned ﾠthat ﾠan ﾠassertion ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠnewer ﾠdevice ﾠmatch-ﾭ‐‑
es ﾠthe ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠprofile ﾠof ﾠan ﾠolder ﾠdevice ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠas ﾠan ﾠadmission ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠ
newer ﾠdevice’s ﾠtechnology ﾠinfringes ﾠon ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠthat ﾠcovers ﾠthe ﾠolder ﾠdevice.226 ﾠThis ﾠholding ﾠ
was ﾠconsistent ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠtrend ﾠamong ﾠsome ﾠlower ﾠcourts, ﾠwhich ﾠrecognized ﾠthe ﾠdistinc-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠbetween ﾠwhat ﾠis ﾠcompared ﾠin ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠsubmission ﾠand ﾠwhat ﾠis ﾠcompared ﾠin ﾠa ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tent ﾠinfringement ﾠlawsuit.227 ﾠUltimately, ﾠ510(k) ﾠrepresents ﾠa ﾠcompletely ﾠseparate ﾠregula-ﾭ‐‑
tory ﾠregime ﾠthan ﾠpatent ﾠlaw, ﾠwith ﾠdifferent ﾠoverall ﾠstandards ﾠbut ﾠsome ﾠconfusingly ﾠsim-ﾭ‐‑
ilar ﾠlanguage.228 ﾠThis ﾠclarification ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠlaw ﾠshould ﾠremove ﾠwhatever ﾠdistortions ﾠexisted ﾠ
for ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturers ﾠdue ﾠto ﾠfears ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠmight ﾠbe ﾠused ﾠagainst ﾠthem. ﾠ
D. ﾠInequitable ﾠConduct ﾠ
 ﾠ 510(k) ﾠapplicants, ﾠespecially ﾠthose ﾠwho ﾠseek ﾠpatents, ﾠare ﾠin ﾠa ﾠdifficult ﾠposition. ﾠ
On ﾠthe ﾠone ﾠhand, ﾠthey ﾠmust ﾠinform ﾠFDA ﾠthat ﾠtheir ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠsimilar ﾠto ﾠexisting ﾠdevic-ﾭ‐‑
es; ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠhand, ﾠthey ﾠassert ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠUSPTO ﾠthat ﾠtheir ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠcompletely ﾠnew ﾠ
                                                 
224 ﾠSee ﾠBuchanan, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ17, ﾠat ﾠ326. ﾠ
225 ﾠSee ﾠInnovative ﾠTherapies, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠKinetic ﾠConcepts, ﾠInc., ﾠ599 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1377, ﾠ1382 ﾠ(Fed. ﾠCir. ﾠ2010). ﾠ
226 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ
227 ﾠSee, ﾠe.g., ﾠCardioVention, ﾠInc. ﾠv. ﾠMedtronic, ﾠInc., ﾠ483 ﾠF. ﾠSupp. ﾠ2d ﾠ830, ﾠ840 ﾠ(D. ﾠMass. ﾠ2007). ﾠ
228 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ ﾠ 48 ﾠ
and ﾠnon-ﾭ‐‑obvious, ﾠin ﾠother ﾠwords, ﾠunlike ﾠanything ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠprior ﾠart.229 ﾠSuch ﾠincongruous ﾠ
behavior ﾠcan ﾠlead ﾠto ﾠan ﾠinequitable ﾠconduct ﾠdefense ﾠif ﾠthat ﾠmanufacturer ﾠlater ﾠasserts ﾠa ﾠ
patent ﾠin ﾠlitigation. ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠ judge-ﾭ‐‑made ﾠ inequitable ﾠ conduct ﾠ defense ﾠ consists ﾠ of ﾠ intentional ﾠ failure ﾠ to ﾠ
disclose ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠUSPTO ﾠmaterial ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠknown ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠapplicant ﾠat ﾠthe ﾠtime ﾠof ﾠ
patent ﾠprosecution.230 ﾠIf ﾠsuccessful, ﾠsuch ﾠa ﾠdefense ﾠrenders ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠunenforceable ﾠand ﾠ
may ﾠmake ﾠattorney ﾠfees ﾠavailable ﾠto ﾠa ﾠdefendant.231 ﾠThis ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠdevastating, ﾠespecially ﾠ
for ﾠan ﾠentity ﾠlike ﾠa ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠstartup, ﾠwhich ﾠmay ﾠhave ﾠone ﾠor ﾠtwo ﾠkey ﾠpatents ﾠthat ﾠ
represent ﾠmuch ﾠor ﾠall ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠtechnological ﾠvalue ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠcompany.232 ﾠ
 ﾠ Medical ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturers ﾠare ﾠat ﾠparticular ﾠrisk ﾠfor ﾠan ﾠinequitable ﾠconduct ﾠ
defense ﾠbecause, ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠFederal ﾠCircuit ﾠheld ﾠin ﾠBruno, ﾠ510(k) ﾠfilings ﾠsubmitted ﾠto ﾠFDA ﾠ
can ﾠdemonstrate ﾠwhat ﾠwas ﾠsubjectively ﾠknown ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠmanufacturer ﾠwhen ﾠit ﾠprosecuted ﾠ
its ﾠpatent.233 ﾠIn ﾠthat ﾠcase, ﾠBruno, ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturer, ﾠsubmitted ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠstairlift, ﾠ
in ﾠwhich ﾠit ﾠdescribed ﾠsimilarities ﾠto ﾠproducts ﾠfrom ﾠanother ﾠcompany.234 ﾠBruno ﾠfiled ﾠits ﾠ
510(k) ﾠafter ﾠits ﾠpatent ﾠapplication ﾠbut ﾠbefore ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠissued, ﾠand ﾠat ﾠno ﾠpoint ﾠdid ﾠBru-ﾭ‐‑
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233 ﾠSee ﾠBruno ﾠIndep. ﾠLiving ﾠAids ﾠv. ﾠAcorn ﾠMobility ﾠServs., ﾠ394 ﾠF.3d ﾠ1348, ﾠ1352 ﾠ(Fed. ﾠCir. ﾠ2005) ﾠ(holding ﾠ
that ﾠa ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠdetermination ﾠcan ﾠsupport ﾠan ﾠinequitable ﾠconduct ﾠfinding). ﾠ
234 ﾠId. ﾠat ﾠ1350. ﾠ ﾠ 49 ﾠ
no ﾠdisclose ﾠits ﾠ510(k) ﾠto ﾠFDA.235 ﾠThe ﾠcase ﾠarose ﾠwhen ﾠBruno ﾠasserted ﾠthis ﾠpatent ﾠagainst ﾠ
a ﾠcompetitor. ﾠDespite ﾠBruno’s ﾠposition ﾠthat ﾠits ﾠ510(k) ﾠwas ﾠonly ﾠrelevant ﾠto ﾠFDA ﾠ(and ﾠ
thus ﾠdid ﾠnot ﾠneed ﾠto ﾠbe ﾠdisclosed ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠUSPTO), ﾠthe ﾠFederal ﾠCircuit ﾠagreed ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
fendant ﾠthat ﾠBruno’s ﾠ510(k) ﾠdemonstrated ﾠknowledge ﾠof ﾠimportant ﾠprior ﾠart ﾠ— ﾠthe ﾠpred-ﾭ‐‑
icate ﾠdevice ﾠ— ﾠthat ﾠit ﾠdid ﾠnot ﾠdisclose.236 ﾠThe ﾠcourt ﾠheld ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠunenforceable ﾠand ﾠ
affirmed ﾠthe ﾠlower ﾠcourt’s ﾠaward ﾠof ﾠattorney ﾠfees ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠdefendant. ﾠ
 ﾠ Lower ﾠcourts ﾠhave ﾠnot ﾠread ﾠBruno ﾠto ﾠmean ﾠthat ﾠnondisclosure ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠUSPTO ﾠof ﾠa ﾠ
510(k) ﾠthat ﾠcites ﾠa ﾠcompeting ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠamounts ﾠto ﾠinequitable ﾠconduct.237 ﾠAfter ﾠ
all, ﾠnot ﾠall ﾠclaims ﾠof ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠare ﾠrelevant ﾠto ﾠpatentability; ﾠmany ﾠpredi-ﾭ‐‑
cate ﾠdevices ﾠlack ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠtechnology ﾠthat ﾠserves ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠbasis ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠand ﾠare ﾠcited ﾠ
only ﾠ for ﾠ their ﾠ functional ﾠ equivalence ﾠ of ﾠ safety ﾠ and ﾠ effectiveness.238 ﾠStill, ﾠ less ﾠ shrewd ﾠ
manufacturers ﾠmust ﾠtread ﾠcarefully ﾠwhen ﾠsubmitting ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠand ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠapplication ﾠ
close ﾠin ﾠtime.239 ﾠThe ﾠfear ﾠof ﾠlosing ﾠpatent ﾠprotection ﾠmakes ﾠ510(k) ﾠa ﾠslightly ﾠmore ﾠperi-ﾭ‐‑
lous ﾠroute ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠthan ﾠa ﾠPMA, ﾠespecially ﾠwhen ﾠa ﾠcompany’s ﾠpatent ﾠattorneys ﾠare ﾠun-ﾭ‐‑
aware ﾠof ﾠfilings ﾠby ﾠits ﾠFDA ﾠcounsel. ﾠ
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238 ﾠSee ﾠRegize, ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ216. ﾠ
239 ﾠSee ﾠid. ﾠ ﾠ 50 ﾠ
E. ﾠThe ﾠDoctrine ﾠof ﾠEquivalents ﾠ
 ﾠ In ﾠan ﾠordinary ﾠpatent ﾠinfringement ﾠcase, ﾠthe ﾠplaintiff ﾠasserts ﾠthat ﾠits ﾠpatent ﾠclaims ﾠ
literally ﾠcover ﾠthe ﾠdefendant’s ﾠproduct ﾠor ﾠactivity.240 ﾠThis ﾠmeans ﾠthat ﾠeach ﾠand ﾠevery ﾠel-ﾭ‐‑
ement ﾠof ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠone ﾠclaim ﾠapplies ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠdefendant’s ﾠproduct ﾠor ﾠactivity.241 ﾠSometimes, ﾠ
however, ﾠthe ﾠdefendant ﾠcomes ﾠvery ﾠclose ﾠto ﾠinfringement, ﾠbut ﾠsomehow ﾠavoids ﾠthe ﾠspe-ﾭ‐‑
cific ﾠ language ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ claims, ﾠ often ﾠ through ﾠ trivial ﾠ design-ﾭ‐‑around ﾠ meant ﾠ precisely ﾠ to ﾠ
avoid ﾠthem. ﾠThe ﾠ“doctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents” ﾠholds ﾠthat ﾠproducts ﾠthat ﾠdo ﾠnot ﾠ“read ﾠliterally ﾠ
on ﾠthe ﾠclaims” ﾠof ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠmay ﾠstill ﾠinfringe ﾠif ﾠthe ﾠdifference ﾠis ﾠinsubstantial.242 ﾠA ﾠcom-ﾭ‐‑
mon ﾠalternative ﾠformulation ﾠis ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠdoctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents ﾠapplies ﾠif ﾠa ﾠproduct ﾠper-ﾭ‐‑
forms ﾠ“substantially ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠfunction, ﾠin ﾠsubstantially ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠway, ﾠto ﾠgive ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠ. ﾠsub-ﾭ‐‑
stantially ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠresult” ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠpatent.243 ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠlanguage ﾠof ﾠsubstantial ﾠequivalence ﾠis ﾠfamiliar ﾠto ﾠus ﾠby ﾠthis ﾠpoint ﾠas ﾠthe ﾠ
standard ﾠused ﾠto ﾠevaluate ﾠ510(k) ﾠapplications. ﾠOf ﾠcourse, ﾠequivalence ﾠfor ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠ
510(k) ﾠis ﾠin ﾠterms ﾠof ﾠfunctional ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness, ﾠyet ﾠequivalence ﾠfor ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠ
the ﾠdoctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents ﾠis ﾠin ﾠterms ﾠof ﾠtechnology. ﾠThe ﾠsimilarities ﾠin ﾠlanguage ﾠnone-ﾭ‐‑
theless ﾠraise ﾠthe ﾠpossibility ﾠof ﾠconflict ﾠbetween ﾠtwo ﾠconcepts ﾠof ﾠequivalence ﾠin ﾠdistinct ﾠ
areas ﾠof ﾠlaw.244 ﾠTo ﾠclaim ﾠpatentability ﾠis ﾠto ﾠclaim ﾠnonequivalence, ﾠand ﾠyet ﾠa ﾠmanufactur-ﾭ‐‑
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242 ﾠBarron ﾠet ﾠal., ﾠsupra ﾠnote ﾠ14, ﾠat ﾠ307. ﾠ
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er ﾠexplicitly ﾠclaims ﾠequivalency ﾠin ﾠa ﾠ510(k).245 ﾠEven ﾠif ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠnot ﾠadmissible ﾠto ﾠprove ﾠ
anticipation, ﾠis ﾠa ﾠstatement ﾠof ﾠequivalence ﾠfor ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠFDA ﾠclearance ﾠadmissible ﾠto ﾠ
prove ﾠequivalence ﾠfor ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠdoctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents? ﾠ ﾠ
It ﾠis ﾠpossible ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠanswer ﾠis ﾠno, ﾠbecause ﾠ510(k) ﾠinvolves ﾠa ﾠcomparison ﾠbe-ﾭ‐‑
tween ﾠproducts ﾠrather ﾠthan ﾠbetween ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠand ﾠa ﾠproduct.246 ﾠOn ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠhand, ﾠthe ﾠ
existence ﾠof ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠmay ﾠamount ﾠto ﾠa ﾠpresumption ﾠof ﾠequivalency ﾠfor ﾠpurposes ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠ
doctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents.247 ﾠ
Courts ﾠhave ﾠgenerally ﾠopined ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠrefers ﾠto ﾠa ﾠdevice ﾠas ﾠa ﾠwhole, ﾠrather ﾠ
than ﾠ each ﾠ element, ﾠ so ﾠ it ﾠ generally ﾠ does ﾠ not ﾠ support ﾠ a ﾠ doctrine ﾠ of ﾠ equivalents ﾠ argu-ﾭ‐‑
ment.248 ﾠThe ﾠcomparison ﾠin ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠholistic; ﾠthe ﾠcomparison ﾠevaluated ﾠin ﾠa ﾠpatent ﾠ
case ﾠis ﾠpiecemeal ﾠand ﾠrooted ﾠin ﾠpatent ﾠclaims. ﾠHowever, ﾠcourts ﾠhave ﾠnot ﾠdefinitively ﾠ
held ﾠthat ﾠa ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠcategorically ﾠinadmissible ﾠfor ﾠdoctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents ﾠpurposes, ﾠun-ﾭ‐‑
like ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠcontext ﾠof ﾠanticipation. ﾠTherefore, ﾠit ﾠremains ﾠtrue ﾠthat ﾠas ﾠcompared ﾠto ﾠother ﾠ
types ﾠof ﾠinventions, ﾠthere ﾠis ﾠsome ﾠrisk ﾠthat ﾠmedical ﾠdevices ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k) ﾠare ﾠ
more ﾠlikely ﾠto ﾠinfringe ﾠon ﾠa ﾠpatent, ﾠbecause ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠprocess ﾠinvolves ﾠa ﾠpossible ﾠad-ﾭ‐‑
mission ﾠof ﾠinfringement ﾠunder ﾠthe ﾠdoctrine ﾠof ﾠequivalents. ﾠThe ﾠuncertainty ﾠalone ﾠmay ﾠ
deter ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠwould ﾠbe ﾠcleared ﾠthrough ﾠ510(k), ﾠwhich ﾠcontravenes ﾠ
one ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠprimary ﾠpurposes ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠpremarket ﾠnotification ﾠprogram. ﾠConversely, ﾠthis ﾠ
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possibility ﾠmay ﾠstrengthen ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠrights ﾠof ﾠearlier ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturers, ﾠ
which ﾠmay ﾠresult ﾠin ﾠhigher ﾠlevels ﾠof ﾠinnovative ﾠactivity ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠindustry ﾠoverall. ﾠ
F. ﾠConceptual ﾠAreas ﾠof ﾠTension ﾠand ﾠ510(k)’s ﾠEffect ﾠon ﾠInnovation ﾠPolicy ﾠ
 ﾠ Most ﾠplainly, ﾠthe ﾠease ﾠof ﾠ510(k) ﾠas ﾠcompared ﾠto ﾠPMA ﾠencourages ﾠthe ﾠdevelop-ﾭ‐‑
ment ﾠof ﾠfamiliar ﾠproducts ﾠwith ﾠfamiliar ﾠintended ﾠuses, ﾠinstead ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠthat ﾠaddress ﾠ
unsolved ﾠhealth ﾠproblems. ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠintended ﾠto ﾠstrike ﾠa ﾠcareful ﾠbalance ﾠbetween ﾠensur-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠthat ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠsafe ﾠand ﾠeffective ﾠand ﾠencouraging ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠ
sector, ﾠbut ﾠit ﾠis ﾠsilent ﾠon ﾠwhich ﾠtypes ﾠof ﾠdevices ﾠare ﾠencouraged.249 ﾠOverall, ﾠit ﾠis ﾠfar ﾠfrom ﾠ
clear ﾠwhether ﾠ510(k) ﾠand ﾠrelated ﾠregulations ﾠhave ﾠa ﾠpositive ﾠor ﾠnegative ﾠeffect ﾠon ﾠinno-ﾭ‐‑
vation ﾠbecause ﾠit ﾠis ﾠtoo ﾠdifficult ﾠto ﾠdisentangle ﾠdevice ﾠtypes ﾠand ﾠhow ﾠinnovation ﾠshould ﾠ
be ﾠmeasured ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠcontext.250 ﾠWhen ﾠit ﾠcomes ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠintersection ﾠbetween ﾠ510(k) ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠ
patent ﾠsystem, ﾠwe ﾠshould ﾠnote ﾠthat ﾠonly ﾠ15% ﾠof ﾠall ﾠ510(k) ﾠapplications ﾠare ﾠfor ﾠdevices ﾠ
with ﾠnew ﾠtechnological ﾠcharacteristics ﾠof ﾠany ﾠkind.251 ﾠIt ﾠis ﾠto ﾠthese ﾠdevices ﾠand ﾠthose ﾠ
subject ﾠto ﾠPMA ﾠthat ﾠour ﾠanalysis ﾠturns. ﾠ
 ﾠ A ﾠcommon ﾠquestion ﾠin ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠtheory ﾠis ﾠwhether ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠsystem ﾠ— ﾠour ﾠle-ﾭ‐‑
gal ﾠimplementation ﾠof ﾠinnovation ﾠpolicy ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠusual ﾠmechanism ﾠfor ﾠencouraging ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
novation ﾠ— ﾠstrikes ﾠthe ﾠoptimal ﾠbalance ﾠbetween ﾠbringing ﾠnew ﾠtechnology ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠpublic ﾠ
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through ﾠ the ﾠ promotion ﾠ of ﾠ innovation, ﾠ and ﾠ ensuring ﾠ that ﾠ new ﾠ technology ﾠ is ﾠ widely ﾠ
available ﾠat ﾠa ﾠreasonable ﾠprice.252 ﾠOverbroad ﾠpatent ﾠprotection ﾠcan ﾠstifle ﾠinnovation ﾠand ﾠ
dissemination ﾠby ﾠreducing ﾠopportunities ﾠfor ﾠfollow-ﾭ‐‑on ﾠinnovation.253 ﾠThis ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠpar-ﾭ‐‑
ticularly ﾠhazardous ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠarea ﾠof ﾠmedical ﾠdevices, ﾠwhere ﾠthe ﾠvast ﾠmajority ﾠexplicitly ﾠ
claim ﾠinspiration ﾠfrom ﾠan ﾠearlier ﾠdevice ﾠin ﾠtheir ﾠ510(k) ﾠapplications. ﾠEven ﾠthough ﾠim-ﾭ‐‑
provements ﾠto ﾠexisting ﾠdevices ﾠcan ﾠthemselves ﾠbe ﾠpatent-ﾭ‐‑eligible, ﾠthose ﾠpatent ﾠrights ﾠare ﾠ
often ﾠ subservient ﾠ to ﾠ the ﾠ “blocking ﾠ patents” ﾠ covering ﾠ an ﾠ earlier ﾠ product.254 ﾠIn ﾠ other ﾠ
words, ﾠa ﾠmanufacturer ﾠmay ﾠneed ﾠseveral ﾠlicenses ﾠto ﾠmarket ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice, ﾠeven ﾠif ﾠthat ﾠ
manufacturer ﾠ obtained ﾠ patent ﾠ protection ﾠ for ﾠ the ﾠ improvements ﾠ that ﾠ are ﾠ the ﾠ device’s ﾠ
selling ﾠpoint.255 ﾠDespite ﾠthe ﾠfact ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠ510(k) ﾠsystem ﾠwas ﾠessentially ﾠdesigned ﾠfor ﾠim-ﾭ‐‑
provements ﾠon ﾠexisting ﾠdevices, ﾠand ﾠthat ﾠthe ﾠSpecial ﾠ510(k) ﾠmechanism ﾠexpedites ﾠthe ﾠ
process ﾠof ﾠclearing ﾠimproved ﾠdevices ﾠfor ﾠmarketing,256 ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠsystem ﾠcould ﾠbe ﾠharm-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠthis ﾠarea.257 ﾠ
 ﾠ There ﾠis, ﾠof ﾠcourse, ﾠa ﾠdifference ﾠfrom ﾠa ﾠpublic ﾠpolicy ﾠperspective ﾠbetween ﾠintro-ﾭ‐‑
ducing ﾠan ﾠimprovement ﾠand ﾠbuilding ﾠa ﾠwholly ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠthat ﾠsolves ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠproblem. ﾠ
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While ﾠa ﾠnew ﾠdevice ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠmarketable ﾠwithout ﾠthe ﾠneed ﾠto ﾠobtain ﾠpatent ﾠlicenses ﾠfrom ﾠ
others, ﾠit ﾠis ﾠdifficult ﾠfor ﾠnew ﾠtechnology ﾠto ﾠcompete ﾠin ﾠa ﾠsystem ﾠin ﾠwhich ﾠold ﾠtechnology ﾠ
(or ﾠimprovements ﾠon ﾠit) ﾠcan ﾠovercome ﾠFDA ﾠregulatory ﾠbarriers ﾠmuch ﾠmore ﾠrapidly.258 ﾠ
Patents ﾠtypically ﾠraise ﾠbarriers ﾠto ﾠentry ﾠfor ﾠcompetitors ﾠby ﾠerecting ﾠmonopolies, ﾠbut ﾠin ﾠ
the ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠindustry, ﾠthe ﾠneed ﾠfor ﾠFDA ﾠclearance ﾠor ﾠapproval ﾠcan ﾠcreate ﾠits ﾠown ﾠ
kind ﾠof ﾠbarriers ﾠthat ﾠprevent ﾠmarket ﾠentry.259 ﾠThese ﾠobstacles, ﾠunfortunately, ﾠincrease ﾠas ﾠ
a ﾠdevice’s ﾠunfamiliarity ﾠand ﾠnovelty ﾠincrease. ﾠUltimately, ﾠmanufacturers ﾠwho ﾠwish ﾠto ﾠ
engage ﾠin ﾠdisruptive ﾠinnovation ﾠwill ﾠbe ﾠdeterred ﾠby ﾠthe ﾠincentive ﾠstructure ﾠthat ﾠnudges ﾠ
them ﾠtoward ﾠmarginal ﾠadvances ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠart.260 ﾠThis ﾠwill ﾠremain ﾠthe ﾠcase ﾠexcept ﾠwhere ﾠ
revolutionary ﾠdevice ﾠpioneers ﾠare ﾠsufficiently ﾠprofit-ﾭ‐‑motivated ﾠto ﾠendure ﾠthe ﾠPMA ﾠpro-ﾭ‐‑
cess.261 ﾠ
 ﾠ Venture ﾠ capital ﾠ is ﾠ of ﾠ paramount ﾠ importance ﾠ to ﾠ any ﾠ discussion ﾠ of ﾠ new ﾠ device ﾠ
generation, ﾠsince ﾠthe ﾠrelative ﾠamount ﾠof ﾠVC ﾠmoney ﾠin ﾠany ﾠfield ﾠroughly ﾠreflects ﾠthe ﾠ
amount ﾠof ﾠinnovation ﾠin ﾠthat ﾠfield.262 ﾠThis ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠthe ﾠcase ﾠbecause ﾠventure ﾠfunding, ﾠas ﾠa ﾠ
descriptive ﾠmatter, ﾠis ﾠthree ﾠtimes ﾠmore ﾠeffective ﾠper ﾠdollar ﾠin ﾠproducing ﾠpatentable ﾠin-ﾭ‐‑
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ventions ﾠthan ﾠis ﾠtraditional ﾠcorporate ﾠresearch ﾠand ﾠdevelopment, ﾠpatents ﾠthemselves ﾠ
being ﾠa ﾠvery ﾠgood ﾠproxy ﾠfor ﾠinnovation.263 ﾠIn ﾠaddition ﾠto ﾠMedicare ﾠreimbursements, ﾠthe ﾠ
two ﾠlegal ﾠconstraints ﾠthat ﾠVCs ﾠcare ﾠdesperately ﾠabout ﾠare ﾠthe ﾠpatent ﾠlandscape ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠ
efficiency ﾠof ﾠFDA ﾠreview.264 ﾠPatent ﾠprotection ﾠis ﾠabsolutely ﾠessential ﾠto ﾠacquiring ﾠnew ﾠ
venture ﾠfunding ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠindustry,265 ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠform ﾠand ﾠoutcome ﾠof ﾠFDA ﾠ
review ﾠgreatly ﾠaffects ﾠa ﾠstartup ﾠcompany’s ﾠexit ﾠstrategy.266 ﾠThe ﾠrelationship ﾠbetween ﾠpa-ﾭ‐‑
tents ﾠand ﾠ510(k) ﾠis ﾠtherefore ﾠof ﾠutmost ﾠimportance ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠsource ﾠof ﾠfunding ﾠfor ﾠmany ﾠ
new ﾠmedical ﾠdevices. ﾠ
 ﾠ The ﾠVC ﾠcommunity, ﾠunsurprisingly, ﾠtakes ﾠthe ﾠposition ﾠthat ﾠFDA ﾠreview ﾠought ﾠto ﾠ
be ﾠ thinner, ﾠ particularly ﾠ for ﾠ revolutionary ﾠ devices, ﾠ most ﾠ of ﾠ which ﾠ are ﾠ developed ﾠ by ﾠ
small, ﾠ venture-ﾭ‐‑backed ﾠ companies.267 ﾠWhile ﾠ the ﾠ 510(k) ﾠ system ﾠ is ﾠ useful ﾠ for ﾠ “routine” ﾠ
products ﾠ(and ﾠencouraging ﾠof ﾠthem), ﾠtruly ﾠrevolutionary ﾠadvances ﾠare ﾠunfairly ﾠtaxed ﾠby ﾠ
the ﾠ requirement ﾠ that ﾠ they ﾠ undergo ﾠ PMA.268 ﾠVCs ﾠ perceive ﾠ FDA’s ﾠ risk ﾠ aversion ﾠ to ﾠ be ﾠ
harmfully ﾠimpacting ﾠinnovation ﾠand ﾠdevelopment ﾠin ﾠmedical ﾠdevices.269 ﾠFrom ﾠtheir ﾠper-ﾭ‐‑
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spective, ﾠthe ﾠFDA ﾠregulatory ﾠsystem ﾠis ﾠ“broken” ﾠin ﾠits ﾠtreatment ﾠof ﾠnovel ﾠmedical ﾠde-ﾭ‐‑
vices ﾠand ﾠa ﾠrevised ﾠprocess ﾠis ﾠneeded ﾠfor ﾠapproval ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠtechnology.270 ﾠ
 ﾠ This ﾠtake ﾠon ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠregulation ﾠis ﾠin ﾠsome ﾠtension ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠneed ﾠto ﾠensure ﾠ
safety ﾠof ﾠtruly ﾠnovel ﾠdevices, ﾠeven ﾠthough ﾠno ﾠone ﾠdisputes ﾠthat ﾠpromoting ﾠthe ﾠdevel-ﾭ‐‑
opment ﾠof ﾠsuch ﾠdevices ﾠis ﾠgenerally ﾠdesirable. ﾠDespite ﾠthe ﾠcries ﾠof ﾠVCs ﾠagainst ﾠoverreg-ﾭ‐‑
ulation ﾠby ﾠFDA, ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠone ﾠacademic ﾠhas ﾠadvanced ﾠthe ﾠargument ﾠthat ﾠvigorous ﾠregula-ﾭ‐‑
tion ﾠmight ﾠbe ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠlong-ﾭ‐‑term ﾠinterest ﾠof ﾠVCs ﾠand ﾠinnovators.271 ﾠEven ﾠthough ﾠit ﾠmay ﾠ
seem ﾠthat ﾠregulation ﾠincreases ﾠcosts, ﾠit ﾠmay ﾠbe ﾠthat ﾠover ﾠtime, ﾠpatents ﾠand ﾠregulation ﾠ
work ﾠtogether ﾠto ﾠincrease ﾠand ﾠprotect ﾠprofits.272 ﾠAfter ﾠall, ﾠincreased ﾠregulatory ﾠhurdles, ﾠ
alongside ﾠpatent ﾠprotection, ﾠalso ﾠincrease ﾠbarriers ﾠto ﾠentry ﾠfor ﾠcompetitors.273 ﾠFor ﾠtruly ﾠ
new ﾠdevices, ﾠthen, ﾠthe ﾠexistence ﾠof ﾠPMA ﾠas ﾠa ﾠlater ﾠbarrier ﾠto ﾠinnovation ﾠmay ﾠencourage ﾠ
innovation ﾠwhen ﾠfeasible ﾠfor ﾠa ﾠpioneer. ﾠAt ﾠthe ﾠsame ﾠtime, ﾠa ﾠrobust ﾠregulatory ﾠsystem ﾠ
that ﾠensures ﾠsafety ﾠand ﾠeffectiveness ﾠmay ﾠincrease ﾠpublic ﾠand ﾠphysician ﾠconfidence ﾠin ﾠ
medical ﾠdevices, ﾠlubricating ﾠnew ﾠdevices’ ﾠgeneral ﾠacceptance ﾠin ﾠthe ﾠmarket ﾠand ﾠincreas-ﾭ‐‑
ing ﾠrevenues ﾠfor ﾠall ﾠdevice ﾠmanufacturers. ﾠ
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V. ﾠCONCLUSION ﾠ
 ﾠ Ultimately, ﾠ medical ﾠ device ﾠ regulation, ﾠ and ﾠ 510(k) ﾠ in ﾠ particular, ﾠ represents ﾠ a ﾠ
tradeoff ﾠbetween ﾠpermitting ﾠthe ﾠexpedient ﾠintroduction ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠand ﾠpreserving ﾠ
the ﾠFDCA’s ﾠprotections ﾠof ﾠpublic ﾠhealth. ﾠThese ﾠobjectives ﾠare ﾠfrequently ﾠin ﾠconflict, ﾠand ﾠ
the ﾠconfusion ﾠis ﾠgreatly ﾠexacerbated ﾠwhen ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠregulation ﾠintersects ﾠwith ﾠthe ﾠ
patent ﾠsystem, ﾠwhich ﾠis ﾠour ﾠusual ﾠmechanism ﾠfor ﾠpromoting ﾠinnovation. ﾠUltimately, ﾠit ﾠ
is ﾠimpossible ﾠto ﾠsay ﾠwhether ﾠthese ﾠconflicts ﾠare ﾠadequately ﾠresolved ﾠby ﾠlegislation ﾠor ﾠ
case ﾠlaw ﾠor ﾠwhether ﾠthey ﾠhave ﾠa ﾠmajor ﾠdistorting ﾠor ﾠchilling ﾠeffect ﾠon ﾠinnovation. ﾠIt ﾠis ﾠ
even ﾠdifficult ﾠto ﾠassess ﾠwhether ﾠ510(k) ﾠsucceeds ﾠin ﾠeither ﾠliberally ﾠpermitting ﾠthe ﾠintro-ﾭ‐‑
duction ﾠof ﾠnew ﾠdevices ﾠor ﾠensuring ﾠthat ﾠthey ﾠare ﾠsafe ﾠand ﾠeffective. ﾠWhat ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠsaid ﾠis ﾠ
that ﾠthe ﾠByzantine ﾠregulatory ﾠsystem ﾠand ﾠthe ﾠintricate ﾠpatent ﾠlaw ﾠare ﾠboth ﾠextremely ﾠ
important ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠmedical ﾠdevice ﾠindustry ﾠand ﾠto ﾠthe ﾠmillions ﾠof ﾠpeople ﾠwho ﾠbenefit ﾠfrom ﾠ
outstanding ﾠdevices. ﾠThe ﾠintersection ﾠbetween ﾠthe ﾠtwo ﾠis ﾠno ﾠless ﾠcomplex, ﾠand ﾠno ﾠless ﾠ
important. ﾠ